Opinion: Another Revolution Is Expected in Moldova?

Anton SHVEC The economy and population exhausted by the lockdown, never-ending political crisis and defiantly unprincipled Moldovan politicians create a pre-revolutionary situation in the country. External forces can again take the occasion to redraw the political landscape of the republic in their interests The previous week was marked by the next stage in the split of Moldovan parliamentary factions. Five more elected representatives broke away from the Democratic Party. Ruxanda Glavan, the former Minister of Health and the spouse of the Vice Governor of the National Bank of the Republic of Moldova, Aureliu Cincilei, who is currently under house arrest, joined the Pro Moldova faction formed by Andrian Candu and Vladimir Cebotari. Ex-democrat Oleg Sirbu followed the same route. Deputies Vladimir Vitiuc and Violeta Ivanov surprised with their accession to the Shor party faction. Both parliamentary groups take a radical anti-government position. Another former Democrat, Elena Bacalu, has not yet decided on her factional affiliation, but in any case she no longer belongs to the parliamentary majority, which has shrunk to 54 seats. The progressive split within the Moldovan political field will  basically erode the foundations of the ruling coalition composed of the socialist and democratic parties. Accordingly, Ion Chicu's technocratic government receives less and less support from the legislature and is increasingly limited in the tools for implementing domestic and foreign policy, including in measures to support the public and business in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic. In particular, the opposition managed, at least temporarily, to prevent the government of the Republic of Moldova from receiving a 200 million euro Russian loan. Following the council meeting of its remaining deputies, the Democratic Party made  a statement of full trust in the current government led by Ion Chicu, which gives some hope for the present parliamentary majority to endure. However, the destruction process of the existing factions in the Moldovan legislative body does not seem to be completed. Because the initial distribution of seats in the parliament did not objectively reflect the whole palette of political preferences of both the Moldovan citizens and external partners, who expressly support  certain political projects in Moldova. Under these conditions, party blocs sitting in the Moldovan Parliament will predictably continue to erode. Obviously, certain external forces are also aimed at this. A vote of no confidence in the current government can unite parliamentarians with diverse political ambitions and platforms only for a while. If the government of Ion Chicu falls at a time when it is necessary to take vigorous measures to overcome the crisis provoked by the pandemic, the massive return of labor migrants and a poor yield, the integrity of the socialist faction will also be in doubt. Now political experts and commentators are considering various coalition life scenarios of the current parliament, but none of the analyzed structures looks like reliable and effectively managed. That is, in any case, the political chaos of Moldova will deepen. Moreover, there are no objective internal prerequisites for a false start to the struggle for power. There was no particular reason to break the coalition of pro-European forces and socialists. Similarly, there is no state need to overthrow the government of Ion Chicu before the presidential election. However, political upheavals are taking place in Moldova non-stop, despite any global challenges which in other countries commonly foster social consolidation. The seats in the parliament of the Republic of Moldova have long turned into a kind of product: someone immediately runs from one faction to another, someone prefers to study all the options available first, but the core of public policy in Moldova is the same and has nothing to do with ideology and values. It is all about Moldovan politicians who in their constant switchovers for corrupt and unprincipled reasons completely forgot about the interests of voters, ordinary citizens of Moldova. They quit being the vox populi long ago. The pandemic is projected  to result in a colossal decline in GDP globally. Moldova will be affected by the crisis no less than other European countries. And at the same time, it will not be able to steer as huge amounts of free money to support citizens and businesses as the governments of the EU countries and the European Commission do. To employ the returned migrants who have lost their jobs in the EU countries may be particularly difficult. Besides, while in Europe, they got accustomed to a certain level of well-being and political freedom. The fact that political turmoil impedes the use of all available credit resources will become an additional annoying factor for the embittered and destitute population. To launch an economy without significant monetary incentives through foreign loans will not help. Thus, we can talk about imminent economic prerequisites for the pre-revolutionary situation in Moldova, topped up by irresistible political chaos provoked by the corruption and incompetence of the Moldovan political class. Given the fact that the republic is traditionally at the crossroads of geopolitical interests of several centers of power at once, the temptation of the next external intervention in order to reshape internal political dispositions in Moldova increases many-fold. And to exclude a new revolutionary turn in the history of Moldova would be reckless. Sooner or later, endless internal and external cataclysms can lead to either the destruction of the Moldovan statehood, or creation of a completely external-controlled artificial structure in the place where there was a country called “the Republic of Moldova”. And solely Moldovan politicians who continue to openly use their posts and statuses for exclusively personal purposes will be to blame.