Opinion: What Is the Candu-Shor Group Indeed Pushing For?

Sergiu CEBAN The Candu-Shor group attacking the president and the ruling coalition seeks to use the pro-European opposition from the ACUM bloc to implement its financial interests  Last week’s events in the country once again highlighted the difficult situation of the current Ion Chicu government, whose chances to remain in power are far from one hundred percent. The opposition continues its diverse pressures, seeking to make it look like a widespread dissatisfaction with the cabinet using traditional methods, including mass protests and pickets of certain social groups. A good example is yesterday’s rally of veterans of the Transdniestrian conflict, where the declared agenda (social security and support for combatants) quickly fell into the shadow of high-profile political demands for the resignation of the president and government, as well as early parliamentary elections. Meanwhile, it is important to understand that the goals of various opposition groups vary significantly, which does not allow them to stand together against the current leadership of the country. For example, for the ACUM bloc, judging by the broadcast statements, the priority is not so much to completely "wipe out" the Chicu government, as to form a new so-called technocratic cabinet, though now already controlled by the opposition bloc leaders. However, at this stage it is too early to talk about the readiness of Maia Sandu and Andrei Nastase to implement such plans together with a motley deputy company with a dubious reputation in the Adrian Candu and Ilan Shor groups. Moldovan practice shows that “monstrous” political coalitions are quite possible, and even temporarily successful, but remarkably short-lived and fraught with serious costs for all participants. The cooperation of the pro-European opposition, well-trained and actively supported by the West, with democratic "secessionists" and a party named after one once successful businessman, is expected to negatively affect the electoral positions of the ACUM bloc leaders. Politicians have to think three times whether it should get into a situation where “the tail is wagging the dog,” bringing about many risks and hard-to-predict turns, for the sake of tactical goals through unseating the Chicu government. In addition, the weighty word remains with external development partners, who, apparently, are in no hurry to consolidate all the administered opposition forces under a single flag. Along with this, the fact that the Candu-Shor group has become the main driver of the anti-government mainstream at the current stage is becoming more and more obvious. By the way, it pursues much more pragmatic goals (the Chisinau airport, which the Chicu government is actively trying to return to state ownership; control over the country's banking system), which hardly coincide with the ideals of the pro-European opposition. Therefore, the source of the most active measures to weaken the government is by no means the ACUM bloc, which is more responsive to processes, trying to blow up political "sparks" to the best of its ability. In this regard, over the past week there has been a steady feeling that active attempts are made to involve the pro-European tandem in the implementation of someone’s agenda. In this sense, Maia Sandu’s endeavors to seize the initiative and complicate the political equation, offering to enter into coalition negotiations of the Democratic Party and flatly refusing to cooperate with the I. Shor faction, are quite understandable. Meanwhile, the pressure on the authorities through enticing deputies and pursuing the potential destruction of the ruling majority put by the forces behind the Candu-Shor project seems to be aimed at pushing Igor Dodon to review his approaches and concede on a number of key issues. It is obvious that until June 2019, the Moldovan president, whose powers were constrained by numerous restrictions (both constitutional and “regime”), was a much more convenient political figure for influential financial and political groups in Moldova. However, the desire of the head of state to be more independent after an influential oligarch was expelled adversely affected the interests of many "bosses" of the Democratic Party, who, apparently, decided to "shake" the head of state in such a way, forcing him to a more compromise behavior. In this sense, Maia Sandu’s fears about the viability of forming a government by the Candu-Shor group’s votes are fully justified, as political partnership and dependence on these forces, as experience shows, can lead to the most unpleasant consequences. However, one should not exclude the resignation of the current government if blackmailing Igor Dodon and attacks on the ruling coalition continue. Already this week, we can expect a vote of no confidence in the current Cabinet, which is able to push the main political players to more decisive and concrete actions to reconfigure the parliamentary majority. There is a very real possibility that all opposition forces in parliament will coherently vote without building a political coalition. Such a conjunctural consolidation of efforts of temporary political satellites will inflict a tangible blow on the coalition of socialists and democrats, but are unlikely to form a capable government of real technocratic professionals. However, the opposition is unlikely to set such an ambitious goal - the presidential election is just around the corner, and it would be suicide to take all responsibility for a country with ongoing pandemic, political and economic crisis and other “fun”. The question remains open: will the ACUM bloc leaders bow to the Candu-Shor group that launched the signal “rocket” and will this signal push to a political “false start” in the context of the main election marathon?