Foggy Negotiations Prospects between Chisinau and Tiraspol

Sergiu CEBAN During the epidemic, relations between the two banks of the Dniester continued to rapidly deteriorate, however, one should not expect radical changes in the negotiation process in the near future Chisinau and Tiraspol are gradually getting out of quarantine trying to start the usual course of life after overcome the peak of pandemic with fairly equal incidence rates. However, political relations between the parties remain at least cold. Moreover, to the surprise of many, these very relations got even pretty bad no matter quarantine and the fight against COVID-19. Stubborn facts indicate that the dialogue between the two banks has practically come to naught (meetings of industry experts have not been held for more than two months to this day). Any meetings or online conversations of political representatives are also not mentioned in open sources. On the other hand, negotiators are increasingly exchanging, tough accusatory, attacks on official departmental resources, thereby confirming that the relationship nature has reached an extremely low level. Nevertheless, today after a long pause in the expert work, a working meeting of specialists on customs issues took place and that seems to be the result of a difficult compromise. There is every reason to believe that it was achieved not without international mediators, since convincing the parties to finally return to working out problem areas is perhaps one of the main operational tasks for all participants in the “5 + 2” format. While Moldova is largely inertia working with the left bank, according to experts, objective factors, primarily domestic political order, will reduce its attention to the region. The deep socio-economic crisis, burdened by an acute financial resources’ shortage, especially after the Russian credit line failure, will inevitably make Chisinau concentrate on its internal problems. In this regard, at least until the end of this year, the banks of the Dniester will continue to live in conditional self-isolation, overcoming all the negative consequences of the epidemic on their own. Another significant factor will be presidential elections in Moldova which are expected to become this year’s central political event in the country. Steady preparations for them within internal political dimension are already taking place these days, as evidenced by the resonant media scandals around the incumbent head of state and criminal cases initiated against his opponents. Against this background, all the actions of Moldovan politicians in the remaining five-plus months, including on the negotiation track, will also be most carefully examined under an electoral prism, which means that any breakthrough or unpredictable storylines in relations between Chisinau and Tiraspol can hardly be expected. To date, the negotiating parties seem to have two most acute problems. Chisinau is seriously concerned with Tiraspol’s additional posts and mobile patrols along the actual demarcation line in Bender and Dubossar district placed to clearly indicate the territorial signs of its subjectivity. It is easy to admit the likelihood that left-bank authorities will be tempted to maintain a tightened control regime for actual territorial demarcation. Transdniestria’s ongoing concern is the issue of launching the second phase of joint control, postponed by the Moldovan government until August 1, given regular scandals surrounding imports during the pandemic, coupled with Ukraine’s closed border. Meanwhile, the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine recently decided to restore functioning of checkpoints on the border with a number of countries, including Moldova, and it is not yet clear whether there is a central Transdniestrian section on this list. Lacking explicit attention or public comments from the international community gives the feeling that it is far from being strongly interested in increasing the dynamics around the Transdniestrian settlement. Apparently, the key external players are now also focused on domestic political plots in Moldova, as well as the outcome of the next political crisis in the republic. It is obvious that the results of these processes (including in terms of the balance of power of the main international players in the Republic of Moldova) will determine which route the negotiation process between Moldova and Transdniestria will follow in the future.