What Is the Future of Moldova-Ukraine Relations?

Sergiu CHEBAN Over a number of years, tactical interests of Chisinau and Kiev have coincided. However, the inevitable intersection of national interests will one way or another force the countries to proceed without regard to each other. Relations between the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine have a complicated history, full of contradictions, individual episodes of which will see the light and become the property of citizens and relevant specialists only in due course. Despite Kiev’s complete disregard for the Moldovan president, relations between the two countries started to gather momentum as far back as after 2014 and remain at a fairly high level, especially after Ukraine has reconsidered its role in the Transdniestrian settlement. Last year’s presidential and parliamentary elections in Ukraine became landmark. Their results were perceived by the pro-western Moldovan elites as an inspiring example of the fact that a generation of young talented managers can comprehensively reboot the entire system of state institutions overnight. Objectively speaking, this is exactly what Moldova lacks for the final implementation of the anti-oligarchic project. Unlike Chisinau politicians, the majority of Moldovan citizens prefers Russian media and has sufficient access to them. This seriously affects the perception by the Moldovan population of the domestic political situation in neighboring Ukraine. First of all, it should be noted that, according to sociologists, neither of the issues of principle for Kiev (eg., the situation in the east of the country and around Crimea, joining NATO, etc.) meets any absolute support from the residents of Moldova, who traditionally hold the position on the need to maneuver between the interests of Moscow and the West. Meanwhile, some deeply patriotic Moldavian experts believe that the current situation in Donbas is a fair retribution to Ukraine. As though Kiev was heavily indebted to Moldova for all the years of a neutral position on the Transdniestrian settlement and insufficient support for the territorial integrity of the Moldovan neighbor at a time when Chisinau needed it. For all the specificity of conventional perceptions in Chisinau, Ukraine, one way or another, remains a regional stakeholder, whose stance strongly influences not only the fate of a single Moldovan state, but also many processes on the European continent. At times, Moldovan politicians still notice that Kiev is not quite serious about the interests of the younger partner and attempts to impose their views. Ukraine positions itself rather as a mentor of Moldova than an equal subject in bilateral relations. A striking example is Kiev’s ongoing tough stance on the construction of hydropower plants on the Nistru, contrary to the Moldovan authorities’ opinion and environmentalists’ discontent. An important component of the political dialogue between Chisinau and Kiev is the security sector and, in particular, close border cooperation on the central Transdniestrian section of the Moldovan-Ukrainian border. Many expected that the new Ukrainian president, Volodymyr Zelensky, would continue a solid line to strengthen control over the Transdniestrian region. However, in all likelihood, the fundamental approaches of the Ukrainian and Moldovan leadership, chosen back in 2014, started to get stuck noticeably. At that, Tiraspol calls on Kiev more and more often to return to a more balanced and impartial position in the negotiation process. Nevertheless, Chisinau still has particular hopes for Kiev, including in the joint efforts to confront possible external imposition of a solution to the Transdniestrian conflict. Obviously, the chosen model for resolving the Transdniestrian problem will have an indirect effect on the prospects for a settlement in Donbas. As experience shows, Ukraine has the necessary civil and political potential and is able to mobilize society to defend its national interests and keep Ukrainian politicians within the “red lines” – as it was, for example, in an attempt to impose the controversial Steinmeier formula on Kiev. At the same time, time impacts any forms and their contents. In this sense, experts express the opinion that the tactical coincidence of the interests of Chisinau and Kiev at the current historical stage is in any case temporary. States that are in different “weight categories” in terms of international political perception, despite even their neighborhood, will sooner or later face circumstances that will force politicians to act primarily in the interests of their country. At the same time, Kiev obviously has much more of them in the Northern Black Sea region. The change in the place and status of Ukraine in international affairs is becoming more and more noticeable. Before the 2014 events, Washington and Brussels tried not to look into the details and tackled Moldova and Ukraine in a kind of a single package when dealing with support and promotion of the European integration potential. At present, the Ukrainian dossier has become almost dominant in the Eastern European agenda, and Chisinau, due to a number of circumstances, is rapidly losing its position in terms of perception from the main international partners. The long-standing lack of stability in the political life of Moldova did not contribute to strengthening the country’s position either in the system of bilateral relations with its eastern neighbor, or on the international stage as a whole. Obviously, it is time for the Moldovan establishment to think about the strategy for returning the interests of its Western partners into orbit and work to align the imbalances in the agenda with Ukraine.