Presidential Race in Moldova: What It Will Be Like?

Sergey CHEBAN The presidential race in Moldova this fall is going to be very hot. The major candidates have already started shaping their electoral programs Last Friday Igor Dodon held a three-hour press conference at his residence, summing up the results of the first six months and carefully outlining the internal political developments this fall. Most experts and politicians took note of several suggestive statements by the Moldovan leader, allowing some conclusions regarding the tactics of the president and the current parliamentary majority for the next period. Given the abundance of statements in media space about the need to renew the current composition of parliament (primarily to purge it of the oligarchic influence), this task seems to be very difficult. Obviously, only the socialists and the Sandu-led PAS are one way or another ready to dissolve the legislature. Other political forces, including the coalition teammates, Pavel Philip’s democrats, are worried about such a prospective, and perhaps even frightened. Therefore, the firm intention of the head of state to early dissolve the parliament is perceived by many from electoral prism rather than as an action plan agreed with the Democratic Party partners. The latter, by the way, will wait for the prime minister or speaker of parliament posts after the presidential campaign, as stated in the coalition agreement. As you know, under the current legislation, to dissolve the Moldovan parliament, the head of state must have at his disposal several grounds: the resignation of the government and failure to appoint a new one within 45 days, or the impossibility of parliamentary legislative activity in the course of 3 months. Therefore, if Dodon wins, in order to maintain the status quo, he will most likely be forced to abandon the idea of ​​early elections and ensure the interests of his current political partners. Otherwise, there is a great chance to push them to seek “salvation from dissolution” in other coalition formats and quasi-unions. Igor Dodon’s comments on the possible postponement of the presidential elections until 2021 if the epidemiological situation worsens sounded somewhat provocative. Experts admit that in doing so Dodon sought to probe the opposition’s reaction (and its foreign mentors). However, this option cannot be completely ruled out, especially if the situation develops according to an uncontrollable scenario, which can advantageous for the opposition candidate to ensure his/her guaranteed victory. Nevertheless, everyone seems to rely upon a coordinated political calendar so far, and the electoral context is being shaped at an accelerated pace. The totality of factors allows assuming that the current government, in partnership with the PDM, by nominating an alternative Democratic candidate and neutralizing Renato Usatii as the main left-flank rival, will try to ensure Igor Dodon’ victory in the first round. Maia Sandu may have real chances for the presidency only in the second round, primarily due to disunity in the right flank. Declarations voiced constantly both by the authorities and the opposition leaders on possible widespread protests during the presidential elections also come under notice. There are opinions that several tentative waves of popular indignation were planned for July-August, as evidenced by the rallies of the veterans of the Transdniestrian conflict. The latter were formally launched to oppose Tiraspol’s illegal posts in the Security Zone, but quickly evolved into anti-government actions with a long list of political demands. However, the traditionally low socio-political activity of citizens in the summer period, as well as a number of concomitant factors, apparently forced the opposition forces to refine their plans and postpone truly large-scale protests until the autumn period closer to the presidential race. Unlike his main opponent, Maia Sandu, who has already announced her intentions to compete for the presidency, the incumbent head of state seems to be planning more careful preparations of his election program charging it with some “special meaning”. During the aforementioned press conference, Igor Dodon repeatedly hinted that the new presidential term should be devoted to some landmark event - for example, the Transdniestrian resolution - and ideologists of his campaign headquarters apparently plan to elevate the second presidential term to the category of almost “the last chance for the country’s reunification”. Perhaps this is the key discrepancy between the main candidates. Maia Sandu and her colleagues on the right flank mainly aim at strengthening the state and its institutions with a clear foreign policy vector, and only time will define the place of the left bank in the strong national political system. Igor Dodon, in turn, expects to unite both Nistru banks into a common national space as soon as possible and decide on its fate later on. Tomorrow, literally, we will see if the words of the Moldovan leadership really have an intrigue, and whether the near future will open real prospects for serious agreements with Tiraspol. Otherwise, as has happened more than once, the dusty folder with the Transdniestrian dossier will again be used exclusively in the electoral context.