Moldovan Opposition’s Autumn Dilemma

Sergiu CHEBAN Moldova’s opposition forces are facing a tough choice: seizing power ahead of elections is risky, but leaving it in the ruling coalition’s hands is fraught with further administrative tricks and traps The vigorous prelude to the new political season in Moldova, launched back in spring, has dragged on for far too long, and is already running out of steam. Opposition-made attempts to declare a vote of no confidence in the Chicu-led government turned into an emotional “letting off steam”, and the struggle itself devolved into sluggish positional “skirmishes” with cross-visits to the troubled Moldovan fields, regular complaints to the prosecutor’s office and routine demonstrations. A voter has noticeably grown weary of all this holy mess – coronaviruses and motley politicians, and notably, people seem to be mostly bored with the latter. In the fall, however, the pre-election struggle is sure to completely absorb everyone, turning, through the efforts of propagandists and political strategists, into the main life-or-death matter for the whole country, which, in general, has happened more than once. In this regard, one can expect an increase in the confrontation degree both between the major candidates and the political forces standing behind them. After an unsuccessful vote of no confidence in the government, opposition parties seem to have focused on daily methodical blows on the current government, headed by the president, who, according to their plan, should bear personal responsibility for domestic situation until the moment of his defeat in the elections. Whether this method of weakening Igor Dodon’s positions will turn out to be effective or not will become clear towards the end of September, when citizens and businesses will begin to sum up the results of the year and ask who is to blame for their plight. Meanwhile, the ruling parliamentary majority and the head of state try not to take seriously incongruent wavering of the pro-European opposition, and are cold-headed in pursuing their electoral strategy. Moreover, they are making the most of the available administrative resource to ensure Igor Dodon’s confident victory in the first round thus preventing the entire pro-Western electorate from consolidating around the only candidate whose chances of taking the palm in the second round will significantly increase. Let’s recall in particular the highly controversial amendments into the country’s electoral code planned by the coalition majority. Their approval in the first reading provoked outrage among the pro-Western coalition, the US Ambassador and the EU Official Representative to Moldova. As a result, the PSRM and PDM deputies were forced to postpone the final approval of the changes until the autumn-winter parliamentary session. That situation clearly demonstrated that the government is already under political “constraints” imposed by international development partners: their opinion is the main criterion for legitimacy of the election process and international recognition of its results. Experts and non-governmental organizations paid special attention to the ambiguous indicators of the state voter base, which is 600 thousand more than the total number of residents of the country, including minors. Such a serious discrepancy in the figures was noticed by opposition parties and the civil sector representatives as far back as before the 2019 parliamentary elections, but no one bothered to find out its true reasons and eliminate such a blatant mistake. The situation is similar with the Transdniestrian voters, who in recent years have caused particular concern among Moldovan politicians, since their small numbers can have a significant impact on the final result. Thus, representatives of the Promo-Lex non-governmental organization, which monitors compliance with current legislation and is actively involved in the organization and course of the electoral process, noted that the number of Transdniestrian residents with the right to vote has been steadily growing in recent years, despite the natural population decline observed in the left bank of the Nistru. Promo-Lex specialists believe that such a situation is mainly caused by the fact that constitutional authorities have no access to the mortality data of the left-bank registry offices. The potential ghost voters in Transdniestrian lists hypothetically open up the possibility for manipulations to ensure the required number of votes without the need for the physical availability of many voters. It seems that the pro-Western opposition forces are facing a difficult dilemma. On the one hand, there is a great risk of getting over-exhausted, trying to seize power literally “for an hour” before the elections, with all the financial, economic and social costs that could be aggravated by the COVID-19 unpredictable situation. On the other hand, continued status quo is fraught with a more reinforced administrative resource of the democratic- socialist ruling coalition, who will undoubtedly make every effort to guarantee Igor Dodon’s victory. The opposition cannot endlessly continue political whining and complaints relying only on the reaction of its curators in Washington and Brussels, since such a clear passive and even infantile position will inevitably lead to a drop in ratings and a decrease in the already unobvious chances of winning. Thus, PAS and the DA Platform will have to act more wisely and decisively already in September, if they will be able to. The ambiguity of the situation is intensified by the personal game of the SOR party and the Pro-Moldova group, which have already pushed the parliamentary majority and the head of state to the brink of the abyss in order to force a compromise. Judging by the fact that the oligarchic tandem of the effective-schemes-lovers has no intention so far to turn the common political “boat”, one can speak of the “bad” guys’ retaining intention to come to an agreement with the current government under guarantees for the future. Thus, the “respectable” opposition has very little time left in August to try to actually consolidate its ranks and decide on a clear tactic of proactive actions for the hot autumn. But it may also happen that they will skillfully scatter their victorious ardor on plaintive letters, pickets and flash mobs, especially under the scorching sun and wearing medical masks.