Lessons of Belarusian Presidential Election for Moldova

Sergiu CEBAN The Moldovan leadership needs to draw correct conclusions out of presidential elections held in the Republic of Belarus, since West’s recognition of the electoral process legitimacy is vital for Chisinau As expected, the incumbent head of state Alexander Lukashenko secured a far ahead victory in the first presidential elections round in Belarus last week. However, according to experts, it is not voting results that will be of fundamental importance for domestic political life but the post-election situation and authorities’ ability to retain control over the situation in the country. Obviously, the scale of opposition activity in the current election campaign is much more serious than ever before. Therefore, one should not expect that the alternative candidates and the protest masses laying behind will calmly accept the official results. The first after elections night demonstrated that the popular discontent, even though it is still controlled by the security forces, has the potential to further increase. By the way, a noticeable increase in protest moods in Belarus, despite the republic's leadership active attempts to tie this trend with the external factor (foreign citizens’ detention, candidates and political strategists’ arrests, the story of military group of Russian citizens), one way or another, has an internal origin and is associated with the whole range of objective prerequisites. First of all, with the current president desire to be re-elected in the best African traditions for a new, already sixth term. Both Minsk and Moscow understood that the next presidential race in Belarus would take place in quite a not familiar, smooth atmosphere. It is with this that one can associate the Kremlin's admonitions to fill 2020 with qualitatively different political meanings, including the project of the union state. After long and difficult conversations between the leaders of the two countries, apparently, something has not come together. Diplomatic sources argue that Moscow had plans to form a new integration level with a closer nationwide structure, which, apparently, should have been joined by other participants from the post-Soviet space, including the breakaway regions of Georgia and Ukraine. It seems that the Russian offer did not suit Lukashenko, and he decided to get involved in the next presidential race. It should not be ruled out that the aforementioned interstate project was only paused, and Mr. Lukashenko, as an experienced authoritarian politician will continue bargaining with Moscow only not as an outgoing, but already newly elected Belarusians leader. However, it is obvious that restarting any discussions against the background of possible socio-political instability in Belarus will be much more difficult and in the international discourse, such integration initiatives are likely to be interpreted as another manifestation of Moscow's imperial appetites. In addition, a 180-degree turn and negotiations resumption with the Russian side would look completely strange, when practically the entire election campaign of the Belarusian leader is built on aggravating relations with Russia and positioning Moscow as the main threat to Belarusian sovereignty. It seems that this time Lukashenko narrowed his room quite a lot to maneuver and prospectively will be thrown upon his own resources or his entourage. Some experts believe that even all the opposition forces weakness, the Republic of Belarus, being to some extent a smaller model of Russia, may become a testing ground for the new so-called "Orange technologies" meant for rocking the internal political situation in the state, being under the strong security forces and special services control. It is already possible to notice the way situation in Belarusian cities has come into the focus of well-known Western media, forming a horrifying picture of confrontation between citizens and representatives of various special forces of the republic. In the coming days, the main issue for official Minsk will be the external recognition of the election results and, accordingly, the legitimacy of the Belarusian authorities in the eyes of voters. One of the main factors will be the opposition protest and disobedience actions duration, to which apparently the current leadership of the country plans to react as harshly as possible. The held presidential elections in the Republic of Belarus and the further events development allow drawing some parallels with the upcoming election of the head of state in Moldova. If Moscow and Minsk mold a new form of a close interstate union, it is possible that Igor Dodon's election campaign could be built on the basis of this new integration model, add practical content to the second presidential term and create more prerequisites for rapprochement of the two banks of the Dniester. If comparing the post-election situation development in Belarus and Moldova, then, of course, in Chisinau, the West is doing much better in terms of influence and control over internal political processes. In this sense, the current Moldovan leadership will have to make a lot of efforts in order to on the one hand effectively resist the opposition forces, and on the other hand, not go too far and not cause disapproval of international partners. Indeed, if any minimal doubts about the legality or legitimacy of the electoral process, the influence of Brussels and Washington, deeply incorporated into public and political life, will make it possible to effectively challenge the victory of the current president. Including by mass popular protest, easily observed in the Belarusian example.