Sergiu CEBAN
A tough pre-election struggle amid oversaturation with negative circumstances threatens to have unpredictable consequences on Moldova
The political situation in the republic is becoming less and less predictable and the current storylines are rapidly changing. The country's leadership does its utmost reacting to crisis situations emerging one after another, as to the domino principle. One of the last week’s most acute problems was agriculture situation; as a result, the authorities were even forced to resort to blocking one of the national highways. This was done to prevent the protest column of agricultural machinery’s penetration into Chisinau. It was heading for the capital to hold a picket in the central square.
Despite government’s chaotic attempts to stop periodic outbreaks, the wave of protest continues to gain momentum. Maia Sandu's PAS and Andrei Nastase's DA Platform actively promote it. Although the opposition agreed to tactically cooperate with the parliamentary majority creating two working groups of deputies, it does not deviate from its main goals and yesterday arranged two anti-government rallies in Chisinau. In addition, according to some sources, the "opposition hand" guided quite a lot of farmers' actions. It seems that this form of political activity will become a weekly practice to create an active zone of protest arising from the capital. Especially when the authorities cut off the possibility of holding an emergency parliament meeting, including through periodic COVID-19 detection among deputies and apparatus staff.
Signals from the outer perimeter only add enthusiasm to the Moldovan opposition: for example, the Romanian government’s statements about a "temporary status" of the current Moldovan authorities in response to Chisinau's awkward attempt to politically capitalize the Ungheni-Chisinau gas pipeline completion. Opposition politicians were also encouraged by rampant events development in the Republic of Belarus where despite all the authoritarian political regime nature, civil protest actions are gaining unprecedented proportions. The storyline in Minsk will become indicative in many respects, especially with regard to the way Brussels and Washington react if Igor Dodon wins in the first round.
However, problems in power arise not only from outside but also directly from the ranks of the ruling coalition, and they certainly do not add stability to the parliamentary majority. This trend is closely related to the ongoing disintegration of the Democratic Party. We are talking, in particular, about MP Vladimir Andronachi withdrawal from the PDM faction, followed by his and Eugen Nichiforciuc’s expulsion from the party. Experts have long said that both deputies are in direct conflict with Pavel Philip and are much closer to the country's leadership and the Socialist Party (primarily, within the framework of jointly implemented business projects). In addition, such a Democratic Party weakening may ultimately affect the implementation of its leadership ambitions in the post-election period and deprive its leader, Pavel Filip of the chance to head the Moldovan government.
At the same time, there was no increase in the socialist faction. Even though Deputy Andronachi openly supported the acting government, he decided to remain "independent" for his own reasons. This may indicate the desire of the people's choice to find his own subjectivity, especially in the conditions when the parliamentary majority is on its way, and the voice of each deputy is literally worth gold. In addition, as you know, Vladimir Andronachi has interests to Metalferos, that government put up for sale. Therefore, it should not be ruled out that such a political initiative is associated with the need to ensure the enterprise denationalizing is in the “right hands”.
It is also possible that the ongoing democrats’ fragmentation will lead to the formation of another deputy group around the Andronachi-Nichiforciuc tandem, to which other deputies will join and as a result of which the situation in parliament will become even more variegated and less predictable. As for the PDM, it is increasingly embraced by irreversible processes, and the once influential political formation risks repeating Vlad Filat's Liberal Democratic Party fate.
Speaking of, despite assurances not to return to politics, Filat himself seems to have revised his plans and is eager for some kind of own and his party’s revenge; he was re-elected its leader on August 16. Meanwhile, according to some observers, this ex-prime minister’s decision is linked to a greater extent with the process of creating a pool of pro-European candidates, that could significantly reduce Maia Sandu’s chances to take a decent result in the first round of elections. By the way, the RTA had previously
assumed that releasing Vlad Filat could be precisely related to his practical spoiler use during the presidential election campaign.
Moldova is approaching autumn in an unenviable position: aggravated by pandemic, coupled with growing political chaos and general loss of control over the situation. Against this background, the protest activity of the motley opposition and crisis in the economy accelerating day after day, increase the tension in society; thus, Moldova’s destabilization will obviously aggravate in the context of upcoming elections and may entail serious consequences for the country.