The Post-Soviet Space as an Instability Zone. What Is Moldova to Expect for?

Sergiu CEBAN On the heels of Ukraine and Belarus, post-election instability may as well be expected in Moldova, unless international players manage to reach a new compromise on the situation in the republic. Over the past years, is being reset the concept of creating around Russia the so-called "Belt of instability" consisting mainly of post-Soviet republics. Moreover, the latter, according to most of Moscow's doctrinal documents, are a zone of its special interests, where large trade, economic, diplomatic and political resources are directed. Recently, on August 1, the Helsinki Final Act, one of the fundamental documents of Europe’s modern history turned 45. That was the result of Western and Soviet diplomats’ hard work that ended the territorial debate on the European continent not abated despite the long-ended Second World War. The USSR collapse, certainly became the main factor in reducing the significance of the final act to launch processes for revising the geopolitical status of the territories gone out of the Moscow metropolis control. One of the first decisive intrusions of the West into the zone of existential interests of the Kremlin was the Rose Revolution in Georgia and the Orange Revolution in Ukraine. It seemed that by 2010 the displacement of the pro-Western forces in Kiev, stopping the events in Armenia and Kyrgyzstan, were a kind of revenge from Moscow, which has demonstrated its readiness to effectively respond to such Washington and Brussels’ interventions. However, further developments in the CIS space confirmed fears that the unfolding geopolitical confrontation is serious and long-standing. According to most experts, the West's main stake was placed on Ukraine, which, in terms of its territorial, socio-economic and political potential, geographical location, is, in fact, a key factor for weakening Russia. The Swedish-Polish Eastern Partnership project, launched in 2009, has only strengthened Kiev's dominant position as the main target of US-EU Eastern European policy. As of 2020, the largest part of the former Soviet perimeter shows an extremely volatile and unpredictable situation in terms of security, socio-economic development, and strategic certainty. This situation is a natural consequence of extremely irresponsible behavior on the part of influential international players who have turned the post-Soviet territories into weak state formations devoid of any prospects, many of which have an additional burden as, for example, unresolved conflicts. Regarding Ukraine, Kiev will traditionally make every effort to stay on the topical Washington, Brussels, Berlin and Paris’ international agenda. It is hardly worth expecting any significant dynamics in the settlement process. The milestone for the future of Ukraine may be the results of the autumn US presidential elections, when the victory of the Democratic Party candidate would give chances for revising Washington's strategy in the Ukrainian direction. If Donald Trump, one way or another, was inclined towards a possible compromise with Moscow, then the Democrats, most likely, will consider the Ukrainian issue from the point of view of further escalating confrontation and Kremlin’s geopolitical containment. At first glance, unshakable Belarus, which was, in fact, the last bastion of stability for Moscow, also unexpectedly turned into the epicenter of popular unrest against the current regime. There is a great chance that it will become another hotbed of tension with the possible movement of the geopolitical confrontation line between the West and Moscow from the western border of the republic directly to its territory. In this sense, will be repeated the example of Moldova where there has long been an open confrontation between pro-Russian and pro-Western political projects. By the way, it seems that Moldova will be next standing in the “queue for instability,” especially if we draw parallels with Belarus or other post-election riots in the CIS. Presidential elections in the republics are one of the best reasons for starting a processes of non-procedural shift of power. The strengthened position of the Russian factor in Moldova since the fall of 2019 is perhaps one of the key irritants for the West, motivating it to take action and regain its lost positions in Moldova. Meanwhile, no matter the way results of the Moldovan presidential elections turn out, it is obvious that in the medium term Moldova will be in an unbalanced and unstable position. Moreover, even greater tension may arise just in case the pro-Western politician party wins, afterwards it is quite expected the already traditional confrontation between the presidency and the government to continue. The waves of instability in the post-Soviet space entail obvious risks and costs, due to which this situation is unlikely to suit pragmatic politicians in the West and in Moscow. Therefore, various “compromise” signals are increasingly being noticed, in particular, the Emmanuel Macron’s voiced calls on the need to come to an agreement with Moscow on the post-Soviet space, which can hardly be incorporated into Western institutions, primarily the EU and NATO. The Moldovan coalition government, which existed for a short period from June to November 2019, used to have an important feature characterizing it consisting in mutual external support from the West and the East that strengthened the country's international legitimacy and, in the long term, could strengthen Moldova’s internal stability. It has long been clear to everyone that the political forces within the country do not want to independently (and therefore are not able to) stabilize the state, find a balance of interests and a sustainable compromise in the name of development. However, as practice shows, international partners have sufficient resources to prevent another multi-year round of the Moldovan inter-institutional crisis after the November elections. In the future, it cannot be ruled out that the political balance of the West and the East will be reanimated creating a broad coalition government from among the pro-Russian socialists and pro-Western parties. The first fundamentally important stage on this path will be the results of the presidential elections in Moldova. Voting results recognition by the world community will pave the way for creating a compromise model for the country’s external support aimed at stabilizing the Moldovan unbalanced state and its fragmented society.