One Week Prior to Elections in Moldova: Excitement before the Fight

Sergiu CEBAN Judging by several episodes, the last hundred meters of the pre-election race promises to be exciting and can have a decisive impact on the final voting results With ten days ahead of the ballot, the Public Opinion Barometer presented to the Moldovan public the results of its sociological survey, which, despite the obvious inaccuracy, provides a general insight into the participants’ political disposition at the final stage of the election campaign. The data obtained indicate that Igor Dodon and Maia Sandu, as the leading electoral competitors, unambiguously win in the first round and easily make it to the second, where the main battle for the presidency will unfold. Meanwhile, a significant number of Moldovan citizens haven’t decided on their choice yet, waiting for more convincing arguments in favor, or against, the main candidates. As sociology shows, the gap between the top rivals has slightly reduced in recent weeks. At the same time, a large percentage of undecided voters is prompting the candidate headquarters to step up the pre-election struggle and search urgently for new forms of winning over the population. One of the first presidential hopefuls to resort to a scandal as a time-tested method was a second-tier candidate who virtually has nothing to lose. Obviously, with his shocking actions at the final pre-election stage, the politician hopes to attract more voters from the segment of those undecided. The last week of the electoral contest Renato Usatii devoted to practicing in the incumbent’s “home field”, demonstrating to the left-flank voters the ability of candidate Igor Dodon to sustain under political “low blows”. As you know, the mayor of Balti has already caused enough trouble to the election headquarters of the head of state, striking painfully from a tactical distance. Now, Usatii’s advisers decided that the moment had come for a frontal attack. In these circumstances, Dodon’s team must work out strong countermeasures, otherwise such primitive daily “attacks” by the Our Party leader are likely to lure away a part of the electorate. At the same time, it should be kept in mind that constant blows to the president’s image are coming from other sides, in particular, the publication of biased materials by the Rise Moldova group and the Russian Dossier center, which discredit the Moldovan leader. Furthermore, the above sociological measurement also revealed one of the resonant indicators reflecting the of unionist sentiments growth among Moldovan citizens from 17% in 2016 to 33% in 2020. An objective look at the situation makes it clear that the gradual increase in the number of those who support unification with Romania is quite understandable, since it directly stems from the long-term sad Moldovan reality and vague prospects for our republic. This alarming for the sovereign Moldova trend is expected to continue in the foreseeable future. Drastic changes in the situation can be invoked only by no less drastic changes in the country’s political profile, provided that Moldovan leaders not in words but in deeds will eradicate Plahotniuc’s toxic legacy, which has deeply penetrated all vital spheres, and carry out real reforms to build a state that inspires true public confidence. Referring again to the elections, it should be noted that the approaching ballot date has revealed positions of numerous Western “development partners” who no longer hide their involvement in the presidential elections in the sovereign Moldovan state, actively supporting the right opposition candidate. The geopolitical flavor of the electoral process manifested itself in Moscow’s official position, which denounces the United States in its destructive plans against Moldova. Against this background, no harsh statements from Igor Dodon and the newfound conciliatory rhetoric in his declarations, including signals to Maia Sandu about the need to reach a compromise, indicate the president’s understanding of current complexities and strategic planning of his own political prospects for a more lasting term than the period of November 1-15. The existing potential provides Dodon with certain opportunities that allow retaining his leadership positions and influence in the country, whatever election results may be. The hypothesis that the president’s team is actively preparing for the post-electoral scenario remains relevant. In this context, adjustments in the president’s statements regarding early parliamentary elections stand out: in his opinion, they can be postponed towards the middle of 2021. Another noteworthy event is urgent withdrawal of four MPs from the PRO Moldova faction (Plahotniuc’s project), who openly supported the presidential candidate from the Sor party. This, apparently, marks the start of a more stable parliamentary coalition formation. It is not yet clear what position the Democratic Party will ultimately take, since its leadership has already given full freedom to its members, allowing them to vote as they wish. Given the ongoing PDM-PSRM parliamentary coalition, such an ostentatious “neutrality” of the democrats touches on the banal betrayal of their socialist partners, who actively support Dodon as their informal leader and the main candidate for presidency. As such, the battle for post-electoral Moldova and control over the country’s parliament is already in full swing, running like a red thread through the presidential elections.