A Radical Status Quo’s Breakdown in the Karabakh Conflict: Conclusions for Moldova

Anton SHVETS The beginning of this week turned out to be crucial for the Karabakh conflict. The territory of the unrecognized republic is actually divided, since this morning almost 2,000 Russian military personnel have been stationed there. The peacekeeping operation largely repeats the patterns of the mission that has been operating in Transdniestria for 28 years. Azerbaijan armed forces, supported by Turkey and individual proxy formations were able to achieve serious military successes in Karabakh in November. The city of Shusha (Shushi) was conquered several days ago; that is a strategic point located a few kilometers from the capital of the unrecognized republic, Stepanakert and at a dominant height. Today, the only road connecting Stepanakert and Yerevan passes through the city captured by the Azerbaijanis. In addition, Shusha detains enormous historical, cultural and symbolic significance for Nagorno-Karabakh and the Armenian people. It was this city capture in 1992 that marked a turning point in the Armenian-Azerbaijani war. On the contrary Baku, most likely has now successfully solved its military tasks and is regaining lost positions. After capturing Shushi, the Armenians of Nagorno-Karabakh were on the verge of a complete military collapse and the capital surrendering. In addition, an incident occurred yesterday evening with a Russian military helicopter shot down by Azerbaijani air defense systems in the Nakhichevan Autonomous Region, as a result of which two Russian servicemen were killed. Baku promptly admitted its guilt and made an official apology, which made it possible to diplomatically "hush up" the episode. Accelerating events became a trigger for the presidents of Russia, Azerbaijan and the Prime Minister of Armenia meeting, following which a joint statement was signed. Based on the text of the statement, which appeared by noon on the website of the President of Russia, a complete ceasefire has been announced from today with the fixation of positions held by Armenia and Azerbaijan. That means Shusha and a significant part of the territory of Nagorno-Karabakh remain under the Azerbaijan control. In the very near future, Armenia pledged to transfer to Azerbaijan all the previously occupied regions around the territory of Nagorno-Karabakh, not directly related to the NKR. The Lachin Corridor - the only communication channel between Stepanakert and Yerevan - will be used for three years until alternative communication routes are built. To protect the corridor (and subsequently a new route that will connect Armenia and the NKR) and the contact line of the parties for a period of at least five years, the Russian peacekeeping contingent consisting of 1,960 servicemen with small arms, 90 armored personnel carriers and 380 units of automobile and special equipment is being introduced. The return of refugees under UN control, the exchange of prisoners of war and the bodies of the dead, as well as the restoration of transport and economic ties are envisaged. By the night of today, Turkish peacekeepers are expected to enter the region, and together with the Russian ones, are to organize and ensure the operation of the ceasefire control center. The peacekeeping mission itself can be extended with the consent of the parties for the next five years. In Armenia, the events of this night were perceived as a surrender and a blow to national identity. Yerevan faced a serious internal political crisis. 17 political parties demanded Nikol Pashinyan's government resignation, accusing the prime minister of military defeat. The country's president refused to support the ceasefire agreement, claiming that he learned about its contents from the media. Protesters ransacked parliamentary and government conference rooms at night, beat the speaker and joined in demanding Pashinyan's resignation. The leadership of Nagorno-Karabakh properly, has little control over the situation in the remaining territory, especially considering the fact that the majority of the republic's population fled to Armenia. At the same time, the very composition of the peacekeeping operation, its entourage and the political and diplomatic dimension of the problem largely copy the experience of Russia in Moldova and Transdniestria. If we analyze the agreement reached and the steps already taken, we can record a number of significant parallels to compare the happening over the past 30 years within the framework of the conflict on the Dniester: - Following the ceasefire agreement signing, the Nagorno-Karabakh status has not been determined, the document does not say a word about. Just as the status of Transdniestria was not defined in the 1992 agreement, and which remains uncoordinated until now; - The Nagorno-Karabakh administration will not control the entire territory it claims to. Azerbaijan will retain the conquered areas of the NKR, therefore the territory controlled by Stepanakert will not coincide with the borders of the autonomous region within the Azerbaijan SSR. In the same way, Tiraspol today in fact does not control Varnitsa and a dozen settlements in the Dubossary region, which it considers to be its own according to the local "constitution"; - The peacekeeping process will be implemented with the participation of Russia and two conflicting parties. Meaning that the operation, just as in Moldova, will be trilateral. At the same time, Turkey, as a country bordering on both conflicting parties and having undoubted interests in the region, will be somehow involved in the peacekeeping mission. This largely reminds Ukraine’s participation, which delegated 10 of its military observers to the Dniester and one participant to the Joint Control Commission in 1998. At the same time, the role of international institutions in the peacekeeping process remains purely decorative - for the time being, it is only about the participation of the relevant UN office in resolving issues of refugees and internally displaced persons; - The peacekeeping process will be separated from the political settlement process. As well known, to resolve the Karabakh conflict, there’s the OSCE Minsk Group functioning. It consists of the conflicting parties and three mediators - France, Russia and the United States. Probably, it will finally be redesigned into an instrument of direct political negotiations (primarily on the status of the NKR) on the basis created by the peacekeeping center to control the ceasefire. Meaning that the Minsk Group, possibly in a modernized or expanded form, will become an analogue of the "5 + 2" format, which is responsible for the Transdniestrian settlement status and political issues. It is possible that over time it will be possible to identify additional similarities in the organization of peacekeeping missions in Transdniestria and Karabakh; similarities in: terms of initial number and nature of weapons; or on which body ensures control of the ceasefire; whether peacekeeping posts will be created; will the boundaries of the "security zone" be clearly defined. However, radical differences are also evident. The fact is that, unlike Transdniestria, the Nagorno-Karabakh administration does not participate in any political negotiations or in the peacekeeping process. It has no representation in the OSCE Minsk Group and apparently, will not be able to participate in the work of the peacekeeping center to control the ceasefire. This kind of starting alignment can be considered very weak from the point of view of the international positioning of Nagorno-Karabakh, which previously secured recognition of the same partially recognized Transdniestria, Abkhazia and South Ossetia, as well as of a number of American and Australian states and cities. In this sense, the prospects for determining the status of the current Karabakh territories outside Azerbaijan and Armenia are very vague. The very fact of Azerbaijan's successful military task solution of breaking the political status quo in the protracted conflict in the European space should not be written off either. In the medium term, this victory may come back to haunt other problems, including the Transdniestrian one. It is that now it will be more difficult for the Moldovan government to achieve a change in the peacekeeping mission format, since something similar turned out to be in demand in 2020. The only question is whether the Russian Federation will have enough military power and economic potential, or the corresponding desire to maintain its peacekeeping presence at the proper level in all hot spots.