Expert: Mass Protests Are Expected in Moldova after Presidential Elections

Vladimir ROTAR After the November 15 voting, Moldova is likely to face a tough confrontation between the newly elected president and the ruling coalition disloyal to him. Lacking legal methods to dissolve parliament, Sandu will surely seek assistance from the “street” Less than a week is left before Moldova will learn its new (or not quite new) president’s name. The winner of the first round, the PAS party chairman Maia Sandu, apparently feels like she has gained the upper hand, and is completely confident in her success. The tactical initiative in the electoral race is on her side, she appoints and cancels debates with Igor Dodon and at the same time delivers new accusations against and insults at her opponent, reflects on the priorities of her work as a future head of state. In addition, this week she has attempted to “enter Dodon’s territory”, as evidenced by relatively conciliatory statements about the Russian language status and development of relations with the Russian Federation. Simultaneously, the opposition candidate is generously making campaign promises and seems to be slightly consumed with the process, repeating Igor Dodon’s mistakes. Previously, colleagues have once explained that institution of the president is largely representative within the system of Moldovan authorities, and the set of powers defined for him is very limited. All that he has is the status of commander-in-chief, meaningless from the point of view of domestic policy, the right to initiate legislation (non-functional without a loyal parliamentary majority), to sign laws (essentially symbolic), to dissolve parliament under certain conditions, and to appoint a prime minister. With this in hands, you won’t gain much, as they say. Interestingly, the Association for Democratic Participation, ADEPT, has recently analyzed the election promises of presidential candidates as to the possibility of their implementation within the framework of constitutional powers. The research has shown that out of 156 “promises” made by Maia Sandu, almost a third (51) turned out to be impossible, and another 24 were fulfilled only partially. It seems that many other promises (not considering the ritual things, such as the fence removal near the president’s office) cannot be translated into action. Sandu needs a serious support in country’s major legislative body like air, ideally – a well-formed majority, with her PAS and a loyal government in the center. The current situation is far from it. In case of victory, Maia Sandu will face a rather aggressive parliamentary environment. The Action and Solidarity party she leads has only 15 mandates, which are supported (though, it’s not for sure) by 11 more deputies from the Dignity and Truth platform, the former ACUM bloc partners. Only the Democratic Party, the Candu group as its fragment and the newly formed Pentru Moldova faction remain in a “tossing”. The socialists are still holding a “controlling stake” in the form of 37 people’s deputies, reinforced by three independent deputies. Of course, theoretically, even with such figures they can remain in opposition. To make this happen, though, a far too motely new coalition would be formed, while sterile pro-Europeans will need to cooperate with oligarchic elements in parliament, which is unlikely at the moment. Given the current situation, Maia Sandu risks appearing as a ceremonial bystander, the way it was with her current opponent during the first two and a half years of his presidency. In this regard, her focusing on the idea of ​​early parliamentary elections is quite logical. The problem is that hardly any of the current parliament residents, except the PAS, needs them – both the DA platform and all variations of the Democrats are well aware of their slim chances in a possible vote. The socialists, probably, also won’t tempt fate at the risk of falling short of mandates amid the losing presidential candidate and the confrontation with Renato Usatii’s political formation. Thus, a potential victory on November 15 could be Pyrrhic in many ways. To prevent this from happening, Sandu has already entered into talks with a situational ally, still the same Usatii, who is also inclined to early elections, hoping to get into parliament with his party (judging by the results of the first round, it is quite reasonable). After their meeting, much was said about considering the parliament dissolution plan and the corresponding legal work. Yesterday, Sandu also hinted at the assistance of the Constitutional Court, loyal to the pro-Europeans, where several appeals will be send. However, so far, all this seems to be nothing more than a grandstanding: the Basic Law quite clearly defines the boundaries of what is possible in this regard. Only options lying outside the legislative field are left, which certainly provides room for maneuver. Primarily, we are talking about possible mass demonstrations of citizens, which have been actively rumored over the past weeks. According to some sources, Renato Usatii will act as the “armed wing”, due to his previous experience in organizing protests in 2015 and success in accumulating the anti-system electorate, part of which can be easily mobilized to fight the regime. Obviously, the key target will be the parliament building, which is likely to be blocked and, most likely, “occupied” by protesters. Seizing a legislative body is quite a trend this year in the post-Soviet space: this was the case in Azerbaijan, Kyrgyzstan and Armenia, and Moldova will not stand out in this row. In addition, there is a fresh experience of the neighboring Ukraine, where President Volodymyr Zelensky directly appeals to the “street”, trying, in the absence of legal grounds, to dissolve the Constitutional Court that he does not like. International players could be another option to help Maia Sandu in organizing early elections. On the other hand, the United States, which will most likely face a certain transitional period, can take a wait-and-see attitude (especially since Washington’s strategic interests are reliably protected under any configuration of the Moldovan government), and the EU’s influence on modern Moldovan affairs is rather limited. Therefore, there is reason to believe that Sandu will have to rely solely on her own forces in the fight against parliament, and the protests are essential in this regard.