Is the Crisis Inevitable? What Do Last Days Before Election in Moldova Show?

Sergiu CEBAN Within 2020 year’s difficult conditions, Moldova is hardly ready to survive another protracted internal political crisis; anyway, Moldovan politicians apparently, are not ready to offer the country another option for events development. The electoral campaign in Moldova is coming to its logical conclusion. However, the accelerated pace of events and a well-warmed internal situation will seemingly not give rest to the country even after votes counting. Moldovan experts are convinced that the observed electorate mobilization and the use of divisive and provocative elements, in addition to statistical bonuses, might have quite unpleasant social manifestations that the current Moldovan state may not be able to cope with. Briefly assessing the situation between the two rounds, we can here highlight the desire of both candidates to maximize the use of available resources and the use of crude conflict or accusatory rhetoric. It minimizes the prospect of any possible form of intra-parliamentary cooperation and the formation of a broad ruling coalition, even on a temporary basis. At the final stage of the election campaign, Maia Sandu made a special emphasis on working with the Russian-speaking citizens of the country in order to lure at least some of her competitor’s potential voters. The PAS leader’s open campaigning in a foreign electoral field once again confirms the hypothesis that both candidates are practically on a par, having sufficient chances of success. Therefore, whoever takes the first place, the advantage will be only a few percent. Igor Dodon is to end his campaign with a large-scale event in Chisinau, during which it is planned to organize a popular march in president’s support. Such a pre-election course is most likely aimed at solving several problems. First of all, it is about achieving the maximum mobilization effect throughout the country and especially in the capital, where Dodon’s voters, judging by the results of the first round, did not show due interest in voting. In addition, the planned demonstration action will be directed towards Maia Sandu and her entourage with a hint to a possible scale of the tragedy if a clash of the two candidates’ supporters occurs on the streets of the city. An important difference between the two electoral strategies is that the current president, to a greater extent, followed the framework of a classical linear campaign, which in some key parameters is much inferior to modern non-trivial political technological methods implemented by Sandu's election headquarters. As a result, the head of state and his associates turned out to be practically unprepared for the massive attack of the entire opposition camp at the final stage of the pre-election race, often acting in an absolutely incoherent and confused manner. In recent days, an abundant stream of damaging material has been thrown into the public space, ranging from the president’s personal correspondence to the financial documents of his election campaign. So far, the most resonant event was the disclosed excess circulation of Igor Dodon’s electoral newspapers, which put the head of state at risk of being removed from the race. Obviously, the likelihood of such a radical CEC decision is not high, but the very fact of considering this matter will cause significant electoral damage. At the same time, the high concentration of materials discrediting the president suggests that for many years he has been closely supervised by both special services, including foreign ones, and hidden agents entrenched in various government bodies, which are actively accumulating and supplying interested persons with information defamatory for Dodon’s reputation. The pressure exerted by the opposition forces in their attempt to undermine the authority of the head of state as much as possible right before a voting day will apparently continue on the day of silence. In this regard, the most painful compromising blow is most likely yet to come, and there will be simply no time left to recover from it. Confirmations received inter alia personally from Maia Sandu about the intention to “resort to the help of people” and hold large-scale protests if Igor Dodon wins, apparently prompted him to take more decisive actions to ensure the legitimacy of his possible victory with broad street support. As a result, from November 16, on the main square of the capital, rallies are expected to be held by two veteran organizations close to the president (the Union of Moldovan Officers and the Union of Veterans of the War in Afghanistan) in order to stop the opposition’s attempts to seize power by force and cancel the election results. It is becoming more and more obvious that the intransigence shown by the main candidates to each other will continue after November 15. Therefore, in the post-election period, one cannot hesitate to expect a more violent political confrontation. Certainly, such developments will have an even more detrimental effect on the already degrading situation in the country.