Expert: Russia Will Use a Traditional Influence Instrument in the Post-Soviet Space

Anton SHVETS Taking into account recent events, including Igor Dodon’s defeat in the presidential elections, the concept of Russian influence in the CIS space will be revised one way or another, probably towards traditional forms: intensifying support for pro-Russian enclaves and relying on military-strategic forces balance based on physical presence in conflict regions. Igor Dodon's lag of 15.5% in the second round of the presidential elections in Moldova confirmed the insufficient influence model and cooperation effectiveness that Moscow used in the Moldovan direction. The high result of Maia Sandu, who did not make any special curtsies to the Kremlin and the pro-Russian electorate during the electoral campaign, testifies that the bet on “cleaning up” the political field of the Republic of Moldova in the interests of the Party of Socialists and its informal leader as a whole did not materialize. Power transit scenarios in Moldova may vary. Maia Sandu's principled position does objectively narrow the space available to her for maneuver and gain full power or, at least create a reliable coalition focused on cooperation with the European Union and NATO. The inevitable transition process can become quite lengthy. At the same time, the very defeat of the current president of Moldova is a signal and milestone thing. Regardless of bureaucratic resistance, it will provoke some work on mistakes and a change in the influence vector. The left flank in Moldova is occupied by the Party of Socialists and Igor Dodon personally, while Renato Usatii and many small political entities have lost confidence in Moscow due to its commitment to the interests of the current president. Recovering lost ground, identifying new footholds and promising leaders can be challenging. Anyway, this work will require a lot of time, as well as a gigantic ideological and intellectual resource. Even if the Ion Chicu government and Speaker Zinaida Greceanii (whose positions in the presidency of parliament seem to be the most stable) can win several months to regroup and seize the lost initiative, it’s not sufficient. In this situation, Moscow can actualize its traditional resource of influence on the geopolitical situation in its near abroad. We are talking about unresolved ethno-territorial conflicts in the post-Soviet space that ensure an effective Russia’s military-political presence in a number of regions. The most obvious example is Georgia. In this country, discussion about the vector of development and foreign policy orientation has been practically absent for more than 10 years. The main political forces in Tbilisi, quarreling over internal political issues, have a consensus on the need for Euro-Atlantic integration, but they failed making real progress in this process. Once Russia recognized Abkhazia and South Ossetia and sent armed and border forces of the Russian Federation to these enclaves, this virtually ruled out Georgia's prospects for NATO and the EU membership. At the same time, Moscow continues participating in the political format of negotiations around Georgia - the Geneva Discussions on the Transcaucasus. Tbilisi is forced to conduct a dialogue with Moscow at the diplomatic level and even carry out symbolic gestures to normalize relations. Such an alignment hardly allows Russia to count on strengthening its positions in Georgia "mainland", but minimizes any risks and threats that stem out from the Georgian state’s geopolitical orientation. When establishing the Russian presence in Nagorno-Karabakh has largely repeated the Georgian scenario for the Kremlin. The difference is that in the Georgian case, the main beneficiaries were the unrecognized territories of the conflict (Abkhazia and South Ossetia), while in the Karabakh case, on the contrary the plot turned into a tragedy for its residents and administration. However, the result turned out to be identical for Russia, and that is: peacekeepers deployment, influence strengthening, a new military-political reality creating. Difficult to say, is it that Moscow provoked situation’s development, fearing an increase in Turkish influence on Azerbaijan and relations with Armenia degradation under the leadership of Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan, or it reacted in proportion to the prevailing circumstances. The fact is that for a period of at least 5 years, participating among other things in the work of the OSCE Minsk Group, Russia has concreted its influence on the situation in Nagorno-Karabakh and indirectly in Azerbaijan and especially in Armenia. Taking into account the historically established living relationships and the large-scale conflict unfolding, including military clashes directly on the European continent, the situation in Ukraine is somewhat different when viewed as Moscow’s success in implementing the scenario of control, however the model itself does largely coincide. Having an important transit value, cooperative and even family ties, as well as relatively functional armed forces, Kiev is more successful in resisting influence, but one thing is invariably - the adequacy of the overall instrument of influencing the situation through conflict regulation. In this sense, despite the statements coming from the Kremlin, Maya Sandu’s coming to power in Moldova may be marked by assistance to Transdniestria intensification. Russia will need to rely on the Tiraspol administration in supporting the format of the peacekeeping mission on the banks of the Dniester, maintaining the presence of the Operational Group of Forces and restoring the normal activities of the 5 + 2 format as an instrument of Moscow's political involvement. Thus, in the coming months, if Maia Sandu nevertheless manages dissolving the Ion Chicu government and parliament, the situation in Moldova risks significantly simplifying and moving into the traditional channel of geopolitical rivalry instead of showing unique examples of limited cooperation, as it used to happen in the summer of 2019, when a coalition of seemingly completely different political forces was formed (with international effort). Time has confirmed the inconsistency of "romantic" projects in the Moldovan realities. This is a challenge for the republic and its new president who will have to act and solve the problems of state development in the context of difficult relations with Moscow and Tiraspol.