Moldova Is Again at the Political Crossroads

Sergiu CEBAN Now Moldova has a new president and old problems. The internal political confrontation won’t be bridged soon On November 15, the second round of the presidential elections took place in Moldova. The results indicate that opposition politician Maia Sandu was elected the new head of state, wining a landslide victory with almost 58%. The current leader of the country, Igor Dodon, was supported by only 42% of voters. As predicted, the turnout was much higher this time and reached 53%. Over the past two weeks, candidates were active in mobilizing the electorate, which eventually have borne fruit. The record holder in this regard was the Moldovan diaspora, with unprecedented turnout. As a result, more than a quarter of a million of our citizens arrived at polling stations abroad. The left bank residents also doubled their turnout compared to the first round. Their voting, however, was again marked by incidents, with the same major scene in the village of Varnita where the main influx of Transdniestrian voters was expected. The fundamental opposition forces were drawn up there to prevent the voters from entering the polling stations by any means. At some point, the situation got out of the police control, and a reinforced special unit arrived to their aid to unblock the highway and cool the patriotic citizens’ ardor. As a result, a Transdniestrian voter in fact became the notorious “parallel electorate”, who is not expected to participate in determining the political fate of the state. This can be confidently defined as an echo of the “Kozak Memorandum”, when the Moldovan elites could not stand the idea that the left-bank population could be part of the political life in the country. Transdniestria’s involvement in the elections on the right bank was so discredited during this election campaign that it would be logical to consider limiting access of the region’s population in future Moldovan elections until this territory is again under control of the constitutional authorities. Immediately after the end of the ballot, both candidates held press conferences without waiting for preliminary results. Igor Dodon was noticeably upset, and his first statements made it clear that he was already aware of his impending defeat. Despite the fact that literally several days in a row the president’s headquarters had openly prepared to retain power by force as in Belarus, the head of state unexpectedly voiced his call for peace and political stability, inviting to seriously consider how to administer the challenging situation in the country. Dodon further announced major changes in the coming days and a number of practical initiatives to overcome the crisis. Maia Sandu was less specific in her comments, she mentioned only the difficulties faced by diaspora during the ballot and also noted numerous violations in organizing the electoral process. No political messages from the president-elect is completely justified: the post-election euphoria will quickly fade away, and she will have to face a catastrophic reality with a weary medical system, degrading key economy sectors, and steadily increasing domestic loans. The prospect of a second lockdown does not add to the positive either. The legacy for the new president is not only the range of socio-economic problems but also the strongest post-electoral split in the society. The Sandu headquarters, however, seem to have no clear answers today on how exactly to handle this situation with a minimum of powers vested in the head of state and lacking necessary tools. One way or another, the developments will force the new Moldovan leader to fit into the complex internal political situation, from which Sandu tried to keep a safe distance over the past years. Since elections are over, the question about Ion Chicu and his Cabinet’s fate logically arises, as their political mandate has actually expired with the end of the presidential race and the Democratic Party’s withdrawal from the coalition. In this context, negotiations on a new parliamentary majority should be expected. And here, even if the pro-European forces and the newly elected president express their categorical refusal to work on a peer basis, Igor Dodon has already prepared the Pentru Moldova deputy group as a backup alternative. To avoid further political weakening, including of the Socialist Party, and to prevent the gradual loss of wide-ranging ties with Moscow, including the prospect of Russian loans, it is vitally important for Igor Dodon to retain the maximum of his political positions and secure a defining function for himself to avoid falling out of a new political equation. Such a domestic political solitaire makes further confrontation almost inevitable, with the elected president (backed by the loyal Constitutional Court, the pro-European opposition in parliament and key international partners) on one pole, and the ruling coalition with its government and almost all power in their hands on the other. Nevertheless, Sandu seems to be ready to play a long game as a moral and political leader, using the presidential rostrum and access to the media to harshly criticize authorities, and to trigger popular protests in the long run. Therefore, she has no need to legitimize any new parliamentary majority and prolong life of the outgoing generation of Moldovan politicians. Moreover, the external partners will certainly lay the groundwork for early elections that she needs so much, which means that any new coalition in the current parliament should already brace itself for a triple pressure from the new president, the street and international players. As you see, the presidential campaign being over is not an end to the Moldovan political game at all – on the contrary, its new and perhaps the most interesting stage begins.