Will Igor Dodon Retain Power?

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Sergiu CEBAN On November 15, Dodon lost the battle, but not the war: the confrontation with the elected president and the opposition is only in its beginning, and even the most sophisticated Moldovan politicians cannot say what the new structure of power will be. After his defeat on November 15, Igor Dodon started active repositioning in an effort to retain his political influence. Fortunately, he still has a sufficient resource base in the form of a socialist faction and a loyal cabinet of ministers to that end. This can explain his strong endeavor to chair the PSRM again, which might help entrench himself at the parliamentary-government level and continue confrontation with the new president in a new capacity. Confrontation, apparently, cannot be avoided. Attempt by the outgoing head of state to take the initiative and assemble parliamentary political forces for consultations resulted in embarrassment and sudden turnaround for Dodon. Fearing to be marginalized, the socialist leader will most likely continue to shape the image of an irreplaceable and in-demand politician, convincing his opponents that any political combinations without his involvement are absolutely excluded. He has already described the refusal of the opposition parties to cooperate as “falling into a trap”. Maia Sandu is also facing a difficult period in her political career, which requires much more balanced and careful actions in order to avoid any reputational side effects. Unlike Igor Dodon, who is looking for ways to remain a determining factor in Moldovan politics, the new president does not need to be active until she officially takes office. Therefore, keeping a safe distance from the epicenter of developments will perhaps be the best solution in this period of time. Foreign policy is seen as the most promising track at the onset of the presidential career. Unlike her predecessor, Sandu is a persona grata in almost all core capitals for the Republic of Moldova, even in Moscow. Given the status and powers of the Moldovan president, in addition to the protocol-ceremonial part, of high importance will be the content of high-profile international meetings, and especially willingness of the Western chanceries to provide practical aid to Chisinau if the government remains under the control of the parliamentary majority disloyal to Sandu. As one can notice, the elected president’s first foreign policy steps so far line up with the pragmatism and balance principles, which were repeatedly declared during the election campaign. Following the talks with the neighboring countries’ top authorities and ambassadors of other key states, Maia Sandu also publicly announced her first official meeting with the Russian Ambassador Oleg Vasnetsov, showing thereby her real interest in establishing stable working contacts with Moscow. Meanwhile, US Ambassador Dereck Hogan seems to have taken on all the rough work and held several important meetings yesterday, including with Prime Minister Ion Chicu and Democratic Party leader Pavel Filip. The latter, by the way, also managed to come face to face with the French and German ambassadors. Thorough press releases can scarcely reflect the real content of their conversations. However, the American diplomat and his European colleagues’ hyperactivity prompts the idea that the US and EU have an intention to switch the domestic policy developments onto the “right” track. By yesterday evening, the head of the Cabinet declared his readiness to meet with Maia Sandu at any time, since he had no doubts about her presidency. At the same time, he expressed his uncertainty whether he would still be prime minister by the time of inauguration. Chicu also voiced the high probability of a parliamentary decision to dismiss the government. Meanwhile, the permanent bureau of the country’s legislative body will convene today, probably, to make arrangements for a regular session of deputies which have not been held for more than two months. Without a coalition majority, all decisions in the bureau, including the agenda, will have to be taken by consensus. At least the democrats are not interested in blocking the next meeting and prompting the legal grounds for parliament dissolution, but it should not be ruled out that Igor Dodon’s former associates and the opposition will once again try to show their worth and prepare a few surprises. The meeting of deputies is planned to take place within the upcoming days and should first of all give an answer to the question whether the current parliament still has the potential to form a new parliamentary majority and whether this community of people’s representatives is ready to back the current government, or a new cabinet appointment should be expected. As you see, the first post-electoral week can provide good food for thought on several critical points at once. Will Igor Dodon’s regime and the Moldovan politician himself sustain? What are the prospects for starting the deputy corps dissolution procedure? What kind of mid-term relations between the branches of government is anticipated by the main political forces and international partners? Perhaps, this week will make it possible to approach the answers to these and other questions.