Is “Ambassadors' Revolution” 2.0 to Be Expected in Moldova?

Sergiu CEBAN Igor Dodon and Ion Chicu are now in almost the same position as Vladimir Plahotniuc and Pavel Filip in June 2019 - they act from a position of force until the last as well. Last week, Moldova identified the main lines of the internal socio-political rift that is leading the country to another difficult period. One of the key episodes in the ruling Olympus was the open coupling of the Socialists Party and the "SHOR / For Moldova" group, which first tested their cooperation through joint bills voting and later on proceeded with clearing the intra-parliamentary structures off the Democratic Party of Moldova’s representatives and replacing them with new socialists’ associates. After the planned law on lustration adoption, the redistribution process is likely to expand so that to include government and other institutions of state power. Although PSRM allies and the eclectic group of deputies try not to show it, nevertheless, many experts and journalists have already noticed the compulsion, hopelessness and poorly concealed mutual distrust between them. Therefore, it seems that decisions made are the result of complex behind-the-scenes bargaining with a short shelf life, and the formalization of inter-faction cooperation is practically excluded. This confirm the regular statements of party speakers, saying that joint voting is nothing more than a tactical coincidence of interests. Whilst the de facto coalition is siphoning power from the elected president and is doing its best to stop the risks of losing power, the government of Ion Chicu is becoming the main vulnerability. The latter is increasingly being demanded to resign, since it is the Prime Minister who has become, in fact, the only one who keeps the situation away from a “political breakdown”. This inevitably leads to an increase in the personal responsibility of the prime minister, who is hardly ready to switch the avalanche of social discontent to himself. The first contact with Maia Sandu indicates that Chicu has chosen a more restrained position in communication with the new head of state and is apparently ready to discuss ways to safely withdraw. Meanwhile, the opposition has no choice but to follow the street protest path. Most of Moldovan politicians, including Renato Usatii, Pavel Filip, Adrian Candu and the leaders of the unionist movement, caught the breath of political winds and quickly joined the elected president. As a result, various political forces gathered under the same banners - something similar was observed in Moldova in 2015 during the period of actions against the Plahotniuc regime. Meanwhile, none of the above politicians showed personal activity, and that is most likely to indicate the absence of a single agreed plan or general action strategy. Apparently, those surrounded by Maia Sandu do not consider it necessary to unite the responding political leaders around themselves and expect that mass events will form spontaneously, allowing the new president to keep its distance from any toxic characters related to both Plahotniuc and Dodon. The only thing that justifies this Maia Sandu’s position is the growing intraspecific struggle for protest, which may have a positive effect on the popularity and ratings of some fading political formations. The DA platform, headed by Andrei Nastase, decided not to lose momentum and has already announced the next gathering of citizens for December 10 - the day when the Constitutional Court is to officially validate the presidential election results. There is no doubt that victory over Dodon and Shor will have lots of “parents”, therefore, as many actors as possible will try joining the process of country’s re-de-oligarchization. As a result, having created the maximum excitement around the Sunday rally, for which the power structures, judging by the reaction of the near-government media and channels’ telegrams were preparing in the most serious way, expecting attempts to seize administrative buildings, the protest rally was held in demo mode. Various versions have been expressed on this score, however, the expectation that the very first meeting of dissatisfied citizens would result in the storming of the government building was obviously greatly overestimated. The event was initially prepared as a trial and was aimed, first of all, at making the authorities and the opposition more attentively assess each other's forces for more thorough preparation in case of a decisive street fight. In addition, it should not be ruled out that at the current stage of methodical pressure from the square will be quite sufficient to convince the current government to agree with the opposition's demands and go along the path of organizing early elections to the legislature as soon as possible. The alternative scenario associated with a forceful shift of power is associated with significant costs and is most likely viewed as an extreme form. Experts do not take the risk to unequivocally express about the final outcome of the current internal political crisis, but the trajectory of the general situation is already quite clearly visible. Speaking about Igor Dodon, one can note the fact that, apparently, he chose the conditional “Belarusian scenario”, betting on the forceful retention of power. Burning all bridges with the West and bribing Moscow with a package of bills, the socialist leader expects increased support from the Kremlin, similar to Alexander Lukashenko. On the other hand, President Dodon and Prime Minister Chicu are in a situation very similar to the situation in June 2019 that Vladimir Plahotniuc and Pavel Filip found themselves. They as well also acted from a position of force until the last. In contrast to Belarus, for the Moldovan internal political reality, the influence of the external and especially the Western factor is sometimes of decisive importance, therefore the next peaceful "Revolution of Ambassadors" can become a completely acceptable alternative to the street abolition of the current regime.