Prospects for Russian Peacekeepers in Moldova - Are There Any Changes Possible?

Anton SHVETS Moldovan President-elect Maia Sandu is a consistent opponent of the Russian military presence in Transdniestria, which she loudly reminded of immediately after the elections. Are the new Moldovan president’s aspirations to be practically transformed in changes? For more than two months, Chisinau and Tiraspol have not been able to agree on the agenda of the Joint Control Commission and open a full-fledged meeting. The contradictions within the JCC largely reflect the polemics that intensified around the peacekeeping mission after Maia Sandu’s victory in the presidential elections. A few days after the election, she noted that the format for resolving the conflict should include a complete withdrawal of Russian troops from Moldova. After a while, she specified her position and stated that there was no danger of military action in Transdniestria and that the peacekeeping mission should be made civilian under the auspices of the OSCE. Also, according to her, the Russian operational group of forces is being in Transdniestria without agreements with the Republic of Moldova and should be withdrawn, and the weapons in Kolbasna should be removed from the territory of Moldova. The Russian Foreign Ministry reacted sharply to Maia Sandu’s statements and described them as "aimed at undermining efforts to peacefully resolve the Transdniestrian problem." A number of resonant responses were voiced by other Russian representatives, and they all boiled down to the inadmissibility of the destruction of the peacekeeping operation and the withdrawal of Russian troops, including the OGRV which, according to Moscow, is part of the peacekeeping contingent. However, Tiraspol considered the speeches of the President-elect of the Republic of Moldova as politicized and aimed at shifting the emphasis from the agenda of the negotiations. According to the leader of the region, Vadim Krasnoselsky, "today there are no legal grounds and prerequisites for any change in the current format of the peacekeeping operation." It should be noted that earlier Chisinau had already "attacked" the peacekeeping operation. In 2017, the regime of Vladimir Plahotniuc tried to demonstrate special loyalty to the United States so that the now fugitive oligarch could hold on to power. Then the issue of the Russian military presence was even brought up on the site of the UN General Assembly. It is obvious that Moscow and Tiraspol’s opinion will not soften Maia Sandu’s position. On the contrary, this topic will be central in the course of upcoming international meetings - a dialogue with the leadership of Romania and Ukraine will take place in the coming weeks. It is extremely important for Maia Sandu to strengthen her reputation as a principled pro-Western politician who is not ready to compromise with those whom she considers a threat to the statehood of Moldova. One cannot but admit that the President of Moldova has no practical tools to influence the situation, as well as obvious factual miscalculations or deliberate omissions in her position. The first of them is the mistaken belief that the deployment of Russian troops on the left bank of the Dniester is not regulated by bilateral Russian-Moldovan agreements. As some experts note, back in October 1994, an Agreement was signed between Russia and Moldova on the legal status, procedure and withdrawal timing of Russian military formations temporarily located on the territory of the Republic of Moldova. According to the document, practical steps for their withdrawal from the territory of the Republic of Moldova "will be synchronized with the political settlement of the Transdniestrian conflict and the determination of a special status of the Transdniestrian region of the Republic of Moldova." In this sense, Russia's position on the presence of OGRV looks logical and consistent. The most active export of weapons from Kolbasna fell on the period when, with the participation of Moscow, the parties came close to a final political settlement - first by arranging the Joint Constitutional Commission work, and subsequently initialed the so-called "Kozak Memorandum". At the same time, the peacekeeping contingent of Russia was reduced in the same 1994 by about four times. As soon as negotiations on conflict resolution stagnated, Russia suspended the liquidation of warehouses and troops withdrawal. As for transforming the peacekeeping operation prospects on the Dniester, the situation here is no less confusing. There is also a direct link with the process of conflict ending completion - the Joint Statement of the leaders of Moldova, Russia and Transdniestria from March 18, 2009 directly states that “the parties note the stabilizing role of the current peacekeeping operation in the region and proceed from the expediency of its transformation into a peacekeeping operation under the auspices of OSCE following the Transdniestrian settlement”, meaning, first a political resolution of the conflict, then the transformation of the peacekeeping mission. And not the withdrawal of Russian troops as part of the settlement process, if we follow the logic of Maia Sandu. A radical option appears itself – withdrawing the signature of the Moldovan President from the aforementioned Joint Statement and, at the same time, from the Agreement on the principles of the peaceful settlement of the armed conflict in the Transdniestrian region of the Republic of Moldova. Such a step by Chisinau automatically outlaws the JCC, peacekeeping contingents and peacekeeping posts in the Security Zone and nullifies the peacekeeping mission on the Dniester. And it levels the status of the OSCE and Ukraine Missions, which are tightly integrated into the current JCC activities. What is Chisinau to gain from? It is impossible to be sure that the peacekeeping operation ends after the Republic of Moldova abandons it. Today, Moscow is independently conducting a peacekeeping operation in Nagorno-Karabakh, not taking into account the opinion of the international community. Moscow also assumed responsibility for ensuring the security of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, simultaneously recognizing their independence. It should not be forgotten that Russia abruptly changed its attitude towards the rebellious republics and agreed to de facto dismember Georgia precisely after the attack on its peacekeepers in South Ossetia. There is no particular doubt that Tiraspol and Moscow will find mutual understanding and the opportunity to make sure the peacekeeping operation (in a new form) continues inside the Transdniestrian territory even without Chisinau’s participation in. To what extent will this strengthen the Moldovan position and is the final conflict settlement to come closer, well, these are issues for discussion. But if Chisinau does not plan acting in the near future by means of Azerbaijan methods, then the termination of the peacekeeping operation would be a mistake. It is obvious that there will intensify sentiments of an outpost and a “besieged fortress” typical for Transdniestria, and the general militarization of the enclave with the Russian support. In addition, the level of 5 + 2 format participants’ involvement, primarily Ukraine and the OSCE in security issues will decrease. This issue will be especially acute for the OSCE Mission, whose mandate directly presupposes such involvement. Thus, the current Maia Sandu’s statements should be perceived as an element of the so-called “Wishful thinking”, which does not yet coincide with her personal capabilities and the objective situation in the process of Transdniestrian problem settling.