"Sometimes They Come Back." Political Emigrants’ Factor in Moldovan Politics

Anton SHVETS Alexei Navalny noticeably stirred up Russian political reality and caused a sharp reaction abroad when loudly coming back. However, such bends are no surprise for Moldova, since it has enough of its own "navalny", whose return on the eve of early parliamentary elections is capable to unpredictably reshuffle the Moldovan political deck Alexei Navalny, who has been absent from his homeland for about 5 months, landed at Moscow's Sheremetyevo airport on Sunday. The 2020 events did not affect the political ambitions of the main Russian opposition leader and his supporters. Despite the fact that the politician was immediately taken from the airport to the Khimki city for a court hearing on preventive measure selection in a long-standing criminal case (and then is to stay arrested for 30 days), the very fact of Navalny's return heated up media battles and inspired the Russian "democratic get-together". Oppositionist’s detention provoked an immediate official reaction from the USA, EU and other states. The Foreign Ministers of Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia raised the issue of expanding sanctions against Russia. It is difficult to predict Alexei Navalny's confrontation outcome with the Kremlin establishment and its consequences at this stage. Anyway, the head of the Anti-Corruption Fund and his wife’s return will provide additional electrification to political reality. The political emigration phenomenon, which is historically widespread throughout the world, has flourished especially actively in recent years in the post-Soviet space. Former President of Ukraine Viktor Yanukovych and the head of his cabinet of ministers Mykola Azarov have been in Russia for almost 7 years. Whilst pursuing them, Ukraine meanwhile, provided citizenship and opportunities for active work to the odious Georgian politician Mikhail Saakashvili, who has not been able to return to his own country for more than 10 years because of the conflict with the ruling party “Georgian Dream” that belongs to the oligarch Bidzina Ivanishvili. Svetlana Tikhanovskaya, being recognized by part of the international community as the winner of the presidential elections in Belarus, is now staying in Lithuania with her children because does not want sharing the fate of her husband, who has been in custody along with other Belarusian oppositionists for about a year. Instead, Minsk sheltered the fugitive Kyrgyz ex-president Kurmanbek Bakiyev. Moldova, for which emigration plays a significant role in the combination of political alignments, in this sense is in the wake of modern post-Soviet trends. First of all, the Moldovan diaspora as a social group consolidated and began to actively influence the electoral process in Moldova. This was especially evident in the course of last presidential elections, following which Maia Sandu confidently won, taking 90% of the abroad voters. However, the personal impact of certain individuals who are or have been outside of Moldova at certain stages, has also become a significant factor in Moldovan politics. The extradition of Veaceslav Platon (who detains Ukrainian citizenship) from Ukraine in August 2016, has become a convincing evidence of personal power regime of the oligarch Vladimir Plahotniuc’s emergence and of his ability to eliminate business rivals by means of political leverage. The deal with Petro Poroshenko left no doubt that a year earlier the “captured state” was completely owned by Plahotniuc, who was ready to act cross-border and decisively. The recently released Veaceslav Platon is now taking part in investigating the billion theft from the banking system of the Republic of Moldova; comments on the Laundromat case and other high-profile news stories, and publicly quarrels with prominent Moldovan politicians. Another key “returnee” example is Renato Usatii, who arrived in Moldova after a four-year absence in June 2019 in the wake of socialists and right-wing parties’ coalition creation in the Moldovan parliament. Usatii's personal role in Igor Dodon's defeat in November presidential elections seems quite high. In addition to gaining almost 17% in the first round of voting (mainly due to the Russian-speaking voters of Dodon), the former mayor of Balti inflicted painful blows on the reputation of the Socialist party and its leader (then informal leader) throughout the electoral campaign and subsequently. The upcoming early parliamentary elections in Moldova should finally transform Renato Usatii into a respectable participant in the country's political life, turning Our Party, withdrawn from the 2014 elections, into a parliamentary party. This will fully correspond to formation’s electoral potential and will meet the standard public request for the presence of populists in the legislative branch. At least today, Our Party looks like a political force capable of overcoming the electoral barrier, as well as taking part in organizing a coalition government. "Shor" – another populist party in conjunction with the association "Pentru Moldova" and the socialists forms a loose coalition in the current convocation of parliament. Despite all its conventionality and dubious accountability of the current government, it has adopted a number of laws and is implementing a program for postponing parliamentary elections. The Shor party, which plays a more active role than could have been assumed taking in consideration its initial result (primarily due to some deputies’ “purchase”), is also led by a political émigré, businessman Ilan Shor now living in Israel, whose return was being discussed almost the whole last year. The main Moldovan political emigrant remains Vladimir Plahotniuc, who is in Turkey and was expelled from Moldova following the diplomatic revolution in the summer of 2019. Even being abroad, the former PDM leader retains significant influence on internal political processes, which was clearly manifested last year: Plahotniuc's hand was visible as in the split of the Democrats and in the epic with a vote of no confidence in the government, so in organizing mass desertions. There is no doubt that the former “master of Moldova” will continue playing a significant role in the country's internal political life. It is unlikely that at this stage someone will want to directly introduce it into the game but if it is necessary to drastically change the alignment before the parliamentary elections or immediately after them, this option must not be completely ruled out. Moreover, the foreign policy situation is developing successfully for Plahotniuc: the American democrats who had previously supported him did not only regain control over the White House, but also ensured superiority in both chambers of parliament. This may well open up new horizons for the puppeteer and facilitate its return to Moldova – and not at all for being imprisoned. With guaranteed participation of Renato Usatii, with the hypothetical involvement of antagonists Veaceslav Platon and Vladimir Plahotniuc together with Ilan Shor, the parliamentary elections are capable of agitating and radically reformatting the Moldovan political reality, thus, strengthening the already significant Moldovan political emigration’s influence on the processes taking place in the country.