Expert: Maia Sandu Can Draw on the Ukrainian Experience in the Fight against Political Opponents

Nicolai TKACH US-backed radical steps taken by Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky in the fight against the opposition may become a model of action for Moldovan leader Maia Sandu Last week, Ukraine was one of the main regional political newsmakers. The decision of the National Security and Defense Council (NSDC) and Volodymyr Zelensky's subsequent presidential decree imposing sanctions against MP Taras Kozak and his three affiliated TV channels 112 Ukraine, NewsOne and ZIK provoked a rather violent reaction both inside and outside the country. Formally, this decision was built on the authorities' desire to curb activities of the Opposition Platform - For Life deputy T. Kozak, allegedly aimed at financing terrorism. De facto, everyone knows that these media platforms have regularly criticized actions of both previous and current Ukrainian authorities, and as a result were attacked by nationalist groups as far back as during the Poroshenko presidency. The latter, however, did not dare to take such radical measures against the opposition channels. According to a number of experts in the field of mass media and jurisprudence, the current situation is almost unique. The decision was made bypassing the stages of elaborating a NSDC decision and bringing the presidential decree to the attention of the executive authorities, which are traditional for such procedures. In addition, responsibility for the media should come within the framework of legal actions, using the right to defense and by the decision of media regulators. In Ukrainian practice, a precedent for the media resources closure on similar grounds was created in 2016 when personal sanctions against 17 heads of Russian news agencies were introduced. However, in that case, the application of the Law on Sanctions was possible in view of the existing Russia-Ukraine relations, since its wording specifically concerns foreign citizens. Extending the same legal mechanism to a Ukrainian citizen clearly goes beyond the scope of the national legislation, and indeed it seems to be a certain know-how. Given the ongoing attacks on political telegram channels that criticize the president and the authorities, the rather unceremonious closure of TV channels can be regarded as a deliberate crackdown on the Ukrainian information space under the pretext of removing "hostile pro-Russian" elements from it. Apparently, this decision was primarily motivated by the accelerating drop in ratings of both the head of state and his Servant of the People party, for whom it was vitally important to somehow curb down the negative media background, albeit in such a radical way. The international response to the blocked TV channels looks extremely curious. The quite expected condemnation of this decision in the Russian expert community contrasted with the rather restrained reaction of the European Union. As for Washington, they directly supported Kiev's actions through the mouth of US ambassador to Ukraine, though, by all odds, such a move cannot be called democratic. By the way, it is possible that the decision was preliminary discussed and "agreed" during the contacts between the US and Ukrainian foreign policy chiefs held the day before the media were forced off the air. Developments in Ukraine are now probably monitored in the neighboring Moldova with special attention, where pro-European politician Maia Sandu became president at the end of last year. She came to power amid the strong disappointment among many segments of society with the previous head of state and her personal consolidating speeches and statements. This definitely invokes certain parallels with Volodymyr Zelensky (whom she met with during her tenure as prime minister). Restoration and development of relations with Ukraine, coupled with the joint efforts on the road to European integration, have already been declared by the Moldovan leader as one of the key foreign policy goals. It is not surprising that Maia Sandu paid her first foreign visit to Kyiv. The Moldovan president is well aware that in fact both states are regionally in one boat, with similar internal problems (low standard of living, corrupt governance, territorial conflicts, etc.) and a similar geopolitical agenda. It is no secret that Chisinau and Kyiv are by no means in the last place in the US strategy to encircle Russia with unfriendly Eastern European countries. True, their transformation into effective weapons against Russian influence in the region is clearly hindered by the permanent political instability and the continued presence of the Russian Federation both in the separatist enclaves on their territories and in the political field. Ukraine has made some progress in this regard over recent years: for the first time in the national history, the "green" team seized full authority, while the forces focused on reanimating Russian-Ukrainian relations do not have real levers of power. Moldova is still lagging behind its neighbor, although following a similar path. Maia Sandu, loyal to the West, has already taken the presidency, but now, like Zelensky in his time, she needs "her own" parliament and government to rule the country with a "firm hand". In this regard, the Ukrainian experience of "information and political cleansing" can be useful to her, especially since Sandu has more than once hinted at her readiness to break the letter of the law for the sake of an uncompromising fight against corruption and unscrupulous politicians. The very first days of her rule the president of Moldova started with customizing a vertical of power by initiating pressure on the "non grata" prosecutor general, provoking snap elections, establishing contacts in the judicial corps, etc. A hypothetical victory of her party in the parliamentary elections (especially if it secures a majority - although such a scenario seems unlikely so far, it cannot be completely ruled out) with the formation of a ruling coalition may create a temptation to subsequently liquidate opposing political groups in order to exclude the very possibility of the socialist revenge during the next elections. Washington actually supporting the current move by Zelensky (and concurrently silent Brussels) can serve an additional incentive for the above actions meaning that Sandu should also not be afraid of a negative reaction from the West to her "undemocratic" steps. Moreover, the United States is basically pragmatic in its foreign policy, showing considerable tolerance to the authoritarian ambitions of its satellites: after all, everything is fair in a geopolitical confrontation.