Sergiu CEBAN
Maintaining against the background of the worsening socio-economic and sanitary-epidemiological situation, the internal political crisis in Moldova might eventually force external partners to more actively intervene in what is happening.
The past week did not add clarity to the issue of overcoming the tough internal political clinch. The two opposing camps – the parliament and the president - continue occupying diametrically different positions and thus, keep the situation motionless. The head of state retains a particular intransigence of approaches and is still far from the idea that under current conditions any compromise is quite possible.
Meanwhile, the epidemiological situation in the country continues deteriorating. According to health professionals, this may indicate the third wave of the pandemic approach, and its dynamics will depend on vaccination’s intensity. By the way, the first batches of the "AstraZeneca" drug arrived from Romania and from the international platform COVAX to Moldova last week; afterwards the medical personnel vaccination started. In addition, details of a strange story leaked into the public space about an attempt to deliver "Sputnik V" to the left-bank territory and about a subsequent meeting at the level of parliament and government leadership regarding a large batch of Russian vaccine purchase.
As part of his weekly broadcast, Igor Dodon once again spoke out for the need to ensure the possibility of vaccinating the population with the Russian drug. However, socialist’s leader remains mainly concerned about the insurmountable internal impasse. Unlike Maia Sandu, the ex-president continues demonstrating flexibility and shrewdness when voicing another set of scenarios, according to which, in his opinion, the political reality in Moldova is to take shape in the coming weeks.
Once having soberly assessed the negative consequences of a possible president’s impeachment that would likely have a positive effect on Sandu and her party’s rating, Igor Dodon's entourage preferred apparently to reorient the Moldovan deputies to a more “passable” event, and namely to amendments to the country's basic law. This is, most likely about the transfer of the president's powers in terms of nominating a candidate for the prime minister to another government body. It seems that such a trick should help overcome the current "blockade situation" and exclude a similar relapse in the future. Actually, 34 deputies from the Socialist Party faction are able to come up with such an initiative and after the Constitutional Court approves this draft, 2/3 of the people's representatives can support the modification if Maia Sandu continues demonstrating firmness of intentions and refusal to dialogue with parliamentary forces.
At the same time, the main political players continue relying on the Constitutional Court. One believes, it should contribute to early election process launching, while others believe that the highest court will disqualify the head of state for usurping power. Meanwhile, proceeding from the next conclusion voiced by the Constitutional Court last week, the Themis servants are trying to maintain a balance and only partially satisfy opposition’s and president’s requests. Thus, the chances for the court to unexpectedly side with Maia Sandu after March 23 are rather low.
Well, of course, the president can continue bending her line and wait for another reason to apply to the Constitutional Court in April, when 45 days have passed since the first attempt to appoint the Natalia Gavrilitsa government. However, if the socio-economic and sanitary-epidemiological situation keeps deteriorating, such persistence may eventually force external partners to intervene more actively in what is happening. Because, at least, Washington and Brussels are not interested in deepening the crisis that would lead to Moldova’s final destabilization.
The first to feel the need for external players being involved was Andrei Nastase. Last week, he openly addressed his Western partners requesting to offer Moldovan politicians a civilized model of overcoming the internal political crisis. However, according to experts, the Da Platform leader, even showing his extreme “care” about the country, still pursues selfish goals to a greater extent. First of all, he intends obtaining external legitimacy so that to continue flirting with various parliamentary groups aiming at being elected as head of the so-called Anti-Crisis Cabinet of Ministers.
Nevertheless, as the 2019 practical experience has shown, international players can have a decisive influence on Moldovan politicians and stimulate them reaching agreed solutions based on even the most painful compromises. But, if Brussels has been quite actively
building up its agenda when joining internal Moldovan processes in recent months, then Moscow and Washington have not yet expressed much about the situation in Chisinau and remain focused on more pressing issues that affect regional reality.
The current relations level between the Kremlin and Western capitals is approaching bottoms, and somewhat reduces the likelihood of any cooperation between the leading external partners in the Moldovan direction, although approaches to Moldova may sometimes coincide. It is pertinent recalling that in 2019, after the well-known " Ambassadors’ Revolution ", it was Dmitry Kozak to openly state that the PSRM and PAS needed to carry out preparatory work as soon as possible and initiate early elections in order to continue country's political system de-oligarchization and form a truly legitimate parliament.
One way or another, even if such extreme parliament’s and president’s positions, there is still room for compromise. According to some respected diplomats accredited in Moldova, effective external mediation should begin with identifying several common subjects that can become points of political contact and cooperation between opposing state institutions. One of the most logical turning points of joint efforts is the fight against the pandemic with active assistance, mainly vaccine, from international donors.
Generally, the current situation and possible external involvement is a bad sign for the Moldovan state prospects and a fat minus for the political elites which are unable finding solutions in such a difficult time for the country. There is no doubt that such precedents do not pass without leaving a trace and moreover, can become a common occurrence in resolving other complex issues of strategic importance - be it country's external vector development, the Transdniestrian settlement or the military neutrality.