Expert: EU's Paralysis on the Moldovan Track Is Getting Inappropriate

Anton Shvets Brussels' inaction in Moldova and the long-term lack (with even no hint) of rationale in bilateral relations is an objective problem for the Moldovan society and political class. The political elite will degrade even further as the structures of the European Union drift away from the Moldovan affairs The head of the European Union Delegation to the Republic of Moldova, Peter Michalko, who will soon complete his failed mandate, was recently again forced to answer the question about the prospects for Moldova's membership in the European Union. The diplomat could not formulate anything new, except for the sore mantras about the need to fulfill the Association Agreement, “But now we need to make sure that the agreement is fulfilled. There is still a lot of work to be done to approach the European standards." In 2021, almost 8 years after the agreement was signed, relations between Brussels and Chisinau have narrowed down to the routine and obsessive commandments of the EU emissaries about the need to follow the principles set out in the Association Agreement. The bilateral cooperation between the EU and the Republic of Moldova seems to be frozen in times of the second Alliance for European Integration with Iurie Leanca, the then Moldova's Prime Minister, as Brussels' best student and favorite. Since then, no attempts have been made to charge the cooperation with new content. At that time, all instructions coming from the European Commission were unequivocally accepted for implementation, including with regard to the endless revitalization of the alliances for European integration, even though at some stage they consisted entirely of political antagonists and were united solely by a careful attention to the wishes and recommendations of Brussels. Half a decade has passed since that “golden age”, but the European Union not only failed to formulate new values in relations with the Moldovan society, which would not resemble obsolete bureaucratic clichés and humiliating moral teachings, but also simply withdrew itself from the daily political process in Chisinau. Any attempts by the EU Delegation or European Commissioners to comment on the political events in the capital of Moldova are days or even weeks behind the real situation. Activity of the American and Romanian ambassadors in Chisinau, as well as Moscow's influence through its confidants in the Party of Socialists, is in no way balanced by the practical actions of the EU residents. The scandalous disappearance of the former Ukrainian judge Nikolai Chaus is gaining a snowball effect. The EU, which has previously invested huge resources to boost Ukrainian-Moldovan cooperation as a counterbalance to the Kremlin's influence and as an instrument of pressure on the rebellious Transdniestrian region, is doing absolutely nothing to help Chisinau and Kyiv overcome this diplomatic split. Requesting Ukraine's Ambassador to appear at the Moldovan Ministry of Foreign Affairs and European Integration is an unprecedented case, as is the Moldovan side's public complaint that President Maia Sandu cannot reach her Ukrainian counterpart for more than a week. The consequences of this scandal can derail the EU's hopes primarily in terms of Ukraine-Moldova joint move to block the separatist Transdniestria, scheduled for this summer-autumn period.  Another example is quite indicative, testifying to the EU's strategic loss of confidence and initiative in Moldovan affairs. In early April, the chairman of the Moldovan parliament, Zinaida Greceanîi, appealed to the Secretary General of the Council of Europe with a request to mediate in resolving the institutional conflict in the Republic of Moldova. It is about the ongoing standoff between President Maia Sandu and the parliamentary majority over the dissolution of the current legislature and the holding of early elections. Ms. Greceanîi complains about the president’s refusal to nominate a candidate for prime minister from the parliamentary majority and “attempts to deviate from constitutional obligations”. The Speaker of the Moldovan Parliament reinforced her letter to the Secretary General of the Council of Europe with an appeal to the Constitutional Court asking to send a request to the Venice Commission of the Council of Europe to obtain an “equidistant, highly qualified opinion on constitutional issues”, i.e. regarding the observance by the President of the Republic of Moldova, Maia Sandu, of the constitutional conditions for the dissolution of the legislative body.  In fact, Zinaida Greceanîi preferred to ask for a position and build communication with the institution, whose secretary general called Moldova a captured state back in 2015; with an institution that has extremely difficult and toxic relations with Russian deputies who have largely patronized the political career of the speaker of the Moldovan parliament since the time of her membership in Vladimir Voronin's Party of Communists. Apparently, the mediation of the European Union is no longer expected in Chisinau, although, as already noted, earlier Brussels initiated the most bizarre coalitions and tactical alliances in Moldova not only to support those who ruled the country, but also against them. It is worth recalling the many months' tent strike in 2016, when supporters of Maia Sandu, Andrei Nastase, Igor Dodon and Renato Usatii together opposed Vladimir Plahotniuc's regime. The union of these politicians in 2021, if it was possible, would ensure representation in parliament at a level of at least 90%. Certainly, the European Union is demobilized by the Brexit and is deep into the vaccination and pandemic management issues. The growing influence of Eurosceptics in peripheral states (such as Estonia) and the physical aging of prominent political leaders who are staunch supporters of integration (Angela Merkel) raise questions about the internal restructuring of the union, retaining its leading position and ensuring an adequate standard of living for the population. The constantly deteriorating relations with China and Russia require attention. There will also be a long way to go with Washington to restore mutual trust after Donald Trump's four-year period. In this sense, Moldova and the overall Eastern Partnership cannot be a priority and areas of effective influence. It should be recalled that a few weeks ago the EU emissary failed the reconciliation process between the Georgian authorities and opposition, in fact acknowledging his inaptitude to solve this task, or how France was the only one from the “OSCE Minsk Group” to learn about the summer war in Nagorno-Karabakh almost from the media and then hurried to catch up by releasing consolatory parliamentary resolutions on the need to recognize the independence of the region, with its one half already de facto under the control of Azerbaijan and another half - of the Russian peacekeepers. Back in November 2019, President Emmanuel Macron stated that NATO was “brain dead”, which sparked tense debate among the Alliance members. With Joe Biden as US President, NATO's military-political and strategic activities are being revised and the bloc does not look so much like a relic of the Cold War. Perhaps we should talk about the “death of the European Union's heart,” since its moral dominance in Eastern Europe, while maintaining institutional positions, has been completely lost. The fatigue and passivity of Brussels testifies to the growth of entropic processes, which finally destroy the discipline of Moldova's political class and exacerbate the plight of the population. If the values are not reformed after the forthcoming replacement of the EU delegate in Chisinau, Moldova, which hasn't yet transformed into a truly European state, may never become one.