Do Neighbors Respect Moldova's Sovereignty?

Vladimir ROTAR Recent events have highlighted Moldova's negative tendencies in relations with its neighbors; they perceive it less and less as an equal partner. For any country, relations with bordering states are one of foreign policy’s key directions. Moldova is no exception in this regard. At the same time, due to various historical reasons, communication between Chisinau, Kiev and Bucharest has never been cloudless. The last relatively serene period in the republic's relations with its neighbors dates back to the times of the Democratic Party's rule, when its leader’s ties with the same oligarchs in Ukraine and Romania (Plahotniuc-Dragnea, Plahotniuc -Poroshenko) ensured a certain "harmony" within contacts with geographically close partners. As well know, large-scale political reshuffles in these three countries took place in 2019, and that brought down the oligarchic regimes, renewed the leadership, and forced them starting to build mutual communication literally from scratch. It didn't work out very smoothly, especially after Maia Sandu’s government resignation. The “social democratic” Moldovan authorities were not favored either in Ukraine or in Romania whilst the latter has even taken a number of openly unfriendly steps in the international arena.  Maia Sandu's victory in last year's elections was supposed to mark a new page in Chisinau's relations with its neighbors. This could be facilitated as by the already established contacts of the new head of state with the leaders of these countries, so by Sandu’s European reputation that was so pleasant to them. This is partly what happened - literally in the first months of her presidency, in an atmosphere of maximum friendliness, meetings were held with Klaus Yohannis and Volodymyr Zelensky. It seemed that a renaissance in the Moldovan-Romanian and Moldovan-Ukrainian relations was on the way. However, the reality turned out to be completely different. Only this month, there have been two egregious events that have vividly reflected the existing imbalances in regional interconnections. The fugitive Ukrainian judge, Nikolai Chaus was abducted in Moldova in early April. The audacity of the operation carried out in the Moldovan capital during the day attracted attention. For almost two weeks, the resonant story remained one of the central news in the media. There are still a lot of white spots within but it is at least clear that the Ukrainian special services and the Ukrainian Embassy were involved in Chaus’ abduction, whose military attaché took the ex-judge to Ukrainian territory. The fact that Kiev is directly involved in the case is openly discussed both in the Ministry of Internal Affairs and in the presidency. It only remains to find out who exactly initiated the "theft". Many experts and politicians point directly to President Zelensky's Office. Now, the Ukrainian side is trying to get out of the media- political blow and is expanding the version that Chaus was anyway going to be extradited (on March 15, 2021, the Collegium of Civil, Commercial and Administrative Disputes of the Supreme Court of Moldova refused to grant him political asylum), which means there was no point in kidnapping him. On the other hand, there allegedly was a motive among his past Ukrainian authorities’ patrons, who were afraid of his possible testimony during the court proceedings.  It sounds good but in fact, it is very doubtful that Chaus could have been given out anytime soon. After the March 15, decision, the first instance court was supposed to continue hearing the case on his extradition, but even if its decision was positive, there was an opportunity to dispute it on appeal and cassation procedure. That is, the process risked dragging on for another year or even more. Anyway, using its Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba, Kiev is obviously misleading Chisinau when not recognizing its participation in the Chaus case. At the same time, under the pretext of being busy with aggravation in the east of the country, Volodymyr Zelensky continues ignoring Maia Sandu whose office has already sent three requests for a telephone conversation.  The second story, though not criminal but no less indicative is connected with the ambassador of our other neighboring country, Romania. He recently made a statement that was extremely impartial for the Moldovan public: «If I could open vaccination centers at the embassies, I would not vaccinate Moldovan citizens against COVID, I would probably vaccinate them against primitive Moldovenism or against those feelings inherited from Soviet times that they possess for Romania in a certain moment. " Subsequently, the diplomat tried to justify himself, but in the end, he only exacerbated the situation when uttering many different clichés within the framework of the well-known concept “one people - one language”. Needless to say, it is almost impossible to imagine such statements on the part of a diplomatic representative in any other state, especially when it comes to seemingly "fraternal" countries. One can of course, say these are only partial episodes but they clearly outline tendencies in Moldova's relations with its neighbors. The internal weakness of our republic, torn apart by endless crises, the lack of will and state thinking among political elites who are unable to defend the country's position, prompts Romania and Ukraine to use this to their advantage. There’s a growing impression they have no attitude towards Moldova as an equal partner on their part, either they have no desire to take into account its interests. All this gets aggravated by attempts to directly interfere in our republic’s internal affairs.  After all, Bucharest constantly seeks imposing an anti-Moldovan, unionist agenda, and fuels the corresponding sentiment. Enough recalling the way Romanian Academy criticized Moldovan language promotion last year, calling it "ideological manipulation" and "a product of Soviet propaganda." Along with, the neighboring state’s ethno-linguistic chauvinism that is tied to the idea of promoting Moldovan statehood’s elimination meets no resistance from official authorities (pro-Western or “pro-Moldovan”). Moreover, the country continues to freely register unionist formations; one of the latter is a branch of the Alliance for the Unification of Romanians. As for Ukraine, despite politicians and diplomats’ protocol words, the real relations between the two countries are far from mutual respect. It has long openly neglected Moldovan interests, which is clearly manifested when constructing for example hydroelectric power plants on the Dniester. The latter threatens Moldova with ecological and humanitarian catastrophe but Kiev is in no hurry to abandon implementing this project, destructive for us. As colleagues already noted, for the Ukrainian side, only joint coordination on the geopolitical perimeter is of real interest in the dialogue with Chisinau. Our republic is viewed as a potential partner needed to confront Russia and its influence, including by putting pressure on the separatist Transdniestria, squeezing out the contingent of Russian troops from there, actively participating in the so-called Crimean Platform. However, hardly any of this corresponds to the present Republic of Moldova’s interests, which has always benefited the most from stable relations with both the West and the East. Restoring ties with neighbors that Maia Sandu announced is an objectively overdue and necessary process (however, it has recently brought only headache for her herself). But at the same time, it is necessary changing the paradigm of these relations consolidating the status of an equal player for Moldova. For this purpose, it is required to firmly stand on one’s own positions and get any diplomat (who does not respect the Moldovan statehood, ethnos and language) vaccinated against "progressive unionism". Thus, we’d instill in our closest partners an understanding of Moldova as a sovereign and subject country.