Will Russia Start a New Integration Project in the Post-Soviet Space?

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Sergey CHEBAN The recent events suggest that Moscow is likely to offer a new integration alternative to the post-Soviet space in the very near future An “aggravation failure” - this is how experts assess the current situation around Ukraine, which threatened to turn into a large-scale catastrophe. Eventually, the degree of tension moved downwards after an unexpected call from American President Joe Biden to his Russian counterpart Vladimir Putin. During the phone conversation, the interlocutors discussed the international and regional agenda, and also agreed to hold a bilateral meeting on the territory of one of the European countries in the near future. Each side expectedly interpreted the decline in tensions and a dramatic turn of events to the internal audience in its own way. Kyiv, in particular, said that the American leader's call clearly signaled to the Kremlin the collective West's strong intention to stand up for Ukraine. Moscow explained the telephone conversation initiative as Washington's recognition of Russia's key role which can no longer be ignored and with which it is necessary to agree on many important issues on the global agenda. The White House administration, in turn, reported that the powerful potential of the North Atlantic bloc helped prevent the escalation in the region and Russia's seemingly imminent armed invasion of Ukraine, which could lead to a serious conflict in the Black Sea. Military experts believe that the main regional heavyweights managed to agree only on a temporary respite in order to avoid an unnecessary large-scale military clash. However, analysts have no doubts in general that the situation around Ukraine will one way or another continue to escalate, especially if the political form of the Donbass conflict resolution further gets less relevant, giving way to forceful scenarios for overcoming the current crisis. Russia and the Western military-political institutions led by the United States, apparently, have come close to each other in the post-Soviet space, inevitably provoking tension in the East European and Black Sea regions. This creeping deeper penetration is forcing Kremlin leaders to take more and more demonstrative and decisive moves, signaling that the post-Soviet territories, including in Ukraine, belong strategically to Russia. The essence of the message addressed to its Western partners is that the Kremlin is not ready to yield in this space and, if the West has an intention to squeeze Moscow, then it needs to prepare for a military scenario. Due to the unwillingness to militarize the dialogue, as well as amid the deliberately reduced diplomatic resources by the parties, mutual sanctions pressure tends to increasingly prevail. The fact that the next day after the aforementioned telephone conversation Biden signed another package of sanctions suggests that the call and the restrictive measures have some correlation. Most likely, telephone conversations with the Russian leader were not entirely successful, and the dates for the bilateral meeting originally scheduled for the coming weeks were postponed for the summer period. For several days already, the echo of a new wave of sanctions has been spreading through the EU countries which are trying to show their loyalty to Washington and expel another group of Russian diplomats. In addition to the symmetrical actions of the Russian Foreign Ministry, the Russian security forces also do not miss the opportunity to probe Kyiv and have conducted a special campaign against one of the Ukrainian diplomats, who was subsequently expelled to Kyiv. Undoubtedly, the further boost and re-escalation of relations is beneficial both to individual states and some internal groups who reduce the stability of the general situation, which can develop into a hot phase at any moment. The forthcoming communication between Biden and Putin is unlikely to lead to any systemic shifts in relations between the two states, as a result of an excessively strong mutual distrust and contradictions. The expected minimum plan is to reach some interim agreements that will prevent a frontal clash between Washington and Moscow, including by drawing conditional "red lines", including the post-Soviet zone, where conflict-generating processes are actively accumulating. The Kremlin seems to have long been preparing for communication with its American partners, reinforcing its positions and conducting training for the next "offensive" along its borders. In recent days, the media space has been actively exaggerating the intrigue around the prospects of Russian-Belarusian relations and the Russian President's message to the Federal Assembly scheduled for April 21. Apparently, in the very near future Moscow and Minsk intend to offer the post-Soviet space a new integration alternative, which was planned to be launched last year but was postponed by Moscow due to the Belarusian leader's actions. The day before, Putin and Lukashenko discussed the schedule of upcoming meetings and announced a meeting of the two leaders in the Russian capital for April 22. Moreover, the Belarusian president announced a program of joint intergovernmental events for the next few months, which will start with a major forum of regions. This will be followed by a meeting of the Union Ministerial Council, and in September-October - by the Supreme State Council of the Union State. It must be assumed that the next integration core will emerge on the basis of the union state, whose potential is likely to be significantly bolstered in the coming weeks opening up the accession possibilities for others. The early integration projects in the post-Soviet space, which were based on a collective initiative, apparently failed to produce the intended result, which forced Moscow to realize ​​the need to implement an individual model for absorbing the former Soviet republics or separate territorial formations breaking away from their metropolises. At the first stage, of course, the main emphasis will be placed not on Abkhazia, Ossetia or Transdniestria, but on the eastern and southern regions of Ukraine witnessing the significantly intensified centrifugal processes. The chain of events expected in the coming months, the inevitable reformatting of the entire regional space, which will undoubtedly have an increased influence on Moldova, calls for an early internal political stabilization in Chisinau in order to give its response to the events and formulate a clear position given the upcoming changes.