Sergiu CEBAN
So far, the communists and socialists are determined to continue their one-team work. However, the future unity of the opposition largely depends on how successful the ruling party team will be
Since the early parliamentary election results were announced, experts and journalists have been focused mainly on discussions about the staffing of the key government bodies and in what way the parliamentary mono-majority will take advantage of its unique position. The best protective measure against the endless stream of ideas, forecasts and assumptions in this regard is simply an advice to wait for the final denouement, which is expected within the next two weeks.
Meanwhile, no less pressing issue that escaped the eye of experts is the situation evolving in the opposition camp, which remains not only an important part of the internal political spectrum but also an integral element of any modern democratic state. Still, weakening and fostering the greatest possible disunity on the opposition flank are among the priorities of any government seeking the most comfortable conditions to implement its political plans.
Indeed, the only oppositional force represented by the Bloc of Communists and Socialists, voices its intention, at least at the public rhetoric level, to put pressure in the most decisive way on the PAS party which, as the BoCS leaders say, will not cope with the whole gravity of the situation in Moldova and will start going to pieces literally the next year according to the so-called "Ukrainian scenario". Thus, in the near future, the communists and socialists will most likely pursue a destructive opposition strategy harshly criticizing the ruling party and refusing any pragmatic compromise.
However, any successful attack on the parliamentary majority must be backed up by a well-designed and properly elaborated tactical line of systemic counteraction with an appropriate set of specific practical measures. Whether our opposition has such a well-functioning program of actions will become clear in the coming weeks, when PAS will get hold of all levers of power.
At the same time, despite the BoCS leaders' attempts to demonstrate the strength and unshakable unity of the bloc, a number of signs point to the fact that the internal situation in the "left alliance" is far from being favourable. For all the doctrinal closeness, it is known that the PSRM and PCRM still had plans to split into two factional groups in the new parliament. However, the weak result in the last elections, apparently, forces both parties to maintain the integrity of such a large structure, which visually increases the political chances. Whether such a platform is functional in terms of electoral results will become clear already during the elections to the People's Assembly of Gagauzia scheduled for September, in which the Communists and Socialists Bloc plans to take part in its current format.
It is no secret that PCRM and PSRM are two completely different, competitively-minded political groups, the former of which position themselves as experienced founding fathers, while the latter see themselves as a young generation of left-wing politicians who have much more prospects and subsequently the right to sideline their own respected predecessors. Judging by indirect signals, despite a certain imbalance in the mandates between the two political formations, the communists do not intend to yield to their allies and are even ready to lead the opposition movement.
Whatever one may say, but the PCRM and its leader Vladimir Voronin, with his two presidential terms, certainly have a bit more political experience. Unlike its partners from the socialist camp, the party generally feels its growing momentum, undergoing sort of a political renaissance. Therefore, it can be assumed with a certain degree of probability that the communists are rigorously promoting the idea that the faction led by the PCRM leader will be more preferable and allow removing the BoCS parliamentary group from the massive criticism and attacks, which will be leveled by the authorities at Igor Dodon personally affecting the faction as a whole.
Meanwhile, the socialist leader, judging by his public statements, does not see a great tragedy in the last election results which moved the internal political pendulum towards the pro-Western forces. Therefore, he is ready to climb on top of the opposition barricades and spearhead the political resistance to Maia Sandu and the parliamentary majority loyal to her.
Given the Constitutional Court's plans to approve the parliamentary election results this Friday, the new parliament will most likely hold its first ceremonial meeting next week to form its governing bodies and sectoral committees. It seems that electing the faction's chairman will be the first challenge for the opposition. Therefore, by that time the leaders of the Communists and Socialists Bloc will have to finally determine, or even make a Solomon's decision, whether a young promising politician with an impeccable reputation should take the lead.
PAS will undoubtedly make the most of the existing contradictions in BoCS and will by all means deepen the split in the opposition camp. Tactical flirting with communist deputies cannot be ruled out, which, judging by the restrained declarations of PAS representatives addressed to PCRM during the pre-election period, are the least toxic for the ruling party. It is possible that the parliamentary majority will offer an honorable place of one of the vice-speakers to Vladimir Voronin, as one of the most experienced representatives of Moldovan politics, who is able to make the opposition voice as loud as possible. At the same time, such a colorful and grotesque character will hardly be able to prevent the president and his parliamentary associates from implementing far-reaching political plans.
Oddly enough, but the further unity of the opposition will depend on how successful the team of the ruling party will be in its work. If all attempts to put obstacles to PAS fail, the socialists and communists will hardly be able to stay in the same team for more than six months. Therefore, by the time the authorities are confronted with the inevitable need to amend the Constitution, the opposition deputies will most likely be more inclined towards the non-aligned status, demonstrating greater constructiveness and readiness for dialogue with the current government.