The West Intends to Oversee the Destruction of the Transdniestria-Based Russian Military Arsenal

Sergiu CHEBAN

The new authorities in Moldova are trying to expedite the process of Russian ammunition destruction on the Transdniestrian territory under the direct control of the West

As a follow-up to the recent visit of Deputy Chief of Staff of the Russian President Dmitry Kozak to Chisinau and the attempts to find benchmarks to align relations between Moldova and Russia, there are signs of the ongoing preparations for the Moldovan delegation's visit to Moscow in both capitals. True, last week the Moldovan president admitted that she was not planning such a trip yet, since, according to her, it requires an appropriate level of preparation. One way or another, but in order for the visit to take place, and with the most successful outcome, all the necessary circumstances and conditions must properly develop. Most likely, the Kremlin expects a moderate rhetoric about Russia and its role in regional processes from Chisinau, as well as its willingness to make certain compromises that allow for Moscow's interests. The Moldovan authorities are noticeably trying to refrain from sharply aggravating relations with the Kremlin, although playing the "tightrope walker" role in an attempt to balance between the interests of geopolitical players is clearly not easy for them. Take, for example, Maia Sandu's public speech at the Crimean Platform. On the one hand, she gave an extremely harsh assessment of the illegal annexation of the peninsula before a high-ranking international audience. On the other hand, she neither made any reference about Russia, nor touched upon the Transdniestrian settlement issue and the Russian troops' presence on the left bank - despite the fact that our situation correlates quite well with the Crimean and Donbas problem, and it would be quite appropriate to mention it. According to experts, Chisinau is trying to get away with it, not very successfully imitating the "complicated" negotiations with Kiev on postponing a September 1 ban on all Transdniestrian-plated cars. Of course, the blocking measures were eventually applied. However, the Moldovan leadership is actively addressing Moscow with requests to accept this generally virtual attempt to resolve another crisis in the Transdniestrian settlement and be satisfied with the formal rhetoric. Talking to the Moldovan press, Dmitry Kozak mentioned the inadmissibility of creating problems for the Transdniestrian population. As we can see, problems did emerge, and now it's Russia's turn to make a move: if Chisinau pretends to have tried to solve this problem, will Russia pretend to have bought that? The head of state has somewhat distanced herself in one of the crucial issues of gas supplies and the country's energy security, placing all responsibility for a possible price boost for the Moldovan population on the Moldovagaz company. The majority owner of the latter, as known, is the Russian corporation PJSC Gazprom. What is important, the Moldovan leadership, unlike all other European capitals, took a principled stance in avoiding comments on the Nord Stream 2, a greatest energy challenge and threat to our Ukrainian neighbors. Despite all the variety of pressing issues in Moldovan-Russian relations, the military factor remains a pivotal topic shaping Moldova's status as a source of regional destabilization. Therefore, judging by the statements of the Deputy Prime Minister for Reintegration, Chisinau will draw Moscow's attention to this issue openly and vocally. Vlad Kulminski, closely linked to Western expert and analytical centers in the past, is known to handle the strategic planning in the head of state's circle. It is not by chance that he holds this particular government post, since the future prospects of Moldova directly depend on the outcome of the Transdniestrian settlement and the resolution of the Russian military presence in the region. Recently, Kulminski made a noteworthy statement on the air of one of the TV channels that the disposal of ammunition stored in the village of Kolbasna should take place under the international supervision, referring to the content of the meeting between Sandu and Kozak. According to the Deputy Prime Minister, nothing new was announced to the Russian side on this topic but it was only proposed to start early preparation to address this difficult task, since this is "not a question of geopolitics, but exclusively of physical security." In addition, the Deputy Prime Minister reiterated his position that it is necessary to withdraw Russian troops from the left bank of the Dniester, and this problem should be resolved at a multilateral level. On August 11, Dmitry Kozak confirmed at a final briefing that the Moldovan authorities had asked for assistance in resolving the Transdniestrian conflict and destroying the expired ammunition stored in Transdniestria. The Russian representative stated that Russia is interested in their disposal. But there are doubts that Moscow has suddenly changed its principled position and agreed to establish the international control. Such signals are not accidental. Characteristically, the President also decided to speak out on this topic yesterday, saying that the issue is "very urgent" due to the "environmental risks". Probably, the point is that the Western expert community might have again included the topic of weapons stock destruction in the Kolbasna depots in the top list. The main risk seen by foreign experts is Moscow's attempts to create conditions to further strengthen its influence by quartering auxiliary forces in the region and legitimizing the OGRV, which might be assigned with a new function to implement the disposal process. Through its representatives in the Moldovan leadership, the West is signaling about the inadmissibility of unilateral elimination of arsenals without deep institutional involvement at the level of the OSCE, and possibly even NATO, including the corresponding international "supervisory" military component. The issue of the future of weapons in the Kolbasna storage facilities has always elicited a jealous reaction from the Russian Federation, which has been providing full control, including the security and safety of depots, for more than three decades. Nevertheless, it must be assumed that this matter cannot be further delayed and Chisinau, being instructed from the outside, begins to speed up the process, politically prompting Moscow to reactivate the problem under the terms imposed by the "world community". Such a tactic was unsuccessful in 2019: the Kremlin finally got irritated by Moldovan maneuvers and simply postponed the issue. Two years later, the same situation happens again, but in a completely different regional context. And although no comments from Moscow have followed so far, it's safe to assume that getting things off the ground through a banal blackmail will be extremely difficult this time, too.