Sergiu CHEBAN
The transport issue revived the Pridnestrovian settlement and forced representatives of the two banks of the Dniester to engage in negotiations. Chisinau declares its willingness to address the problems of the residents of the region affected by the Ukrainian ban. Tiraspol, however, doesn’t seem to believe this and counts on Moscow's support.
The two-year stagnation in the Pridnestrovian settlement, apparently, is finally becoming a thing of the past. The transport crisis hitting the left bank after Ukraine's decision to ban Pridnestrovian vehicles from entering its territory revived the negotiation process, roused international observers and forced representatives of the two banks to start communicating regularly. The capital recently hosted the second meeting of the two main negotiators from Chisinau and Tiraspol this month, in an extended format – with the participation of field experts. The previous meeting, as we know, took place on September 3, when Kulminski and Ignatiev met in Bender, without press or foreign observers.
Judging by the final press release, yesterday the Moldovan side stressed the need to identify “quick humanitarian solutions for people and vehicles crossing the Moldovan-Ukrainian border”, as well as the importance of resolving all technical issues in this area. Among other things, reference was made to improve the functionality of the so-called Registration Offices in Tiraspol and Rybnitsa in order to enable as many people on the left bank as possible to use the services of the two centers.
The Tiraspol representatives predictably described the results of the meeting in the already traditional accusatory tone. They complained that Chisinau refused to jointly appeal to Kiev with a request to reconsider its decision and was allegedly unwilling to start working on certain mechanisms for re-registering cargo and passenger cars and issuing driver's licenses to Pridnestrovian residents.
One must give credit to the authorities, who have tried in recent weeks to choose a calm tactic and “cool down” the transport issue in the public space, ranging it as a low priority. The Bureau of Reintegration Policy, for instance, held a public discussion of the draft Government Action Plan for 2021-2022 for the unification of the two banks of the Dniester. A coordinated interdepartmental policy, updating the national legislative framework, resuming the activities of the platform for parliamentary consultations on the Pridnestrovian settlement, promoting sustainable development projects and initiating political “5+2” negotiations on all three baskets are among the main priorities.
Interestingly, last week the Deputy Prime Minister of Ukraine for the temporarily occupied territories, Alexei Reznikov, visited Chisinau and met with his Moldovan counterpart. As noted, the officials discussed security issues, the further implementation of joint control on the Moldovan-Ukrainian state border, the completion of the demarcation process, as well as the establishment of cooperation in reintegrating the territories.
While the topic of Pridnestrovian vehicles is gradually dropping out of the public discussion, foreign diplomats have only started to show their interest in it, as can be seen from the intensity of international meetings and foreign visits. In recent days, several European ambassadors visited both the right and left banks. It can be assumed that the purpose of the shuttle trips was to “probe” the situation and understand what Chisinau and Tiraspol are preparing for, how they plan to act, and how Ukraine’s decision regarding the cars with left-bank registration can affect the negotiation process and the regional situation in general.
Among others, the intelligence-type “raid” was made by the OSCE Special Representative Thomas Mayr-Harting. He informed about his preparations for a visit by the OSCE Chairman-in-Office, Swedish Foreign Minister Ann Linde, scheduled for October, and also about his desire to study the prospects for organizing a 5+2 meeting in Stockholm this fall. It should be admitted that the current context for the visit of the OSCE head and holding a round of negotiations is clearly not the best one. On the other hand, the fact that no one is going to abandon their big plans right now may indicate certain hopes of international partners for a quick stabilization of the situation.
Most likely, the diplomatic attention will be focused on Chisinau in the coming weeks, who is expected to make at least any gesture to alleviate the situation of the left-bank population and prevent possible risks of escalating tensions in relations with Tiraspol. This can explain the proposal to Tiraspol, voiced by the Moldovan delegation during yesterday's meeting, to submit a list of transport units affected by the Ukrainian ban, which will be carefully studied, including jointly with Ukraine.
This step is absolutely correct, since the key task for Chisinau now is to win as much time as possible in order to calm a small diplomatic stir around the transport “crisis” and to demonstrate its willingness to solve all the problems encountered by the residents of the left-bank regions since September 1.
Chisinau's compromise proposals to minimize the negative consequences can in fact suit not only Western and European partners, but also the Kremlin. In the run-up to signing the same gas contract, our diplomacy will have to work very hard and communicate to Moscow the idea of its full constructiveness in the dialogue with Tiraspol in order not to allow certain radical groups in the Russian establishment to convince Russia's leadership to toughen up the policy towards our country.
The negotiation process is resumed today in a bit overstrained manner, which to a certain extent hinders attempts to find growth points in relations with the Kremlin. At the same time, despite the prudent behavior of the Transdniestrian administration, there is a lingering feeling that Tiraspol has taken a wait-and-see approach, and, not believing in Chisinau's true intentions to help, is looking forward to some favorable reactions from Moscow. However, the latter may also choose to hold off, while awaiting, together with other international “colleagues” in the settlement of the conflict, a “shift of wind” in the Moldovan-Pridnestrovian relations.