What Is the Role of Moldova in Ukraine's Plans to “Kill” the Dniester?

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Sergiu CEBAN
The silence of Chisinau against the background of the impending environmental disaster on the Dniester apparently suggests a secret political agreement between Moldova and Ukraine
In recent weeks, scientists and environmentalists have been particularly vocal in sounding the alarm about the condition of the Dniester, which is adversely affected by Ukraine's plans for the active construction of energy generating facilities. Since the commissioning of the Dniester hydroelectric complex, specialists have begun to record a decrease in the maximum flow by 30%, the appearance of a pulsating effect (known as hydropeaking), significant fluctuations in the average annual temperature of the river. As a result, all this led to siltation and bio-contamination, the disappearance of 19 fish species and a reduction in commercial fish stocks by 96%. Even though Moldovan and Ukrainian politicians try not to show alarm, calmly monitoring the situation, they nevertheless understand that it is impossible to hide the problem any longer. During the recent visit to Chisinau of the Deputy Prime Minister of Ukraine, co-chairman of the Moldovan-Ukrainian intergovernmental commission Alexei Reznikov, the sides agreed to hold a joint meeting of field experts who should discuss the critical problems of the common waterway. Chisinau proceeds from the fact that the Dniester is a river that crosses the territory of the two states, which means that it is for mutual benefit to keep on cooperating to ensure sufficient water quality and amount for everyone. At the same time, building on the statements of Ukrainian representatives, Kiev seems to have the same interests, because the Dniester is a drinking water source not only for Moldova but for the population of certain regions of Ukraine as well. However, the actions are still far from the words. Negotiations to agree on the functioning of the Dniester hydropower unit began back in 2008 at the initiative of Ukraine, which has long been seeking to make the most of the hydrological potential of the Dniester. In the meantime, Moldova has failed to clearly formulate its specific interests in this matter. Moreover, in 2017, in the midst of the “honeymoon” between Chisinau and Kiev, it was the strong reaction of the civil society and environmental organizations that helped prevent the signing of an agreement on building the hydroelectric power plants. It is known that the draft of this document almost completely served Ukraine's economic interests, but did not take into account the needs of the river ecosystem. The Moldovan authorities are trying to carefully balance around this complex topic which complicates relations between the two neighboring countries and impedes their further development. Some of our officials are promoting the idea of ​​preparing and signing a certain regulation for the operation of hydrological facilities, which will provide for monitoring, control and appropriate regulatory measures to prevent possible problems. While Chisinau is trying to find a "comfortable" position, Kiev, meanwhile, is much more decisive in its actions and continues working on the installation of new hydroelectric power plants on the river. As a result, on August 17, the fourth turbine of the seven planned at the Novodnestrovsk pumped storage station was launched. Such a negative trend, coupled with the tactics of a soft but confident offensive by the Ukrainians, poses a great danger for the republic and our main waterway, which provides about 70% of the volume of drinking water consumed and, without a doubt, is our strategic resource. Therefore, this issue requires rethinking and responsible moves in order to somehow counterbalance the actions of our eastern neighbor. Experts and environmentalists are justifiably indignant at the very suspiciously cautious behavior of, inter alia, the new Moldovan authorities. The latter have more than a sufficient range of means and instruments, including international ones, to influence Kiev and slow down the construction of hydrological structures on the Dniester. Such counter-offensive steps are necessary at least before all the necessary conditions for the functioning of Ukrainian technical facilities and ways to minimize the impact of these facilities on the ecology of the river are agreed. Our government should take a clearer stance, including at the international level, and exert maximum diplomatic efforts to persuade Kiev to abandon plans to quickly implement its energy infrastructure projects. In addition, Moldovan authorities should “declassify” the negotiations with the Ukrainian side and give them maximum publicity through the broad engagement of the interested public and non-governmental organizations in the drafting of an agreement on the operation of the Dniester hydropower hub. Meanwhile, on August 26, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky signed a decree “On the Strategy of Ukraine's Foreign Policy Activities”. The core priority in relations with Moldova in this document is to reach the level of strategic partnership between the two states. Characteristically, the key short-term tasks of cooperation are the settlement of existing problems related to the completion of the border demarcation, as well as ensuring the functioning of the Dniester integrated hydroelectric complex. This means Kiev has already identified for itself a priority direction in the talks with Chisinau and is extremely determined to close the issue of hydraulic structures in the upper Dniester River as quickly as possible and with minimal damage to its benefits. Our government has not yet revealed a desire to oppose anything significant to the pressure of Ukrainian diplomacy, which cannot but worry, given the importance of the Dniester ecosystem for Moldova. In fact, the Moldovan leadership of the republic, “keeps mum” watching the environmental disaster descend upon the republic. Experts more often see the signs of a secret political agreement with Ukraine in this silence of the Moldovan leadership. After all, in 2017, when Chisinau and Kiev were about to sign an agreement that was unfavorable for Moldova, our country managed to open the first joint customs control on Ukrainian territory and thereby launch systematic work to establish control over the Pridnestrovian segment of the Moldovan-Ukrainian state border. Apparently, this time, the “silence on the Dniester” will be exchanged for certain perks. But whether it will even out the possible losses from "killing" the Dniester is a big question.