Europe is following with concern the sharp aggravation of relations between Belgrade and Pristina caused by the car plates problem, fearing a direct armed clash between the parties. What is the background of the new crisis in the Kosovo settlement?
Dorin MOCANU, RTA:
Serbia's relations with the self-proclaimed Kosovo are going through hard times again. Tension has been growing between them over the past week: the sides are mobilizing additional units of security forces and heavy military equipment towards the contact line. And the official reason for the aggravation of the situation, oddly enough, was the issue of license plates.
The problem burst out last Monday, when the Kosovo authorities banned the use of Serbian license plates on their territory, offering car owners to use temporary Kosovo plates with a fee of 5 euros. In Pristina, the decision was called a reciprocal measure: Belgrade also does not allow vehicles with Kosovo plates to Serbia, forcing the autonomous region residents to also purchase temporary plates for a period of 60 days for a respective fee.
The actions of the Kosovars provoked strong reaction from ethnic Serbs living in northern Kosovo, who began to break through the transport blockade by force. Due to the frequent confrontations between the gathered at the checkpoint disgruntled citizens and Kosovo law enforcement officers, Pristina decided to reinforce the Jarinje and Brnjak checkpoints with additional SWAT and police units. The security forces were provided with heavy equipment and automatic weapons, while special means were allowed to be used against small groups of protesters.
Belgrade responded robustly to the actions of the separatists by drawing additional formations of the armed forces as close as possible to Kosovo as well as bringing units nearby to the territory of the region into a state of high alert. In addition, Serbian President Aleksandar Vucic said that military units would be ready to enter the territory of Kosovo to restore justice in case of NATO's inaction, ensuring the security and freedom of movement for the population.
In response, the Kosovo administration demanded that Serbia's armed formations be withdrawn to a safe distance, implying the possibility of holding a referendum on unification with Albania in the nearest future in order to bring the conflict with Belgrade to an end.
Despite the gravity of the situation, the current escalation could hardly escalate into a direct armed conflict. Each side has its own reasons to act demonstratively and radically. First of all, it concerns Pristina, where there is an active growth of internal dissatisfaction with the recent years’ process of “strengthening” the international status of the unrecognized republic. Kosovars’ reasons to worry increase in number every year. So, for example, in early August, information appeared in the press that about ten more states intend to revoke their recognition from Kosovo.
The Serbian-Kosovo talks in Washington organized by the United States in September last year must also be recalled. As a result, an agreement was signed to normalize the situation, including a number of accords on road and rail communication, mutual recognition of diplomas and diversification of energy supplies. An important point was Pristina's annual refusal to apply for membership in international organizations, while Belgrade promised to suspend the foreign policy campaign to revoke recognition of Kosovo's independence.
However, the Serbian-Kosovo deal with Donald Trump has almost fallen apart today. The vehicle problem that has arisen is likely to become the most convenient excuse for both sides to withdraw from the Washington agreement signed under the previous American administration as quickly as possible. Cessation of all last year's compromises will allow both Belgrade and Pristina, at least, to return to the usual form of their relations, without creating a sense of “surrendering” or “capitulation” among their own population.
It should be noted that the current escalation is taking place in a changed geopolitical environment. Even the Serbian leadership behaves much more decisively, although previously it only responded “verbally” to the Kosovars’ provocations. This time, Belgrade demonstrated Russian-upgraded military equipment and even issued a 24-hour ultimatum to the NATO leadership to return the status quo with access to Kosovo for Serbian transport. It is known that the forces of the block have already arrived at the Jarinje checkpoint. It should not be ruled out that Alexandar Vucic’s political courage was inspired by certain assurances from Moscow about its readiness to intervene in case of an unconventional situation requiring Russian military participation.
It is known that the Kremlin has been devising its Balkan plans for a long time, so a small skirmish between Serbs and Kosovars is not only a good reason to try and impact on the “course of history” in the Balkans and the difficult fate of Belgrade, but also to return to this difficult European region, edging out strategic rivals. Of course, this is not just about the United States and the North Atlantic Alliance. The peninsula has long been of particular interest to Turkey, that promotes the concept of neo-Ottomanism in nearby regions. However, Moscow is no stranger to close pragmatic contact with Ankara.
Pristina, relying mainly on the White House, is apparently playing its own game and amid the current crisis probing the degree of readiness of Joseph Biden’s new administration to respond and maintain a leading role in the Kosovo Serb settlement. Washington's determination to finally move away from the Trump model of finding compromises and resuming the process of accumulating the number of countries that have recognized Kosovo will be a crucial factor for Pristina.
The vehicle crisis, having inflamed Serbian-Kosovo relations, suggests obvious semblances with how the Pridnestrovian settlement is currently proceeding. Of course, both conflicts are very different in their essence, nature and specifics. Meanwhile, one way or another, all territorial conflicts have similar problem areas and related processes that need to be analyzed and taken into account. The vehicle issues in Kosovo and Pridnestrovie differ significantly and drawing exact parallels would probably be inappropriate. However, it was the problem of license plates that became the very sparkle that fueled another conflict between Belgrade and Pristina along with the risks of armed confrontation.
The relations between Chisinau and Tiraspol are now actually close to aggravation, with further escalation into a tense phase of confrontation. Besides, any escalation with unpredictable consequences may become an additional determinant for internal destabilization that will complicate the already difficult state of affairs for the current government.