Will Russia Regroup Its Forces in Moldova?

Sergiu CEBAN

It seems that Moscow has not given up and is eager for revenge in Moldova, carefully preparing for a new round of the apparently inevitable internal political crisis in the republic

The presidential and parliamentary elections in our country have become the turning point for the Russian Federation, bringing closer awareness of its role in Moldova. It is difficult to say to what degree the conclusions drawn from the series of defeats of political forces loyal to Moscow over the past year are correct. Nevertheless, certain “rehabilitation” and reassessment measures have evidently been taken, and the Kremlin has slowly begun to regroup its forces. Despite all the seemingly reduced attention and some cooling of interest in Moldova, Moscow has apparently reconsidered the work in the Moldovan direction, aiming at preserving the existing tools of influence on the republic and strengthening its positions. All this should provide the basis for the formation of strong and long-term conditions for political influence on Chisinau. The geographic and geostrategic status of our country, the amount of resources invested by Russia in Moldovan politicians, parties, economic sectors, business, the media sphere, as well as in the Transdniestrian settlement, let the Kremlin take hold in our region. Despite the opinions of numerous Russian skeptics who do not see Moldova as particularly important for Moscow, a number of signs indicate that in the near future our country will remain in the action zone of Russian foreign policy. Today, it can be assumed that the main goal of Russian strategists is to increase the number of party projects of various ideological orientations and the alignment of these forces along the entire perimeter of Moldova’s political spectrum. Probably, the key conclusion to which Moscow was pushed by the summer parliamentary elections is that it is no longer possible to rely solely on pro-Russian projects on the left flank to take confident post-electoral positions. This is largely due to the transformation of Moldovan society, the decline of the Russian-speaking population, changes in the electoral structure and citizens’ political preferences, as well as the increase in the quality of social demand for Moldovan political elites. Despite the weakening of Igor Dodon and the Party of Socialists' positions, all idle arguments about abandoning these political projects do not stand up to any criticism so far. Most likely, we can only say that the PSRM and its leaders have lost the status of Kremlin’s unequivocal favorites. For now, however, the Socialists remain a rather popular political formation, which Moscow either way will have to rely on over the coming years. The main intrigue in recent months has unfolded around the Bloc of Communists and Socialists, which was predicted either a rapid collapse, or the final “merging of assets”. Prior to the elections, the formation leaders made a variety of statements about post-election turns of events, including plans to create two separate factions. As a result, we saw the consolidation of the opposition, and this implies that the next logical step should be the unification of the two parties. However, earlier this month, speaking positively about cooperation with the PSRM within the parliamentary faction, Vladimir Voronin nevertheless quite sharply rejected the idea of full unification with the Socialists, citing the ideological incompatibility of the parties. Besides, the Communist leader dispelled the rumors about him discussing this issue with Igor Dodon. Whether this is a manifestation of political bargaining or a sign of the Communists’ unwillingness to be absorbed by their associates, will become clearer closer to November. Then the PCRM will hold a republican congress, where decisions will be made on the future fate of the party. Igor Dodon, in fact, returned the favor to Voronin last week, saying that the Communists have no chance of remaining on the Moldovan political Olympus without the Party of Socialists' support. According to Dodon, since the Communist Party leaders see no need to proceed with inter-party integration, the PSRM is ready to continue its political path independently. The central segment of Moldovan politics, which is actually empty now after the Democratic Party of Moldova left the country's political life, is apparently becoming a qualitatively new direction for Moscow's efforts, in addition to the traditional routine activities on the left flank. The fact that those who usually vote for the centrist parties decided to give preference to the Action and Solidarity party in the past early elections is, according to experts, a temporary phenomenon and is largely due to the lack of a viable alternative. For that reason, experts agree that in the coming years the Kremlin will actively work to develop a new project to be subsequently placed in the center of the Moldovan political spectrum. Currently one might notice an ongoing steady selection of frontrunners and leaders of the new party who are gradually changing their positioning in our political market as promising young politicians able to offer citizens an alternative moderate course of the country's development. The stepwise pace suggests this is going to be a long-term process. However, given the current state of affairs of the incumbent government, it is possible that a new centrist party might be officially launched ahead of schedule. Among the most obvious contenders are the Governor of Gagauzia, Irina Vlah, and the Mayor of Chisinau, Ion Ceban, who are more and more often go beyond their local agenda and voice the claim to continue a political career on a national scale. At the same time, consistent efforts are made to increase interest from the broader electoral strata through putting emphasis on the Romanian language, the need to build good mutual relations with all external partners, as well as special relations with the EU and Romania. It should be noted that the rhetoric of this category of high-potential politicians is primarily distinguished by public and pronounced distancing from Igor Dodon and from all the toxic processes on the left-flank. It seems that Moscow has not given up and is eager for some revenge in Moldova and cautiously preparing for a new round of internal political crisis, which, apparently, is inevitable. Diversifying projects and broadening the range of tools, which we wrote about a year ago, have become the only possible option that can preserve real prospects for Russia in our region.