Russian-American Negotiations and “Frozen Conflicts” in Europe

Anton Șveț

Discussion of the pan-European security problems by Moscow and Washington at some stage will inevitably include the settlement of territorial conflicts on the continent

The appointment of a Deputy Prime Minister for Reintegration, despite a long search for a suitable candidate, will inevitably increase the attention of the country’s leadership to the Transnistrian settlement. In the current circumstances, it will come in very handy. Now it is vital to draw up an adequate response to modern geopolitical trends characterized by the launch of a strategic dialogue between the US (as well as NATO and the OSCE) and Russia on European security issues. These negotiations will not necessarily lead to results, but over time they will include an increasingly wide range of problematic issues, which, of course, include “frozen conflicts”. This is also understood by President Maia Sandu, who asked Oleg Serebrian after taking the oath to “identify a peaceful diplomatic solution to the Transnistrian conflict”. This was the case in the late 2000s, when Moscow and Washington started a “reset” of relations under the presidency of Dmitry Medvedev. Then, at the suggestion of the Russian Foreign Ministry, ideas about a “single and indivisible” space of pan-European security from Lisbon to Vladivostok appeared. Agreed upon after Medvedev’s meeting with German Chancellor Angela Merkel in 2010, the creation of a Russia-EU committee on foreign and security policy was accompanied by commitments to cooperate on resolving the Transnistrian conflict as well. At the same time, back then, the situation in the negotiation process was not particularly encouraging – the 5+2 format did not work, Chisinau and Tiraspol practically did not communicate, the referendum on independence and accession to Russia held on the left bank of the Dniester was still fresh in memory. However, global players were not particularly concerned about this. They knew well that they had sufficient capabilities to turn the situation in any direction. Therefore, even if the current alignment in the settlement is also not called inspiring, Moscow or Washington hardly see this as a significant obstacle. Moreover, the adjustments on the Transnistrian issue were actively conducted in an informal manner throughout 2021. The OSCE and a number of experts with a serious professional background actively participated in the process. Now Russia is basing its talks on NATO’s non-expansion eastward and return to the state of the mid-90s. Topics considered in isolation from other issues can hardly suit Washington, since the very logic of the alliance’s existence implies a policy of expansion and containment of Russia. Therefore, the Americans will seek to reformat or, at least, expand the agenda, which is standard practice in such cases. Besides, the idea of a dialogue on security issues on the European continent without due regard to the status and prospects of territorial conflicts seems per se to be absurd, since they pose a direct threat to this security, which the UN and OSCE have repeatedly recognized. Thomas Graham, a prominent American expert on Russia, is of the same opinion and has already boded the inclusion of “frozen conflicts” in the pool of negotiating topics. Meanwhile, he puts forward a rather unexpected version of resolving them via referendums under international monitoring in order to find out with certainty what people living in the disputed territories want. In fact, the expert calls for a “peaceful divorce” as a remedy to overcome contradictions and also considers that a 20/25-year long moratorium on NATO’s eastward expansion is possible. Such a scenario, seemingly catastrophic for the current political elites of Moldova and Ukraine, one way or another, can be discussed in Washington for a number of reasons. First, a delay in NATO enlargement would per se mean nothing more than a principled agreement to such expansion in the future, which would be a tangible success of American diplomacy. Any deadlines in this situation are conditional. For example, the so-called Kozak memorandum implied the quartering of Russian troops in Moldova for a period of 15 years from the moment of signing, i.e. already in 2018 Russia would have disbanded and withdrawn the OGRF. Now, in 2022, few people would remember that they were here. Secondly, resolving conflicts by secession would finally legitimize the reality that has developed after the secession of Kosovo on the Balkan peninsula with the dominant position of the United States, NATO and the EU. Today Serbia remains a bastion of friendly relations with Russia and anti-American sentiments largely because of Russia’s principled position on the Kosovo precedent. Thirdly, the separation and consolidation of Transnistria and Donbass by Russia with the possibility of the “metropolises” joining NATO would consolidate a noticeably large part of these former Soviet republics’ territories in the zone of the US priority influence without the need to maintain depressed pro-Russian regions. Washington has always considered the “divide and rule” principle quite operable in its foreign policy. But such an approach would also be beneficial to Russia, which would protect its strategic borders, as well as the interests of the Russian-speaking population of Moldova and Ukraine. It would also eliminate the prerequisites for confrontation by creating a platform for cooperation through direct but “regulated” contact. So, in the negotiations on security guarantees initiated by the Kremlin, quite promising topics may gradually emerge, which increases the degree of current Moldovan government’s responsibility for the development of events on the banks of the Dniester. Full concentration and responsibility will be required, since the negotiation void and the logic of the geopolitical “zero-sum game” can quickly form into a consensus around the Transnistrian problem, which will become undesirable or even deadly for the political course of the republic.