Sergiu CEBAN
Judging by the results of the Munich Security Conference, the West is also considering the emergence of new dividing lines in Europe, which will delineate areas of influence as a result of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict
Last week witnessed an international security conference in Munich, one of the world’s major forums of this kind. There are only a few such high-profile venues during the year to bring together most state leaders and global elites. These include the high-level week at the UN General Assembly in New York in September, the Davos Economic Forum in January and the Munich conference in February.
A few days before the conference, an analytical report on global security was presented at a special event in Berlin, which can be considered a starting point for further discussions on the margins of the forum. Notably, its title was “Lose-Lose?”, which implies “a loss for all”. Even this title makes it clear that the mood of the international political elites and expert community is rather pessimistic. In fact, this is the logical outcome when global players are guided solely by their own selfish goals and do not care interests of other actors. In this case, everyone will eventually lose.
Last year, the Russian-Ukrainian conflict was naturally the central topic in Munich, but this time it gave way to the Middle East crisis and the presidential campaign in the United States. Europe is anxiously watching the internal political turmoil in Washington and is afraid of Donald Trump’s return to the White House. In addition, if last year the threat from Russia ranked second in the overall list of fears, this year it has dropped to the ninth place. The first three lines in the “security index” rating were taken by environmental and climate change problems, followed by fears of economic crisis and fears of mass illegal migration.
The growing pessimism and uncertainty is a perfectly natural reaction to what has been happening in the world over the past few years, starting with the pandemic. Areas of instability are expanding every year, the number of security problems is increasing, and there are fewer and fewer ways to resolve them. This situation reflects primarily the deterioration of the present system of international relations, including the gradual loss of the U.S. leadership position, which used to be based on the ability to keep various regions of the globe stable and under control.
One of the challenges for Western elites in 2024 will be the need to formulate a new strategy for the war in Ukraine as Moscow takes over the military initiative. This happened, among other things, because of delays in the disbursement of U.S. military and financial aid, while European military arsenals and defense capabilities were largely depleted or limited. Obviously, this significantly reduces the potential of the Ukrainian army and, as a result, Ukraine’s prospects of ending the conflict with its stated goals of reaching the 1991 borders.
In such circumstances, Kyiv seems to be considering different strategies, for example, entrenchment on the current front line until better times come. While on a visit to Europe, Volodymyr Zelensky signed a security guarantee agreement with Germany and then with France. A month earlier, a similar document was signed with the British Prime Minister in the Ukrainian capital. Apparently, this creates a certain basis for a post-war coalition format of support for Kyiv and for Ukraine’s accelerated accession to NATO. Although statements are still being made on the margins of the Munich conference that the question of joining the North Atlantic Alliance is undecidable until the end of hostilities.
The potential consequences of Donald Trump’s new election were also one of the main topics of conversation at the Munich forum. The main questions hanging in the air ahead of the U.S. presidential election are whether the unity of the Western world in supporting Ukraine will be maintained and what the new White House chief of staff’s policy towards the Russian-Ukrainian war will be. “The Trump phenomenon”, however, has already intensified intra-European discussions about whether EU countries need to establish their own security system if Trump’s policies paralyze NATO’s effectiveness. Obviously, statements by the U.S. presidential candidate should be construed in terms of his inherent bombast. Nevertheless, if he is re-elected, the bloc’s functioning mechanism may indeed be adjusted towards shifting the financial burden to Europe. This frightens European leaders, who will have to speed up the development of the defense-industrial complex and reduce social obligations, at the risk of putting power in the hands of local populists.
Although no official documents are adopted in Munich, the importance of this event lies in the fact that in behind-the-scenes contacts, a common vision of the majority of states, especially in the Western world, is formed with regard to this or that security issue. Therefore, it is also crucial for our leadership to understand what our country should expect from the West in terms of determining Moldova’s place in future European arrangements.
Alas, the uncertainty around the European security due to Washington’s policy changes will inevitably lead to an increase in risks and unpredictability of the entire regional space. One of the first chapters of the Munich Conference report is devoted not only to Ukraine, but also to other countries that the authors included in the “grey zone” between NATO/EU on the one hand and Russia on the other. These include Moldova, Georgia and the Western Balkans. “Despite verbal commitments by Western leaders to move Eastern Europe out of the gray zone, it is unclear how quickly this will happen and whether the transatlantic partners are willing to pay the price,” the report said. Simply put, according to experts, Western leaders may refuse to enter into direct conflict with the Kremlin over the countries mentioned, and perhaps even sacrifice them. Therefore, all the aspirations of our authorities to be on the right side of history may cause Moldova to get stuck in a gray, in terms of security, geographical perimeter for long.
Some may have been encouraged by the alarmed call of Munich Security Conference Chairman Christoph Heusgen that if Russia does not lose the war in Ukraine, we should expect it to reach Moldova or the Baltic states. However, judging by the statements of German officials, the West must prepare to learn to live with dividing lines again, once the European security structure crumbles. Considering the EU vague position, it is still difficult to understand whether European capitals are ready to draw these lines on their own, since otherwise Russia itself will define the limits of its geopolitical frontier and area of influence on the European continent.