Two Years of Hostilities in Ukraine: What Lies Ahead?

Sergiu CEBAN

The situation in the Ukrainian conflict on the eve of its second anniversary is strikingly different from what was a year ago. Moscow now holds the strategic initiative, while Kyiv is facing mobilization problems, reduced Western supplies and the threat of internal political instability. A chain of landmark political events in Russia, Ukraine and the U.S. will surely determine the course of the war this year

On 24 February 2022, the Kremlin started a full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Initially conceived by the Russian command as a blitz operation with minimal casualties, it immediately went awry and could have ended in a compromise as early as March-April. However, as fate would have it, it was destined to escalate into the largest European war since WWII, the end of which, alas, is still not in sight. Now 18% of Ukrainian territory is occupied by Russia, and more than 6.4 million Ukrainians have become refugees. The number of military and civilian casualties is not precisely known, but most estimates put it in the hundreds of thousands. On the eve of the second anniversary of the conflict, the prime ministers of Italy, Canada and Belgium, as well as former British Prime Minister Boris Johnson, arrived in Kyiv together with the head of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen. There they held a G7 meeting in the format of a video conference to relay their intention to continue providing aid, sanctions and economic pressure on the Russian Federation and on those countries that help Russia circumvent it, as well as to voice their support for Volodymyr Zelensky’s “peace formula”. Meanwhile, the front line, almost 1,500 kilometres long, has not changed significantly in recent months. The sides are engaged in an exhausting fighting aimed at reducing the enemy’s resources and reserves. Nevertheless, there are other versions of what is happening. According to one of them, Russia is trying to knock out key bastions of the Ukrainian defense, such as Mariinka and Avdiivka, one by one, before launching a larger operation to crash the front. Throughout 2023, the Russians have accumulated and continue to accumulate personnel, ammunition and military equipment, while levelling the front line. During the autumn-winter campaign, the Russian general staff has largely focused on small-scale operations and reconnaissance tactics, striking at specific locations in search of weaknesses in the Ukrainian defense. Unless there is a sharp turn towards diplomacy and negotiations in the coming months, experts predict a large-scale strategic operation by Russia closer to early April of this year. In general, over the two years, the hostilities went through several transformational stages. After the tactics of military and political blackmail failed to have an effect in the first months, the Kremlin turned the conflict into a classic large-scale war, being, by the way, unprepared for it. This resulted in a retreat from Kharkiv and Kherson oblasts, and, accordingly, an increase in Kyiv’s military advantage. However, inflated expectations from the AFU summer offensive in 2023 led the armed confrontation to another phase and the revision of Ukraine’s military prospects, primarily in the West. As a result, the strategic initiative and advantage has so far shifted to Moscow. A glance into the underlying causes of what happened shows that the Russian-Ukrainian crisis itself is not only the second phase of the USSR disintegration but also Ukraine’s attempt to withdraw from the post-Soviet geopolitical and geo-cultural space. In addition, we are witnessing a new type of modern conflict centered on the formation of enlarged, strong, viable social systems with their own supranational identity. Hence, this type of warfare in the European part of the post-Soviet perimeter will most likely lead to the collision of two large areas that will incorporate certain territories or state formations. This explains why, two years later, having abandoned the initial policy of military coercion, the Kremlin has moved on to a more sophisticated form of destroying the organization institutions of Ukrainian society and dispersing it. The main effort is aimed at absorbing human resources and re-educating the Ukrainian population to enable the development of the “Russian world” project. Therefore, while losing thousands killed, Moscow is actually making up for its losses with millions of Ukrainian citizens, who will be offered a more moderate form of identity harmonized with all-Russian social practices. Ukraine continues to resist, but the internal legitimacy of the government raises more questions amidst missed opportunities in the economic and military spheres. The decline in the quality of the situation’s management is leading to growing confusion among Ukrainian elites and centrifugal processes around Volodymyr Zelensky. There is also a lack of understanding within Ukrainian society as to which alternative leadership group could be brought to power to bring about a possible change in policy and preserve the socio-political cohesion of the state. If by the first anniversary of the war in the winter of 2023 the internal Ukrainian discourse operated with the question “how to win?”, by the second anniversary it has shifted to “how to survive?”. According to the latest sociological polls, about half of citizens believe that things in the country are heading in the wrong direction. At the same time, in the first months of the war, more than 70 per cent of citizens thought the opposite, although in terms of military situation things were much worse for the AFU. 2024 won’t be a time for planning a counteroffensive by the AFU and military operations, but rather a period of creating deeply echeloned defensive lines in Ukraine. It is important for Kyiv to ensure the country’s internal territorial and political cohesion and to objectively assess the limits of its own resilience in order to begin work in earnest on a plan to end the war. Its own vision will first and foremost allow the Ukrainian authorities not to become hostage to foreign geopolitical strategies, which may imply the risk of the ultimate loss of statehood. In terms of time, the key points that are likely to be decisive in the Russian-Ukrainian war this year are the following. First, the March presidential election in Russia. By the time of the re-election and/or possibly closer to the inauguration, the Russian defense ministry will try to add an additional “military success” to Putin’s victory. The second is May-June, when Volodymyr Zelensky’s mandate will expire, which may cause internal political turbulence. It will surely be exploited by the Kremlin to deal a painful blow to the Ukrainian leader and his credibility. And the third point is the U.S. presidential election in autumn, which may also be accompanied by active measures of the Russian army in order to convince the American voter of the strategic mistake of the White House head, Joe Biden, who chose to escalate relations with Moscow. As much as our politicians would like to mind their own business, Moldova is in the thick of things and this situation is likely to get worse. Since Russia has started the war in Ukraine, almost 1.4 million Ukrainian citizens have entered our country, of whom 116 thousand have stayed on our territory and more than 2 thousand have been granted citizenship. On the eve of another anniversary, just like last year, the Transnistrian region is once again in the spotlight, but this time due to speculations about possible recognition/accession to Russia. This news wave became a convincing evidence that Moldova and the unresolved conflict on its territory are a part of a complex regional puzzle and a vulnerable spot that can fail at any moment.