Driven Escalation in the Middle East and Moldova’s Interests

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Anton ŠVEC
The recent weekend was marked by a large-scale Iranian air attack on targets in Israel, which attracted international attention. Moldova, which has no special interests in the region, is nevertheless forced to closely monitor the situation and the actions of its allies
Tehran launched a massive attack against Israel on Saturday night as a predictable response to the destruction of the Iranian consular office in Damascus, Syria, which killed Iranian military personnel, including a top leader of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. The five-hour attack involved several hundred drones and more than a hundred cruise and surface-to-surface missiles. Meanwhile, the escalation was fairly controlled. The Israeli military recorded limited damage and the destruction of 99% of aerial targets, including due to the assistance of the US, UK and Jordan. The Israeli command is considering scenarios of retaliatory strikes that will inevitably intensify the escalation. However, the international community is calling for restraint. In particular, the problem was discussed at a meeting of the UN Security Council, where Russia stated Tehran’s right to self-defense and the inadmissibility of attacks on diplomatic institutions. Washington also discourages Israel from continuing the exchange of strikes and refuses to participate in an attack on Iran, although it has declared its full support for the Jewish state. Switzerland and Turkey are actively building bridges between the players involved in an effort to manage tensions and prevent further attacks in the Middle East. There are still many factors in the conflict that could theoretically provoke escalation, but the external participants are striving for reconciliation. Our leadership, meanwhile, diplomatically responded to the situation with duty calls, largely similar to Bucharest’s position. Thus, Chisinau condemned the Iranian strikes, expressed solidarity with the people of Israel and called for no further escalation. In addition, on Monday and earlier, the Foreign Ministry advised citizens to refrain from visiting Israel and a number of other countries in the region without serious necessity. In general, official Chisinau in its diplomatic assessments demonstrated unity of approach with the collective West and concern for the security of its own citizens. There was probably no point in expecting a fundamentally different reaction in such a situation. Moldova has no crucial interests in Israel or the Middle East. The extradition of the oligarch Ilan Sor, which Tel Aviv failed to agree on, is hardly one of them, especially now that the politician has settled in Moscow and is fighting the regime of Maia Sandu from there. There is a fairly large Moldovan diaspora in Israel, but its main part is represented by ethnic Jews who emigrated to Israel from Bessarabia and Soviet Moldavia during the 20th century and in the very early 1990s. There are about 85-100 thousand such persons in Israel, but they are all ethnic Jews and citizens with full rights. There are no more than 25,000 labor migrants in Israel on work contracts who need consular services and other attention from Chisinau - a number not comparable to key destinations in the EU (Portugal, Germany, Italy, Romania) or even Russia. At the same time, a close analysis of the situation reveals a certain interest of Moldova in keeping escalation in the Middle East limited and controlled. Direct clashes between Israel and other countries of the region, primarily Iran, are fraught with a full-scale war with a wide involvement of international players. Neither Washington, London nor Berlin will be able to shun the conflict. And even Emmanuel Macron’s France, which intends to become a key counterweight to Russia in Moldova and Romania and, in this regard, is actively exploring the regional space. The West already spends resources to supply Tel Aviv’s military operation in the Gaza Strip and fighting the Houthis in Yemen who attack naval vessels in the Gulf of Aden (blocking the Bab el-Mandeb Strait may have been a major problem for international trade, as well as attempts of sabotage against internet infrastructure). It is extremely important to the current government that military and financial resources of Western countries remain in Eastern Europe and are used to deter Russia. Chisinau actively feeds from the European Peace Facility, receives funding from NATO, the European Union and military aid from individual countries - Great Britain, France, Romania and Poland. Romania is conducting hidden mobilization with the aim of targeting the Black Sea and Moldovan theatres of military operations. In addition, the current regime directly links its own security to Ukraine’s ability to defend itself and deter a Russian offensive. Kyiv is facing near-fatal problems due to a shortage of U.S. funding stuck in the U.S. Congress. Diverting western resources and attention to the defense of Israel in the current circumstances would be a disaster for Ukraine and Maia Sandu’s administration. Chisinau should therefore pray that escalation in the Middle East remains within a relatively pragmatic framework. And that’s exactly the kind of thing that can be a known problem. Israel, as already mentioned, is studying options for a military response to an Iranian air attack (since Tel Aviv has not received support in the UN Security Council). Its line will largely be determined by the internal politics of the Jewish state, which has been very volatile for a number of years. Israeli elections have been held five times since 2020, and no coalition has been able to hold on to power. Current Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu of the Likud party heads a minority government, lacks popular support and has faced constant mass protests, including after the start of the operation in the Gaza Strip. Experts say that Benjamin Netanyahu retains power only as long as Israel is at war. However, the confrontation with Hamas has an extremely unpredictable trajectory. Tel Aviv has failed to achieve its goal of disarming and seizing the Gaza Strip and establishing a sanitary zone there. Hence the significant risks of escalation. Continuation of the military operation with civilian casualties and violations of humanitarian law may lead to such plots that the Islamic countries of the region will find intolerable and launch an armed defense of Palestine. Or, on the contrary, Hamas resistance will be promptly crushed, which may lead to the mainstreaming of the theme of confronting Tehran on the Israeli agenda. This is the point of the escalation phenomenon - it is difficult to manage and can be influenced by a variety of factors, ranging from domestic political factors to trivial mistakes, reduced to misinterpretation of mutual signals. The risk is high, despite the conciliatory statements of external players. By the way, the problem of escalation control directly concerns Moldovan affairs as well. Chisinau deliberately aggravates relations with the Transnistrian region and the Gagauz autonomy by applying a whole range of measures that Tiraspol and Comrat consider restrictive and discriminatory. Whether Maia Sandu’s regime elaborates the risks involved and whether it acts independently in this matter at all remains to be seen. But an aggravation in Moldova would be an extremely high stake for PAS in the hope of Western assistance and, obviously, the last one, if for some reason this assistance does not come.