Conflict in Ukraine: Between Negotiations and Intensified Warfare

Sergiu CEBAN

The war in Ukraine has entered a new phase, with Russian forces on the offensive in many areas, making gradual advances, and Kyiv experiencing an acute shortage of weapons and ammunition. Against this backdrop, there are renewed efforts to put an end to the conflict by diplomatic means

Neighboring Ukraine has recently reached the 10-year anniversary since the outbreak of the anti-terrorist operation in Donbas. On 13 April 2014, interim Ukrainian President Oleksandr Turchynov announced the start of the ATO after units of retired Russian military marched into Ukraine’s eastern regions. Two months later, on 26 May, already elected President Petro Poroshenko made a statement that “the ATO cannot and will not last 2-3 months, but must end within hours”. However, due to the large-scale support of quasi-state formations by the Russian Federation and the recurrent direct involvement of the Russian military, the hostilities in eastern Ukraine grew into a prolonged conflict and subsequently escalated into a full-scale clash between two regular armies. As of today, the situation on the front is rather alarming for Kyiv. The Russian armed forces keep on their offensive in a significant number of areas, slowly pulling the Ukrainian forces out and forcing them to retreat. The Russians are trying to develop their main offensive in the Donetsk oblast, where the AFU is facing a difficult situation in the Bakhmut direction and near the town of Chasiv Yar, the battle for which will apparently be the major topic of military reports in the coming months. Now certain of its air superiority, Russia is massively using aviation and heavy glide bombs, which make it possible to destroy Ukrainian military positions and to take the offensive initiative for more than half a year now. In the first three months of 2024, the Russian army captured more than three hundred square kilometers of territory, rather unimpressive result in general, but quite solid by the standards of this trench warfare. It is obvious that the pace of Russia’s advance on the frontline in 2024 has accelerated due to the delays in aid from the Western allies and, above all, the USA where support for Ukraine has become a subject of domestic political intrigue. According to Volodymyr Zelensky, the AFU is experiencing a serious ammunition shortage and the available resources are sufficient only for defensive operations. The deficit of ammunition forces Kyiv to save money and prioritize critical sections of the frontline, which in turn increases the risk of a Russian breakthrough in other, less equipped segments of the line of contact. Based on the statements by the Ukrainian leaders and intelligence officials, Kyiv expects the Russian army to intensify its offensive operations by the end of spring and early summer, mainly in the Donetsk oblast. However, according to experts’ assessments, Moscow’s limited resources suggest that no large-scale attack should be expected, except for an increased intensity of fighting and overall tension on the entire front line in order to further exhaust the Ukrainian army and identify vulnerabilities in the defense. Even this limited nature of offensive operations during the summer may allow the Russian Federation to achieve greater operational success. Due to a decrease in resource support, including for air defense systems, Moscow is launching a series of strikes against Ukraine’s energy infrastructure and, consequently, the country’s economy. In particular, Russia has changed its tactics of attacking energy facilities, using precision missiles to destroy power plants in less defended areas. As a result, in the worst-case scenario, total electricity generation may drop by up to 50%, which will inevitably lead to an increase in the price of electricity to cover the cost of repairing the destroyed plants and to pay for European imports. Amid the resource and combat exhaustion, the Ukrainian leadership, under pressure from its military and Western partners, took a painful decision by passing a new law on mobilization through parliament. Even before its adoption, it caused great resonance and discontent among Ukrainians. According to experts, the reduction of the mobilization age from 27 to 25 will potentially allow to enlist up to 140 thousand additional people to the AFU. On the one hand, this inflow of manpower will help restore the number of armed forces. However, the lack of Western assistance in the amount of previous years, fatigue from two years of war and its unclear prospects greatly reduce the motivation of new recruits and will inevitably weaken the combat effectiveness of the units. The war between Ukraine and Russia is always accompanied by a parallel process aimed at launching peace talks. Given the experience of recent years, any escalation on the front line is preceded by a wave of diplomatic and behind-the-scenes contacts. A certain revival of efforts to possibly halt hostilities in Ukraine can be observed now. In a certain sense, Kyiv and its Western allies are interested in some respite to decide on the form and volume of further support. In addition, complex electoral processes are looming in both Europe and the USA, making it difficult to adopt any fundamental decisions. Many people link the prospects for peace processes to China, which already received German Chancellor Olaf Scholz and is expecting Vladimir Putin in May. After that, the Chinese leader will travel to France. Some crucial points in China’s stance have already been voiced by official representatives. Thus, Beijing supports the convening of an international peace conference with equal participation of all sides and impartial discussion of all peace initiatives, which should be recognized by both Ukraine and Russia. In this sense, Kyiv’s attempt to convene a summit in Switzerland based on Volodymyr Zelensky’s “peace formula” is facing difficulties, reducing both the number of the participants in this event and the likelihood that it will be held in the format envisaged by the Ukrainian leadership. Despite the Chinese factor, Moscow probably realizes that Kyiv will never accept Beijing’s leading role in the peace process for a variety of reasons. Therefore, while flirting diplomatically, it is likely that in fact the Kremlin does not expect to seriously consider any peace settlement proposals this year and will continue to nominally proceed with the plan to inflict a strategic defeat on Ukraine. Russia has long and openly said that it is not going to negotiate anything with Kyiv, so all military decisions will be aimed at maximizing its negotiating position in the dialogue with the new White House administration, which will not begin until 2025. Chisinau is closely monitoring not only the front line in Ukraine, but also the external situation that is forming around the Russian-Ukrainian confrontation. The question of possible post-conflict scenarios and the extent to which they can affect Moldova is raised more and more often in expert conversations and, consequently, in governmental offices. It is obvious that we have to prepare for complex and enduring negotiations in order to achieve a better place and position in the new regional architecture. But the main conclusion to be drawn by our politicians is that it is better to have a decade of routine, sometimes fruitless negotiations on the most complex political, cultural and linguistic topics than years of bloodshed with no clear prospect of achieving initial goals.