Different Peacekeepers on Both Sides of the Dniester?

Sergiu CEBAN

One day, the familiar vision that has emerged over the past three decades in the region will fade into oblivion to be replaced by a completely different securitized landscape

Last week, Foreign Minister Mihai Popsoi held a “farewell” meeting with US Ambassador Kent Logsdon, who is completing his diplomatic mission in Moldova. He will be succeeded by the equally experienced new ambassador Kelly Adams-Smith, nominated by US President Joe Biden back in March. Concurrently, unconfirmed reports about setting up a FBI office in Chisinau appeared in the press. The office will allegedly operate within the walls of the US Embassy with a staff of up to 50 people, mostly US officers. It is known that one of the largest regional offices is located in Bucharest, and it was this office that cooperated with our relevant agencies. In fact, it is not so important how true the information is that several dozen FBI officers will be sent to Moldova. Obviously, sooner or later it was bound to happen, especially if, for example, the issue of transferring the territory of the capital’s stadium for the new US embassy had not been delayed. In general, all the indicators suggest that Washington’s efforts to build up its forces in Moldova has long been underway and will continue, as the number of important operational tasks here will only increase. Thus, the strategic line of the US geopolitical interests appears to be moving from the Prut closer to the Dniester. The most obvious sign of this is the intensity of the joint army drills, which, incidentally, are also taking place these days. Yesterday and today, our and the American military are carrying out paratroop training in the districts of Falesti and Floresti. More than 200 servicemen from the Fulger Special Forces Battalion and the US 82nd Airborne Division are jumping from a height of 350 meters from two C-130 Hercules military aircrafts, using the MC6/T-11 parachute system. In addition, our government has initiated negotiations with Bucharest to amend the Defense Cooperation Agreement of 20 April 2012. The new amendment will complete the document with a clause that implies the obligation of the parties to provide mutual logistical and administrative support for the preparation and participation in international peacekeeping missions. Given the reduction of expenses for such missions from the Moldovan side, part of them will be taken by the Romanians. Certainly, it would not go amiss to explain to the citizens what kind of peacekeeping operations we are talking about and whether there is any connection with Bucharest’s plans to legislate the possibility of its army to protect its fellow citizens outside Romania. Official reports say that all these moves seek to increase the level of participation of the Moldovan armed forces in peacekeeping missions, so that the republic is not only a consumer of security, but also a supplier. However, this explanation looks more like a cover for much more far-reaching goals related to preparation for different variants of developments in the nearest theatres of hostilities. Such openness on the part of Romania and NATO is a clear signal that our country is already under the strong geopolitical guardianship of the West, and it will not be that easy to derail it. Another important partner of the North Atlantic Alliance on its eastern flank is Poland. Therefore, it is absolutely no coincidence that a series of Moldovan-Polish military-political consultations were held in Chisinau just recently. Nominally, the need to develop political dialogue, military cooperation, and to restore international order based on the rules, norms and principles of the UN Charter was discussed. However, the contacts with Warsaw on security issues are most likely meant to elaborate a coordinated plan between all countries located on the Baltic-Black Sea arc of a potential military clash between the West and Russia. We have no intention to frighten anyone, but in our opinion today’s picture has quite clear contours and general intent. The cycle of large-scale global exercises of the U.S. Department of Defense that has started almost along the entire line of geopolitical contact with the Russian Federation, as well as the demonstrative involvement of Moldova in this campaign contains all the signs of the actual cancellation of the neutrality with the potential risk of being drawn into a military conflict, which may reach the territory of our country. Of course, in the conditions of confrontation between two large blocs or countries, the neutrality of the frontier states is always very relative and is more of a decorative value. Nevertheless, the MPs of the Communists and Socialists Bloc have once again registered in parliament a law on neutrality, which should clarify and expand the relevant constitutional article. There is no doubt that this initiative is doomed to failure, and its main purpose is for Russia to probe the current position of the ruling Moldovan elites with regard to the neutral status of the country. Meanwhile, in Moscow, after Vladimir Putin took office as head of state, the process of reconstructing the administrative framework, primarily in the government, was launched. The previous configuration has been largely preserved, but the main marker of change is the dismissal of the permanent Minister of Defense Sergei Shoigu, who has been replaced by the well-known economist Andrey Belousov. According to preliminary expert assessments, Putin’s decision indicates Russia’s intention to prepare for a prolonged confrontation and increase military spending. Some personnel reshuffles have also taken place in the Russian presidential administration, which is known to be the key superstructure over the entire system of government bodies in Russia, ensuring manual management of the country. Given the upcoming reappointment of Sergey Lavrov, the overall foreign policy course is likely to remain unchanged. However, it is more important for us to understand who will be responsible for the Kremlin’s policy in the post-Soviet space or, much worse, for Moldova personally. Putin’s former special representative for the development of trade and economic relations with Moldova, Dmitry Kozak, has retained his post of deputy head of the PA, but it is not clear whether he will be further engaged in our issue, and whether Moscow is not planning to return to the practice of establishing a separate post with the functions of supervising Transnistria. Assigning another Rogozin or Moscow’s more focused attention on our country does not bode well for Russian-Moldovan relations. As we see, everyone has their own plans for us. Russia’s goal, presumably, is to force the West to retreat to its original positions. What real intentions of the West in Moldova are, no one dares to say aloud. Most likely, different variants are being considered, both in case of freezing of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, and gradual shift of the front, and offensive of the Russian army deep into Ukraine. It is hard to believe that in such conditions Moldova will be used as a showcase, rather the opposite – a well-equipped fortification. The only question is the future strategy: will they build a buffer strip along the Dniester to the sea in order to protect Romania and the Danube delta from a possible Russian invasion, or the goal is to prevent Russia from taking the entire Black Sea coast of Ukraine. By and large, Chisinau has long been resolving its security issues without regard to Moscow’s position. So, one day, the familiar patterns that have emerged over the past three decades in the region will fade into oblivion and be replaced by a completely different security landscape. Depending on the circumstances, we may face all sorts of things, up to two different groups of peacekeepers on both banks of the Dniester.