Will Viktor Orban’s Shuttle Diplomacy Reach Moldova?

Anton Švec

“Peace Mission” of the Hungarian premier stands out from the general spectrum of opinions in the West about the strategy of action in the Russian-Ukrainian conflict. Will Viktor Orbán’s diplomacy bring the desired result and is Moldova in his plans?

After taking up the formal position of President of the Council of the European Union for six months, Hungary’s conservative Prime Minister Viktor Orbán immediately set off on an international tour. His stated goal is to achieve a cease-fire and start negotiations on a Ukrainian settlement. Earlier, the head of the Hungarian government repeatedly spoke out against continuing the war, arms deliveries to Kyiv and Ukraine’s membership in NATO. Even though the results of the elections in France and earlier in the EU have demonstrated the establishment’s resilience and ability to maneuver despite the changes in public sentiment, Orbán has serious support at home and in some other EU states, as well as in the new convocation of the European Parliament. Solidarity with his Hungarian colleague’s diplomatic mission has already been expressed by Slovak Prime Minister Robert Fitzo, who recently survived an assassination attempt. Despite the fact that the European bureaucracy (Ursula von der Leyen, Josep Borrell) and the leadership of a number of EU countries (e.g., the premiere of Sweden) sharply criticized Viktor Orbán’s frontrunning, he was welcomed in all major capitals. He held talks with Volodymyr Zelensky in Kyiv, Vladimir Putin in Moscow, and Xi Jinping in Beijing. Yesterday, Viktor left for Washington to attend the North Atlantic Alliance summit in Washington, where he will have a chance to say that he has listened to the views of both sides of the conflict and China. The latter, recall, came up last year with its own, most streamlined and cautious peace initiative. At least, the Hungarian prime minister’s administration claimed Orban would use his visit to the American capital for a “peace mission” as well. The Ukrainian and Russian presidents delivered their requested positions to him – Zelensky demanded continued military and financial support for Kyiv and did not support the idea of a temporary ceasefire pending negotiations. Putin also refused to suspend hostilities and called on Ukraine to withdraw troops from the ‘LDNR’, Zaporizhzhya and Kherson regions, threatening that the next proposals would only be worse. In parallel, Russia has intensified its rocket attacks on Ukrainian territories and continues to be proactive along the entire line of contact. At the cost of serious efforts and the transfer of reserves, the Ukrainian command has been able to stabilize the front in Kharkiv region, but crises are growing in other areas. In China, Orban discussed escalation control. At least, that's how Xi Jinping presented it, calling it a priority to cool the situation by adhering to three principles –  avoiding the expansion of the battlefield, the fierce fighting and the fanning of the flames by any side. According to the Chinese leader, “if all major countries invest positive rather than negative energy, a ceasefire in this conflict can come as soon as possible.” The interests of Hungary and China are to ensure that the fighting is not exported outside Ukraine and does not lead to a world war, and to keep open channels for dialog.  It is also about keeping the channels for dialog open. This is the bare minimum that for Beijing and especially Budapest is of utmost importance, and even such an achievement would already be seen as a success. In this sense, Viktor Orbán is playing against the consolidated position of the Western establishment, which constantly raises the bar for escalation, despite domestic problems and dwindling public support for this course. The Hungarian prime minister’s resolute diplomacy, which does not require substantial investments, carries virtually no risks for him, especially against the backdrop of the failure of the Swiss peace summit, the preparation for which took many months. At the same time, it cannot be ruled out that the agenda of his visits also partially included the issues of prisoner exchange (humanitarian dimension of the conflict) and/or food and nuclear security. If there is progress on these topics, Orban will be able to take credit for solving these purely Western tasks agreed with Kyiv, and will no longer be seen as a front. He will not even need to “stand apart” at the NATO summit; rather, he will be the most involved and active player, pursuing common goals by the methods at his disposal. The second half of 2024 is a crucial period for the Moldovan authorities, which includes presidential elections, a referendum, and the start of negotiations on Moldova’s membership in the European Union. The political factors for the next six months, given the preferences of voters, will determine the country’s long-term trajectory. Brussels’ reaction to the outcome of the referendum campaign and the election of the head of state will be of key importance. Moldova has been in the focus of Budapest’s attention for many years as a nation and as a member of the so-called Visegrad Four. It is on the basis of the Hungarian embassy that a single visa issuing center operates in Chisinau, opening access to most EU countries. Although the number of requests has decreased a hundredfold following the visa liberalization, Hungarian diplomacy continues to focus on interaction with Chisinau, often deviating from the pan-European line at the level of routine contacts. As a reminder, Viktor Orban visited Chisinau in March 2020 and held meetings with Igor Dodon and Ion Chiсu, now in opposition to the PAS regime. This does not cancel active support on the part of Budapest for Moldova’s European integration. In January, Viktor Orban met with Prime Minister Dorin Recean in the Hungarian capital and said that Moldova and Hungary are strategic partners, “Our cooperation in agriculture, banking and pharmaceuticals is exemplary. Hungary will continue to support Moldova on its path to the EU.” It is also important that, while hindering Ukraine’s European integration, Hungary always notes that it has nothing against the prospect of Moldova joining the EU, thus separating our countries in a common package that could prove useful in the future. On the other hand, Hungary will most definitely not support the militarization of Moldova and any conflict plots in relations with Gagauzia and Transnistria, because for Orban the main priority is to prevent the spillover of the Ukrainian crisis and reduce the conflict on the continent. If PAS needs artificial aggravation and a “short victorious war” to retain power, Chisinau should not expect support from Brussels or, at least, from the President of the EU Council in the person of Viktor Orban.