“Neither Peace nor War”: Situation with the Transnistrian Settlement

Sergiu CEBAN

It seems that the government’s strategy towards the Transnistrian issue is slowly changing, mainly due to regional trends and an already visibly weakening Ukraine

In the vicissitudes of internal political life, one should not forget to constantly stay informed about other topics of strategic importance for the country. Although the Transnistrian settlement has not been at the top of the list of important issues for the republic’s citizens for a long time, our politicians understand that the left bank needs to be kept under tight control and not to allow even the slightest cause for destabilization in the current circumstances. Europe is also closely monitoring the dynamics on the banks of the Dniester, expecting that the situation will be kept within the established framework. The first visit to Moldova in many years by the Director of the OSCE Conflict Prevention Centre can be construed as an expression of some concern and a desire to send a positive impetus. Traditionally, representatives of the OSCE Chairpersonship-in-Office also visit us by the middle of the year. However, after Thomas Mayr-Harting’s visit in early June, it became clear that no particular positive developments were to be expected. The first signal that the negotiations between Chisinau and Tiraspol were still not going well was the claims publicly voiced to the right bank by the Transnistrian leader at a meeting with the head of the European Union delegation. The discontent of the left-bank administration was caused by the refusal of the Moldovan negotiator’s office to sign the draft of the so-called “declaration on peaceful settlement” handed over in May. Krasnoselsky said the document contained only “an appeal for peace, mutual respect, and fulfilment of previously reached agreements” and called the position of the central authorities “incomprehensible”. Chisinau responded by accusing Tiraspol of deliberately launching “provocative initiatives” and reminding admonishingly of the “main goal of negotiations” to achieve a comprehensive and sustainable settlement of the Transnistrian conflict on the basis of Moldova’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. The other participants in the negotiation process did not comment on another deadlock in relations between the sides, even on such a trivial topic as a joint political statement. Only the Russian foreign ministry regretted the diverging positions of Chisinau and Tiraspol. In addition, the ministry casually underscored the urgent need to intensify the dialogue, which Russia, as a mediator and guarantor, is ready to facilitate. Moscow exploited the opportunity to advise a return to the tactic of “small steps”, i.e. the achievement of small concrete solutions in the interests of the population. Apparently, either the Russian capital knows something or cannot get used to the new reality, which will be full of a completely different content in the coming years. A return to the practices of cooperation between the two banks of the Dniester from the previous decade is hardly possible. And the fact that Russian diplomacy is not keeping up with the rapidly changing circumstances is not only Moscow’s problem, but also a risk for the entire process in which it seeks to play a leading role. On the other hand, while everything is complicated at the political level, some things are moving forward in the implementation of the existing agreements. For example, the parliamentarians passed a law allowing to prolong the mechanism of issuing neutral license plates, although earlier everything indicated that for Chisinau this issue had been “buried”. Moreover, stricter rules were expected for cars with left bank registration. In fact, this scenario is still rather probable after 2026, when the new term for issuing neutral plates ends. In addition, it’s noteworthy that the extension of the OSCE Mission’s mandate was not so conflictual this time, unlike the previous year, when the topic was deliberately overheated. At that time, the Russians threatened to shut down the field mission in Moldova because it was failing to fulfil its direct duties and made the convening of the 5+2 format a condition for the continuation of its operation. As we know, this was not done, but the organization’s office in Moldova remained. This is easy to explain: the OSCE is still the only structure to which current processes of communication between the conflicting parties and international stakeholders are linked. Therefore, I do not think anyone is ready to undermine it in any way now, radically changing the status quo and stepping into the unknown. Meanwhile, on July 3, the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly adopted a resolution following its session in Bucharest. Its separate chapter describes the state of affairs in the Transnistrian region. The OSCE PA notes that the 5+2 negotiation format is no longer functional and once again calls on Russia to withdraw troops and ammunition from the left bank. The document also contains a demand for the immediate release of all political prisoners arbitrarily detained in the region. And, of course, the main goal of the conflict settlement is to achieve a peaceful and sustainable solution within Moldova’s internationally recognized borders. Transnistria reacted rather painfully to the adopted resolution, calling its content “false accusations and biased assessments that have nothing to do with the real state of affairs.” The harshest epithets were showered on the Parliamentary Assembly, but there was also implicit criticism of the OSCE itself. In fact, nobody will remember the “peace declaration” proposed by Tiraspol, as well as the OSCE PA resolution in a week’s time. But the very fact that such documents appeared demonstrates a serious split and the absence of a once common vision of a model for ending the conflict among the international actors. In the meantime, it seems that both Chisinau and Kyiv have clear understanding of further coexistence in the current circumstances, and the unresolved conflict is not a hindrance at all. Recently, the foreign ministers of Moldova, Romania and Ukraine signed a joint declaration, in which they fixed the intention to place on our territory the capacities of electricity production for the neighboring country. This is about the supplies within the Power-to-gas project. Among other things, they also agreed to work on increasing the capacity of the Trans-Balkan gas pipeline, especially in case the transit of Russian gas through the Ukrainian territory is halted. In the meantime, representatives from Maia Sandu’s entourage began to say that the settlement of the Transnistrian issue had been postponed until after the parliamentary elections. At the same time, there is an assumption that the conflict will be resolved at peace talks on the results of the war in Ukraine in a general package of agreements related to the situation in the region. It seems that our government’s strategy in the Transnistrian issue is beginning to change, mainly due to regional trends and the already noticeably weakening Ukraine, which still provides Moldova with a geopolitical barrier. Apparently, our authorities plan to focus on a kind of “European integration of the Transnistrian conflict” and try to persuade Tiraspol to get involved in preparations for tough negotiations with Brussels. Alas, but numerous concurrent factors suggest that exactly the regional environment will set the tone to which our authorities will have to adjust.