Moldova and Its Role in a “Big Deal”

Anton ŠVEC

If a “big deal” on Ukraine really takes place after the U.S. presidential election, its terms will certainly include Moldova              

Joseph Biden, amid failed debates and repeated COVID-19 illness, announced his decision to withdraw from the November U.S. presidential election. Vice President Kamala Harris is now the leading candidate to succeed him. She has already managed to attract about a third of the votes of the Democratic delegates, and her ratings have been steadily rising since Biden’s unsuccessful sparring with Trump. Nevertheless, support for this candidate is far from unanimous, so there might be surprises. The Democrats could consider the option of California Governor Gavin Newsom, but there is little time to promote him, so party sponsors will probably refuse such a risky bet. Be that as it may, the position of the Democratic Party and the establishment as a whole, who by all accounts were extremely satisfied with the incumbent president, is extremely vulnerable. Donald Trump is the undisputed frontrunner in the election race, pumping up his ratings with a convincing performance in the televised debates and an impressive response to the assassination attempt in Pennsylvania. The latter event even allowed him, almost for the first time, to add unifying sentiments to his campaign and the intention to become “a president for all Americans”. Unless there are unexpected turns in U.S. domestic politics in the coming months (any external upheavals such as setbacks in Yemen or the possible failure of the Ukrainian front will only play into the hands of the Republican candidate) or physically removing Donald Trump from the electoral race, his victory seems a very likely outcome. Trump himself repeatedly stated that he could easily beat Kamala Harris, and reiterated this idea after the release of Joe Biden’s withdrawal letter. Thus, Donald Trump’s election rhetoric will very soon become part of the U.S. administration’s practical programme. In particular, this concerns the situation in Ukraine, to which the Republican has paid considerable attention in his campaign. The nomination of James David Vance as vice-presidential candidate, held with a view to the next elections and mobilization of the so-called “Rust Belt” electorate, further increases the likelihood of a “Ukrainian deal”. He has repeatedly criticized Washington’s current strategy on the Ukrainian conflict, calling to stop sponsoring Kyiv and demanding an end to the suffering of the civilians. Despite the totally opposite positions of Kyiv and Moscow (which, as it stands, are virtually impossible to bring closer without colossal concessions that would be difficult to explain to an internal audience), both sides, including Volodymyr Zelensky, are now signaling willingness to negotiate. Feeling Donald Trump’s serious approach, Viktor Orban, despite the zealous criticism of the Euro bureaucracy, embarked into his shuttle diplomacy, and the Ukrainian president had a phone conversation with Trump. During the election campaign, the Republican candidate repeatedly promised to resolve the conflict between Russia and Ukraine quickly, almost in “24 hours” if he won, even before his inauguration. He did not reveal details of how this would be done, but certain leaks suggest that the actual plan exists, as do the tools to force both sides into peace talks. Kyiv is known to be completely dependent on American funding, arms supplies, and information and diplomatic support, while the Kremlin is interested in the lifting of sanctions, dialogue on European security, and arms control. And Russians in general have repeatedly shown a propensity to bargain over protracted conflicts. Judging by Boris Johnson’s statements after his conversation with Donald Trump, he will attempt to draw the conflicting parties into the agreement that will force Kyiv to give up some of the territories seized by Russian troops and abandon its bid to join NATO. At the same time, Russia, which has the initiative on the ground, will hardly be offered all the annexed areas fixed in its constitution by referendums. Therefore, the Kremlin will traditionally try to amend the context of the deal in order to have guarantees and consider its own global objectives at least partially fulfilled. Of course, Moscow will raise issues of pan-European security, including in Moldova bordering Ukraine, where Russian interests appear (Russian peacekeeping contingent and, reportedly, 220 thousand Russian citizens in Transnistria). Our authorities, as they repeatedly said, relied on the fact that they had a lot of time and a safe environment to seek the capitulation of the Transnistrian administration without unnecessary negotiations. The bet was that Ukraine would defend itself and prevent Russia from reaching the border with the region, allowing the ruling party to quietly integrate the pro-Russian enclave under the slogans of European integration and through legislative and customs-economic pressure. In case of a “grand bargain” between Russia and the West, this balance will be significantly changed. Even though Russia will not be able to ensure its reinforcement in Transnistria, it is quite capable of requesting negotiations on the settlement of the conflict taking into account its interests. Given that the value of this particular ‘lot’ is not particularly high, the West may well meet Russia’s needs. Until the presidential elections in Moldova, a certain stability will be maintained, but afterwards the country’s leadership will have to swap its strategy to a more flexible one. We may be demanded to reduce cooperation programmes with NATO and military activity, to stop anti-Russian hysteria, as well as to make concessions in the conflict settlement process up to the resumption of the 5+2 format. This will be favorable for Tiraspol, which will have a chance to remove the most painful issues, such as duties on imports of goods or their export to foreign markets, including Russia. Moscow will not give up its military presence in the region and will not agree to reintegration without a reliably guaranteed status for Transnistria. It will also be necessary to decide whether the Transnistrian region will become part of Moldova’s accession to the European Union – the Kremlin will certainly keep in mind the fact that a referendum held there two decades ago confirmed the pro-Russian vector. A “Ukrainian deal” will trigger tectonic shifts in global politics, which will most likely require Chisinau to make concessions. Moreover, no one in Washington or Moscow will ask the opinion of the Moldovan authorities – if the U.S. administration pressurizes Russia and Ukraine, our republic simply has no instruments to balance the situation. Moldova as it is under Maia Sandu and PAS is coming to an end. Willy-nilly, we will have to agree to adjust the course, a de facto restart of the state or other hard decisions. If the “grand deal” fails, which is also very likely due to a large number of variables, Europe will face an expansion of the conflict and a major war, which will inevitably affect Moldova as well. For many years our citizens have had to choose between bad and very bad. It is not excluded that in the coming months the PAS regime will find itself in the same situation.