Strategic Divergence and “Soft Pressure” in Moldova-Ukraine Relations

Sergiu CEBAN

Despite the current tactical coincidence of individual interests, the strategic priorities of Moldova and Ukraine have been and most likely will remain different

At this historical point, Moldova and Ukraine are linked more than ever before by common interests and goals, which predetermine a high rate and long-term growth of mutual cooperation. The range of areas for joint efforts is as wide as possible: trade, economy, joint cross-border projects, development of transport, logistics and transit infrastructure, etc. However, despite the diversity of cooperative ties, there is always room for divergence, especially in understanding the strategy for further management of the regional space and its internal processes. On the way to the EU accession, both countries will have to work hard to implement various requirements and standards. Because of this, Moldovan-Ukrainian relations will be even closer and trade and economic systems will become increasingly mutually integrated. In such circumstances, Kyiv relies on the convergence of efforts with Chisinau to build a sustainable position in the dialogue with Brussels and European business. But let’s be frank: our politicians are hardly ready to act together with Ukrainian neighbors and consider Bucharest as a senior partner and lobbyist of Moldovan interests. At the same time, it is hardly possible to simply dismiss the eastern neighbor in the current circumstances. There have not yet been any particular public proofs of divergent views – the parties are focusing on where they are less likely to have contradictions. One of the main projects is related to the fact that in the perspective of a few years Ukraine, one way or another, will become one of the biggest construction sites in Europe. Therefore, our authorities expect to make Moldova a major regional transport hub in order to embed the Moldovan economy in the neighboring state’s reconstruction process. Undoubtedly, such ambitious plans need political fine-tuning, as appropriate interstate coordination mechanisms will be required. That is why the functional interaction on the Bucharest-Chisinau-Kyiv axis is built up. In fact, this is a bid to make the entire Northern Black Sea region a zone of its responsibility, where all key decisions will be taken collectively with mutual consideration of interests. The fact that the participants in this format are already committed to such work is evidenced by another trilateral meeting in early July in Chisinau. It resulted in a joint declaration at the level of foreign ministers, which focuses on strengthening relations both in the political sphere and in the economy, energy and infrastructure. In addition, the intention to accelerate interconnection of their electricity systems into a large regional assembly was fixed. The plans to host the generating plants needed to export electricity to Ukraine are the most notable. They will use Ukrainian natural gas, for which all three countries have agreed to increase the capacity of the Trans-Balkan gas pipeline in the mode of a vertical gas corridor (reverse from the south). In fact, all this “plants” are mentioned only to cover supplies from the MoldGRES, without which the “energy equation” is unlikely to work. This explains why earlier Kyiv so easily agreed to reverse supplies of Russian gas to the left bank of the Dniester. In addition, everyone needs to save face when the power plant is actually jointly controlled by Tiraspol and Moscow. Such hybrid cooperative models seem to suit everyone for the time being, as they allow to solve critical problems here and now. At the same time, as far as European integration is concerned, our paths will start to increasingly diverge at some point. Obviously, our small republic is much easier to incorporate than Ukraine, which, although battered by war, still has serious potential in the agricultural sector. Despite the EU’s package approach, negotiations with Ukraine will surely be much tougher. Therefore, no matter how Kyiv tries to preserve the Moldovan-Ukrainian “Eurotandem”, Brussels will inevitably treat both countries differently. The neighbors, to all appearances, would like synchronous integration of the entire notional common geographical space. At the same time, our leadership sees this process as gradual, cutting even the Transnistrian region out of the initial phase. Kyiv sees this egoism of Chisinau and is hardly satisfied with it. At the same time, paradoxically, it is Ukraine that speaks a lot about the need to include the Transnistrian settlement in the agenda of negotiations with Brussels. While the relevant deputy prime minister, Cristina Gherasimov, says that she does not see any possibility of such involvement and wants to limit the situation to closed information sessions with the Transnistrian administration, Ukrainian diplomats are quite freely and publicly arguing that it would be more correct to find a place for Tiraspol in these negotiations. In particular, the outgoing Ukrainian Ambassador Marko Shevchenko recently discussed this. In his opinion, such an inclusive approach would make it possible to make the process of European integration of the two states irreversible and exclude any geopolitical discrepancies of the whole regional space. Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba went even further and, recognizing the incapacity of the 5+2, said in an interview with a Moldovan outlet that it should be reset taking into account the start of negotiations on Moldova’s and Ukraine’s accession to the European Union. Kuleba believes that on the basis of this foundation it is possible to build a future international format on the Transnistrian settlement under the aegis and with the leading role of the EU. Chisinau is silent in response – and this is the main sign that the authorities, to put it mildly, do not agree with this formulation of the issue and the speedy modes of Ukrainian diplomacy. So, alas, for all the current tactical coincidence of individual interests, the strategic priorities of Moldova and Ukraine have been different and, to all appearances, will remain so. One would think that it is worth accepting this reality and building further relations taking into account the inevitably existing disagreements. But Ukrainian Ambassador Shevchenko is literally raising the same topic about the possible closure of the entire perimeter of the Moldovan-Ukrainian border with a difference in several weeks. Although he presents it with a certain diplomacy and reservations that such a scenario would be a disaster and should not be brought to it, a reasonable question arises: why talk about it at all? We must assume that the public voicing of such warnings is nothing more than a soft threat from Kyiv, which is thus trying to encourage our authorities to rethink something or consider making some decisions in the interests of our neighbors.