Could Georgia Become a Federation?

Anton ŠVEС

The dire crisis in relations of Tbilisi with the US and the EU, alongside with a gradual thaw with Russia, could once again bring the issue of Georgia’s territorial integrity back onto the agenda

A few weeks ago, the Prime Minister of Georgia, once our ally in the Association Trio, harshly criticized the situation in Moldova, which enjoys the unconditional support of the West. He said that we do not observe democratic standards and freedom of the press. The aim was to highlight the double standards of the US and the EU, which are currently exerting massive political pressure on Tbilisi. In general, relations between them are experiencing the deepest crisis in the last few decades – after all, since Mikheil Saakashvili came to power, Georgia has not deviated from the pro-Western path. Even today, the Georgian leadership is targeting to European integration and strengthening cooperation with NATO, but the reciprocal movement has been (temporarily?) suspended. The current situation is explained, first of all, by the upcoming parliamentary elections. The ruling Georgian Dream party, which conducts a rather pragmatic domestic and foreign policy, is naturally interested in maintaining a majority in the legislative body and, accordingly, its own rule. However, the West is clearly not interested in it. It would like to see Tbilisi taking more solidarity actions towards Russia, or at least join the sanctions. In order to reduce the Western ability to influence Georgia’s internal affairs, the ruling party adopted the notorious “foreign agent law”, which has sparked a storm of criticism in Western capitals with penalties in the form of suspended funding, as well as opposition protests that the government is forced to deal with. The US and EU have reacted no less sharply to the preparations for the adoption of a package of bills aimed at limiting LGBT propaganda among minors and protecting traditional family values. In addition, Mikheil Saakashvili remains in prison, despite constant calls for his release. Even his former ally, Georgian President Salome Zurabishvili, is in no hurry to grant a pardon to the former head of state. In general, the freezing of Georgia’s European integration is good news for Chisinau. Firstly, the ban on financial support for Tbilisi could facilitate the redistribution of some funds in favor of Moldova and Ukraine. Secondly, removing the topic of Georgia’s inclusion in the EU from the agenda makes a hypothetical new wave of expansion simpler from a geographical and bureaucratic point of view, and therefore more likely. But the main thing is that the challenges for Tbilisi are a favorable backdrop to the completely loyal pro-Western regime in Moldova, which now has free rein to engage in corruption, oppress the opposition and the mass media, and ignore economic degradation. Despite the anti-democratic and illegal nature of the current Moldovan government, negotiations with Brussels are progressing successfully, and cooperation with NATO is taking root at an accelerated pace. The main actors no longer consider even the territorial and political conflict in Transnistria as an insurmountable obstacle to Moldova’s European integration. As the Ukrainian-Russian armed confrontation escalates, Georgia has adopted a wait-and-see position, avoiding an escalation with Abkhazia and South Ossetia, although the temptation to open a new anti-Russian front, provoked by the West, is now greater than ever. Moscow, having become bogged down in Ukraine, has lost several positions in strategic directions – the Baltics have practically closed their border with the Russian Federation, Sweden and Finland have fenced themselves off and joined NATO, Russian forces have left Nagorno-Karabakh and are being systematically squeezed out of Armenia. The Kremlin lacks the resources for Transcaucasus strategic military superiority, and we hear talks about the future of South Ossetia and Abkhazia with renewed vigor. Just a while ago this issue was considered long “settled”, but recently the Russian Foreign Ministry suddenly declared its willingness to “facilitate dialogue between the three parties”, which stimulated some experts to consider ideas about the possible federalization of Georgia. It is clear that even theoretical talk about it is categorically rejected in Tskhinvali and Sukhum, but Moscow, despite this, clearly shows interest in stabilizing relations with Tbilisi (mutual visa abolition, launch of transport link). At first glance, the prospects for restoring Georgia’s territorial integrity through federalization seem illusory. Sixteen years after Russia recognized its independence, South Ossetia and Abkhazia, which are pursuing a fairly active and obviously multi-vector foreign policy, will not simply agree to such negotiations, even in the context of a security crisis, which is not yet mentioned. Moreover, memories of that war are still strong in Ossetia. It will also be difficult for Moscow to save blushes and regional strategic positions in case of revocation of the recognition act for the rebellious republics. And Georgia has never declared its willingness to consider federal models of settlement in the 21st century. At the same time, the conditions may change. Tbilisi is moving away from maximum demands due to the historical specifics of the conflict, as well as the motivation of the ruling Georgian Dream party, for which peaceful reintegration may become a super project and an additional source of sustainable legitimacy. Abkhazia and South Ossetia (or Abkhazia only) may prove much more accommodating if they lose financial, diplomatic and military support from the Russian Federation. This is by no means a fantastic scenario, since we can recall the mid-1990s, when the Russians, forcing Sukhum to negotiate with Eduard Shevardnadze, blocked the border with the region, due to which it traded exclusively by contraband methods through Georgia and Turkey, via the Black Sea. Our leaders cannot ignore this issue, especially in light of the declared commitment of Moscow and Kyiv to begin the peace process. Bankova Street openly says that the invasion of the Kursk Region is dictated, among other things, by the interests of improving the starting negotiation positions. Probably, one of the Kremlin’s demands will be the federalization of Ukraine with the preservation of cooperation channels for some of its regions with the Russian Federation. If such a deal with the inclusion of the Ukrainian Black Sea regions in the area of Russian influence will take shape, additional aggravation will arise in the relations between the two banks of the Dniester in Moldova. All talk of federalization has long been outdated, and the current authorities, including the Deputy Prime Minister for Reintegration, fiercely reject such an idea. It is clear: such a transformation of the country would destroy the power monopoly of PAS, change the identity of the state and threaten cooperation with NATO and, perhaps, even the process of European integration. Therefore, our ruling elites are probably watching with apprehension both the Ukrainian-Russian battles and the development of the situation around Georgia.