What Awaits Moldova After the Presidential Elections?

Sergiu CEBAN

Let’s explore two post-election scenarios, in case of Maia Sandu’s victory or defeat

The festive mood in Moldova is likely to continue until the middle of next week, due to a row of significant dates. After that, the period of holidays will finally come to an end and the country will return to its usual pace of life. In the first days of September, the Parliament will resume its work, giving a start to the autumn-winter political season, which promises to be very “hot”. Right now, experts are trying to focus on forecasts about the outcome of the presidential election. This is, so to say, the deadline for detailed planning. Our proposal, however, is to look “beyond the horizon” and try to understand how events may develop after the electoral autumn. The range of options in this case is as wide as possible, and everything depends on the point of view and imagination. In my attempt, I will consider two scenarios of the post-election period – Sandu’s victory and Sandu’s defeat. Let’s start with the possible re-election of the incumbent president. According to all sociological measurements, this probability is still high, although the position of the main favorite remains quite fragile. It is crucial for the electoral headquarters that nothing extraordinary happens in the next six weeks and that Maia Sandu retains her 30-40% rating. This virtually guarantees her victory in the first round and good chances in the second round, especially if the opposition camp continues to disintegrate. After the elections, Sandu will face the challenge of maintaining the real leadership of the state, rather than remaining a purely symbolic figure. This will be followed by a second round of electoral struggle for the parliament. In addition, Sandu’s victory, one way or another, will boost optimism within the ruling party and give its members more confidence before the start of the new election campaign, which, by the way, will begin almost immediately after the winner of the presidential race is announced. During the upcoming pre-election campaign, PAS will obviously hurl all efforts on getting the maximum number of people elected from its ranks, and if not to remain a majority party, then at least to get the largest faction in parliament. However, there is an opinion that even Sandu’s personal success will not reverse the negative trend in people’s attitudes towards the current ruling party. It may happen that the voters have less complaints to the president than to the PAS and the government, as they are likely to closely associate her with objective successes in foreign policy. Therefore, the regime will still have to build its future political strategy in the conditions of growing discontent and disappointment. The easiest thing the electoral headquarters of the ruling party can do is to try to implement the transfer of the “Sandu victory effect”. It makes sense, as there is certainly a direct interdependence between the two, and individually both projects have no future. At the same time, it is far from certain that Sandu will even agree to be the main PAS frontrunner in the 2025 summer elections. Political advisers may advise her that the party is already outdated, which would prompt the head of state to take a neutral stance and support all pro-European projects, expecting to continue her political career with new parliamentary forces. But what if Maia Sandu loses the election? The likelihood of this scenario is also high, and it will be multiplied if the majority of opposition forces urge citizens to vote for a counter-candidate, regardless of who makes it to the second round. Earlier we have already written that the departure of the incumbent president from the stage will deal a very strong, if not fatal, blow to the ruling regime in Moldova. Much, of course, will depend on the personality of the republic’s new leader, personal qualities and short-term plan of action. Either he will openly challenge the PAS and its system, or focus on ensuring fair conditions for the parliamentary elections. Under such conditions, the possibilities for PAS to get a decent result at the elections are sharply reduced. Moreover, the ruling party will then almost inevitably move to the opposition, which, in fact, will be the beginning of the end of this project. It may start with the division of its faction into small groups, especially if Maia Sandu refuses to fight further and leaves Moldovan politics after a painful defeat. So, in case of Sandu’s defeat, the ruling regime will not be able to preserve the status quo, and in the second half of 2025 Moldova will face a completely different configuration of power. The headquarters of PAS and the president are probably considering post-election strategies, some signs of which we can already notice today. I mean a gradual preparation for the launch of new political projects that could become allies of PAS in the future parliament or absorb a part of the pro-European electorate that is no longer ready to give its vote to the current ruling party. Most likely, the opposition will also try to build on the success of “overthrowing” Maia Sandu by demanding snap parliamentary elections and downplaying the PAS ratings. If the Socialists shared the fate of “whipping boys” with other political forces in 2020-2021, the Party of Action and Solidarity would become the main and perhaps the only target for all those who expect to get into the future parliament. However, given that the entire state system is tightly controlled by PAS, Maia Sandu and external partners, I assume that no one will give up power so easily. The behavior of the motley opposition, which failed to unite around a single candidate in the presidential election and will not be able to act together after the election, will also contribute to this. Parliament is at stake when no one will want to side with potential rivals and everyone will play their own game. Under such conditions, we may see very unusual solutions from the ruling group, especially if the pro-European referendum is validated and Maia Sandu finds the strength to continue the struggle in a new capacity. In order to mobilize its voters, including the disillusioned ones, fears about the freezing of the European path and the threat of the restoration of political forces loyal to Moscow will be actively replicated. Notwithstanding Sandu’s loss and to demonstrate the severity of its intentions, PAS may well appoint the former president as prime minister. This will allow not only to stay afloat until the summer of 2025, but also to get a relatively good result in the elections. And then, as luck and the Moldovan electorate would have it. At least, Maia Sandu and the majority of people from her entourage will end up in the new parliament. PAS will then either go into passive opposition or, more likely, join a coalition but still retain most of the power and control of the state system.