The Shadow of the Transnistrian Conflict Over Moldova

Sergiu CEBAN

Be it as it may, the Transnistrian conflict continues to make itself felt, remaining an unknown and unpredictable variable in the current complex regional environment

The second of September is an unremarkable date for Moldova, unless, as this year, Knowledge Day is shifted to it. However, in the age of information, it is becoming increasingly difficult to pretend and as if not to notice that year after year one of the regions is loudly celebrating the next anniversary of Chisinau’s loss of constitutional control over a part of the country. We, of course, will not pretend that nothing is happening and will talk a little about the Transnistrian settlement and its current state. Of course, behind the active political life of the republic, which for the last year has revolved around the presidential elections and the European integration referendum, it is easy to overlook all the other problems. One can continue to think that all of them have paled into insignificance and are somewhere quietly smoldering away from our hot everyday life, not having much influence on the internal political processes in the country. However, the situation both between the banks of the Dniester and around our country is still far from calm and relaxed. There are plenty of examples: from the constant statements of third-rate politicians and civil activists calling for a military solution to the Transnistrian issue to the still bad situation on the regional perimeter. In fact, our situation now is comparable to living at the foot of a large dam, which at any moment may burst, and the rapid flow of events will sweep away all flesh in its path. To begin with, the gradual devolution of Ukraine’s defense capabilities and resistance is leading to an intensive advance of the Russian army in Donbas, and this in itself is a bad sign. Under such conditions, Kyiv is forced to act asymmetrically and deliver painful blows to its enemy in places where it has problems. Let us be frank, we all understand perfectly well that there are more than convenient targets for the Ukrainian General Staff on our territory. Therefore, we can only hope for international partners, who should persuade Kyiv to avoid anything that could lead Moldova into a state of total chaos. But given the fact that Ukraine’s actions are becoming increasingly adventurous and unpredictable, and sometimes, as in the case of the Kursk oblast, are prepared and implemented in secret even from the Western allies (who are asked to accept the new reality), this hope may be in vain. If we look at the presidential race, apart from the electoral video of one of the candidates recorded in the central square of Tiraspol, the Transnistrian topic is hardly represented there either. This is understandable, because it is not even among the top ten main issues of concern to Moldovan society. Everyone knows that there is so complex and unresolved issue that it is best to keep it on the periphery of the attention until the right conditions are ripe. This is confirmed by the politicians responsible for the Transnistrian direction, who say that although the socio-economic reintegration of the region has significantly accelerated in two years, additional efforts are needed. At the same time, the chairman of the parliament, Igor Grosu, ironically speaks of sending Russian troops home as soon as possible from the left bank “with flowers and music”. At the end of last week, some targeted statements were made by the head of the local administration from the left bank. Given the growing number of military exercises and arms purchases, one of Tiraspol’s main appeals to Chisinau was to prevent military escalation and bloodshed following the example of neighboring Ukraine, and therefore to continue the dialogue, no matter how difficult it might be. At the same time, the left-bank authorities talk about the absence of normal negotiations, although political representatives Oleg Serebrian and Vitaly Ignatiev hold non-public meetings in addition to official ones. By the way, for the first time in a long time, Tiraspol, although not directly, has again shown its interest in contacts with Maia Sandu, where we could discuss “peace and security” and other topics. However, the probability of such communication with the left-bank leader has been low before, and on the eve of the presidential elections it is even more likely to be zero. In addition, Transnistria decided to comment on the issue of integration into the European Union, which many of our experts consider as a catalyst for the reunification of the country. From Krasnoselsky’s speech we can understand only several points: Brussels and Chisinau have not yet formulated a clear proposal on the conditions and parameters for the involvement of the left bank in the process of European integration, so Tiraspol has many open questions, but far fewer answers. It is obvious that one of the foundations of relative stability between the banks of the Dniester is mutually beneficial cooperation in the energy sector. However, it seems that both Chisinau and Tiraspol have become alarmed amid the latest categorical statements from Kyiv about its intention not to extend the gas transit contract and comments from Moscow that under such circumstances European consumers will have to pay much more for the supply of Russian blue fuel. The only encouraging thing is Russia’s willingness to look for opportunities to transit its gas to Europe via alternative routes. “Suspense” applies not only to the energy situation, but also to the whole range of issues that form the basis of the Transnistrian conflict. It may seem natural to some people that under such conditions every effort should be made to preserve the current relatively predictable situation in relations with the Transnistrian region. But, unfortunately, such a view hardly prevails on the sidelines of our government. Most likely, Chisinau will continue to bring the conflict out of the status quo, as in the current conditions its settlement on our terms is hardly possible. Therefore, after the presidential elections, we can expect the authorities to take new steps to stir up the situation in order to create new negotiation chances for themselves. At the same time, despite the fact that everything has stalled in the official negotiation process, the parties seem to be actively practicing informal “exchanges of views”. And despite the firmness of their publicly voiced positions, closed channels of interaction make it possible to find some compromises, as evidenced by the resumption of the issuance of so-called “neutral” car license plates. There is an opinion that these unspoken discussions also concern other, including basic, aspects of the settlement. For instance, we can cite the decision voiced by the Transnistrian leader to come up with a “legislative initiative” to equate the term ‘Transnistria’ with symbols of fascism and Nazism, with the corresponding legal consequences. The controversy over this word has been going on for a long time, and Tiraspol pedals this issue at every opportunity. It is difficult to answer unequivocally why it is doing this now, but it is not about PR or some additional political points. Perhaps the answer lies in the fact that the term ‘Transnistria’ is fixed in the 2005 law on the basic provisions of the special legal status of localities from the left bank of the Dniester. According to some experts, this law sets a clear direction for a settlement, while others believe that it ties Chisinau’s hands and does not allow it to formulate a more flexible position, maneuvering depending on the circumstances. Anyway, the Transnistrian conflict remains in light as an unknown and unpredictable variable in the current challenging regional environment. The central authorities, as we have already written, would like to abstract from this issue, waiting for the war to be over or even for the European integration process to be completed (shifting the problem to Brussels). But reality impose other demands, and the more the shadow of the conflict hangs over Moldova, the sooner additional state efforts in the Transnistrian settlement will be required.