Expert: Protest Potential Growing in Moldova

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Anton ŠVEC
The upcoming presidential elections will be a crash test for the authoritarian system of government in Moldova that has developed in recent years. The PAS regime approaches the big political event with a whole set of internal and external problems
The ruling party’s policy, designed on the basis of loyalty to the West and the regime’s personal preferences, continues to split society. September started with a number of new anti-Russian demarches. Foreign minister Mihai Popsoi, with undisguised gloating, actually supported Ukraine’s invasion of Russia’s internationally recognized territory in the Kursk oblast. According to him, this is Kyiv’s way of defending security and common values. In addition, official Chisinau criticized Russian Ambassador Oleg Vasnetsov for participating in events in Transnistria marking the anniversary of the region’s de facto independence, calling them “a recurrent and harmful practice that complicates the settlement talks”. Moscow was not in debt – foreign ministry spokeswoman Maria Zakharova recently spoke of the “unprecedentedly mean and low” policy of the West, which undermines Moldova’s sovereignty. She traditionally appealed to the painful language-related issue, which has long been our “apple of discord”. Romanian politicians have been actively promoting this issue in recent months in the run-up to the competitive presidential elections scheduled for the end of the year. To demonstrate support and mobilize the pro-European electorate, representatives of European Union countries regularly visit Moldova. In August alone, German Federal Chancellor Olaf Scholz, Baltic leaders and Romanian President Klaus Iohannis visited us. Such visits will continue in September, along with the practice of large-scale exercises with NATO contingents. Undisguised foreign aid to Maia Sandu’s regime, ignoring the existing violations and excesses, against the background of military-strategic development of the country’s territory by the Western military alliance stirs up the population and forms protest moods. The sad result for the authorities is the decrease in the voters’ support for the European course recorded in opinion polls, which threatens the lame results of the upcoming referendum, and the fall in the ratings of the incumbent president and representatives of her team. The strategic tendency to split the society is complemented by miscalculations and inertia in certain areas where the authorities ignore problems, thus provoking discontent and tension. The railway sector demonstrates a catastrophic backwardness combined with the total unwillingness of the government to intervene in the situation and, at least, to solve the historical problem of wage arrears to the staff of the state enterprise Moldova Railway. At the same time, the public field is constantly informed about the plans to spend the already limited funds inappropriately and irrationally, for instance on festive events for “friends”, on unpromising construction projects, etc. All this is happening in parallel with the departure of foreign investors due to inefficient management of the economy by the government, which is unable to create competitive advantages for foreign capital and guarantee adequate GDP growth. The climate of military preparations, with inadequate rhetoric of some governmental representatives, forcing international business to look for more favorable and predictable conditions, does not help either. People remain without stable jobs in the public sector, where key social institutions - schools, universities, hospitals - are systematically closed (under the guise of mergers and optimizations). Entire communities are left without the opportunity to provide necessary services to their inhabitants, which leads to increased outmigration. Another side of the migration problem, which the authorities have not yet spoken about publicly, stems from negotiations with Brussels on EU membership. As early as next year, Chisinau may be imposed obligations both to accept quota refugees from Muslim and African countries, including those expelled from the EU for offences committed, and to deport some conscript-age Ukrainian refugees who have adapted normally in our society. In fact, Moldova is not ready for the rapid transformation of migration legislation and changes in the ethnic (religious, linguistic, etc.) composition of the population. The main reasons are the constant outflow of the indigenous Moldovan population and the lack of a stable national identity, into which the authorities are now artificially introducing Romanian and Western European components for political reasons. In this sense, the regime’s attempts to import the Ukrainian experience of pressure on the Russian Orthodox Church in Moldova will not contribute to stability and mutual understanding in society either. The population, especially in rural areas, is quite religious, and flirting with the Bessarabian Metropolis of the Romanian Orthodox Church and the Patriarchate of Constantinople may provoke a church crisis and schism. Especially when the ruling party’s MPs privately spur a debate that neither parliament nor the president’s office is yet prepared to manage. The problems in agriculture, despite the attempts by Minister Vladimir Bolea amid his limited resources to establish feedback, worsen every season. Chisinau’s requests to Bucharest to share diesel fuel and seeds, even if satisfied before the sowing campaign, will not significantly improve the situation. Especially since this aid is often directed primarily to “loyal” farmers who support the PAS regime. Crop failure and drought amid shrinking eastern markets, which cannot be quickly compensated for by increasing supplies to the European Union, logistical crisis, lack of irrigation infrastructure and high fuel costs have led the agricultural sector to a large-scale disaster, which can only be handled through enormous external support and consolidation of domestic resources. However, the government is not yet ready to do everything possible to save the sector. Vladimir Bolea is holding back the accumulated protest potential virtually single-handedly in an attempt to make it to the parliamentary elections in March. There is simply no prospect of further planning, which the farming community clearly understands. The “cold war” between Chisinau and Comrat continues. The police regularly harass various institutions in the autonomy, while the authorities fine local TV channels and close media outlets, and prevent festive events. The authorities can already now classify the Gagauz electorate as protesting, not only in terms of voting, but also in terms of possible political actions. The Central Electoral Commission, politically controlled by the presidency, will be the key news provider in September. Under various pretexts, the CEC has already refused to register some candidates for the post of head of state – ex-premier Vladimir Filat has dropped out of the electoral race, and others are having problems with their applications. If the authorities continue the practice of depriving voters of the opportunity to choose, protest amid radical transformations and international instability will become quite expected and, in fact, the only form of struggle for their rights available to the population. Of course, without surprises in the elections and consolidation of the opposition, protest hotbeds will be suppressed with no regard for politeness and democratic standards. But the tolerance and political infantilism of a part of Moldovan society will not always play into the hands of the current authoritarian regime.