Is Moldova Under Threat of War Again?

The RTA expert examines whether the Russian-Ukrainian conflict can expand its geography spilling over to Moldova, and who can benefit from it at the current stage

Vladimir ROTARI, RTA: Unfortunately, after a long period of relative calm, Moldova is again more frequently appearing in news reports and expert analyses in the context of a possible geographical expansion of the Russian-Ukrainian war. The recent statement by the official representative of the Russian foreign ministry, Maria Zakharova, that Moscow would consider any provocations against its peacekeepers and citizens in Transnistria as an attack on itself was a natural outcome of the tension fanned around the region in recent weeks. It may be recalled that similar warnings were issued by the Russian authorities in February 2023, when the hysteria about the Ukrainian attack on the left bank of the Dniester reached its peak. Now the situation seems less acute - the proposals to “solve” the Transnistrian issue militarily are voiced mainly by speakers without formal status and positions. However, given the new round of escalation of the conflict in Ukraine, one can no longer completely rule out such a scenario. But how realistic is it in terms of interests and positions of all concerned parties, and who can benefit from it at the current stage? Moldova? It is believed that the authorities do not need any upheavals in the Transnistrian issue at all, and this sounds quite logical, given the upcoming major election campaigns for the election of the president and parliament. Indeed, the issue of reintegration is not a significant priority for the society, which is unequivocally against any forceful actions, even if they are aimed at reunification of the country. Under such conditions, it is too risky and politically unprofitable to resume the Transnistrian conflict. Especially since the government reasonably says that de facto reintegration is underway: at least, the Moldovan legal field is slowly but surely penetrating into the region. This is a rather favorable barter for the current authorities – the rapprochement of the two banks takes place with minimal effort, by itself, and without the need to channel limited resources at this in fact secondary direction. I do not see many scenarios where the ruling elites might reconsider their perception of the status quo. The first is related to the uncontrolled escalation in the Security Zone, where various incidents with a conflict potential occur regularly. However, the available security mechanisms, primarily the JCC, have so far made it possible to manage them without severe consequences. The second scenario may consist in catastrophic internal political trends for PAS, when there will be risks of loss of power or even geopolitical reversal of Moldova. In this case, armed incidents in the Transnistrian region may be useful in terms of the possibility to temporarily suspend some democratic procedures or to impose more powerful pressure on the opposition. The West? Certainly, some Western countries would like to ignite new hotbeds in the Russian underbelly that would potentially contribute to the strategic defeat of the Russian Federation. However, the main actor, the United States, does not seem to be very interested in this. The Americans, who also have key elections ahead, clearly do not want to raise the “military degree”, preferring to engage in some kind of substantive peace process while supporting the balance of power on the Russian-Ukrainian front. This is proved both by their ban on using the long-range weapons of any origin on the “old” territories of the Russian Federation and, in a certain sense, by punishing Kyiv for the Kursk operation. It manifested itself, in particular, in a sharply reduced aid – over the past month only one package was allocated for the sum of only 125 million dollars, and all this is happening amid the severe fighting in the Pokrovsk area. In addition, the nomenclature of the weapons provided shows that the United States is boosting the defensive potential of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, while providing neither aircraft nor armored vehicles in sufficient quantities, thus depriving the Ukrainian army of the tools for active offensive actions. Many analysts believe that Washington wants to leave the door open for the future normalization of relations with Russia and exclude its complete fall under the influence of China. In this sense, the strategy and tactics of the Americans seem logical, and dragging a new country, i.e. Moldova, into the conflict contradicts them. Russia? It has already been repeatedly stated that any “mess” in Transnistria is totally disadvantageous for Moscow due to the impossibility to provide effective assistance to the Russian contingent and local armed formations located there. Based on the configuration of forces, it is practically impossible for the Russian Armed Forces to rush to the Dniester or launch a large-scale landing operation; only missile weapons remain, but they cannot play a decisive role in the field. Therefore, the Kremlin is acting verbally, making targeted threats and hinting at the use of extreme measures in the hope that at least no one will cross these “red lines”. Ukraine? Over the past year and a half, the aggressive rhetoric of officials and leaders of public opinion towards the left-bank regions of the Dniester has been largely moderate, and official contacts with the region have even been re-established through visits by Ambassador-at-Large of the Ukrainian Foreign Ministry Paun Rohovei. In addition, Kyiv has confirmed at the highest level that it does not consider any forceful action against Transnistria, bearing in mind that it is a constitutional territory of Moldova, whose authorities have made no relevant requests. Therefore, any predictions of a Ukrainian attack on the “PMR” before August 6 could have been considered pure speculation, even despite the periodic flights of FPV drones undermining military equipment on the left bank. However, the attack by the AFU on the Kursk oblast, one could say, has flipped the situation around and canceled out a number of previously delineated “boundaries of war”. As we already know, prior to this event, the parties held the internationally mediated talks in Qatar to stop mutual strikes on energy infrastructure. In case of a positive outcome, this would have been a great diplomatic success, which could have paved the way for new negotiation rounds on limiting hostilities or even freezing them altogether. Especially since both Kyiv and Moscow are under increasing international pressure to end the war. At the same time, it was completely unfavorable for the Ukrainian leadership to enter into peace talks at that time. The Russian army had a strong grip on the initiative, was advancing effectively in many parts of the front, and this gave Moscow the opportunity to conduct dialogue from a sufficiently strong position. With the Kursk operation, Vladimir Zelensky solved several tasks at once – he disrupted the negotiations, which did not promise his country acceptable results at this stage; he raised the morale of the army and the population, shattered by the territorial losses of this year; he crossed the obvious “red line” of the Russian Federation without any special consequences, giving food for thought to the Western allies. As I have already said, the same United States was not too enthusiastic about Kyiv’s adventurous and uncoordinated actions, issuing a penalty in the form of a temporary suspension of military supplies. It is natural that the Kursk operation is actively criticized in the Western media, and the situation in Donbass is overdramatized to create an impression of the “catastrophic” nature of Ukraine’s mistake with Kursk. Nevertheless, Zelensky has managed to create a new reality in the conflict, where Russia now has a piece of territory occupied by the enemy, and Western partners, like it or not, have to reckon with it. In recent interviews, the Ukrainian president has stated that his country has a “strategy for victory”, within the framework of which it is planned not only to hold the captured bridgehead in the Kursk oblast indefinitely, but also to carry out some other maneuvers, the content of which, of course, he has not yet disclosed. Given the creative potential of the Ukrainian leadership, which is capable of unconventional moves (as we can see, sometimes against the wishes of its allies or military-strategic logic) it is difficult to assume Kyiv’s next move. It could be either an attempted landing in Crimea or the seizure of Energodar with the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant. But these options are hardly optimal, given how strong the defense is in this area. This is where the Transnistria option comes into play. The goals that Kyiv could pursue in this region are well known – defeat of the Russian contingent and serious replenishment of the exchange fund; seizure of arsenals; depriving Russia of the lever of control over Moldova; release of troops stationed on the Transnistrian border section. Most likely, such an operation would receive wide public approval, improving shaky ratings of the authorities. However, the Moldovan authorities are unlikely to authorize such actions in the short and medium term. On the other hand, after Kursk, no one can firmly state that Ukraine will not start everything on its own, presenting both Chisinau and the West with a fait accompli. Right now, I think that the probability of such a development is low. It is likely that the Ukrainian General Staff will choose some target on Ukrainian territory or in the Russian border area for a new strike as part of Zelensky’s “victory strategy”. Nevertheless, all experts and military analysts, as well as Russian and Western staffers will always have to keep the “Transnistrian gambit” in mind when making their forecasts and plans.