Challenges of the Next Stage of Moldova’s European Integration

Sergiu CEBAN

The split of society on key issues, recurring problems in the field of justice, opposition from opponents of Moldova’s membership in the EU and the destruction of the pan-European consensus on expansion to the east are among the factors that together can dramatically slow down the process of European integration of our country

As expected, the June decision of the European Union to open accession negotiations with our country has smoothly receded into the second or third plan, giving way to much more pressing topics of domestic political life. However, if the issue of European integration has not been in the first place for citizens for a long time, then for larger geopolitical players it is one of the most important ever. Just recently, the relevant deputy prime minister Cristina Gherasimov confirmed that the first real consultations on joining the European Union may not begin until next year. So far, only the general framework of the dialogue has been discussed, and in addition, the so-called screening of national legislation for its compliance with European legislation is underway, and this will take the entire next six months. So far, the whole plan is based on the fact that Moldova will join the EU by 2030 if it fulfills the basic requirements – first of all, successful justice reform and defeat of corruption. At the same time, we know that the integration process can easily be delayed, as it happened with Turkey and Serbia. The split of Moldovan society on various issues, including the development vector, the unresolved Transnistrian issue, the continuing Russian influence in one form or another – these are the factors that together can slow down the process towards the EU membership. October-November will be a crucial period for Moldova’s European prospects. The results of the referendum, coupled with the presidential elections, will have a direct impact on the further high-speed mode of negotiations with Brussels. Obviously, they will not be fully launched until the entire electoral cycle ends in summer of 2025. Only when the Moldovan government acquires a clear image, structure and personalities in key positions, the European bureaucracy will formulate the further route of our republic’s path to the EU. While everything is more or less clear with the strategy of Brussels, it is still difficult to grasp what the opponents of Moldova’s European integration are going to do. I think, they won’t just watch the election race. Most likely, they will act more deviously, using various leverages, including within the European Union. For example, with regard to Georgia, Moscow has managed to achieve, albeit intermediate, but quite noticeable successes. For a number of reasons, anti-Western sentiments and rhetoric have recently intensified in the ruling Georgian Dream party, while ties with Russia have significantly strengthened and expanded. In two and a half years, the Russian-Georgian trade turnover has increased several times, air traffic between the countries has been restored, and Russia has canceled visas for Georgian citizens. Despite all the difficulties of the Russian economy, the Kremlin still has “carrots” in store that can encourage more pragmatism among the post-Soviet elites. It’s not just about economy. So, in the run-up to the parliamentary elections in Georgia, the Kremlin unexpectedly chose to cool relations with Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The most striking gesture was the absence of congratulations to the leaders of the two regions on the day of the so-called “Russian recognition”. In addition, information is surfacing that some kind of financial sanctions are being applied against Abkhazia. Such public gestures may be a signal to Tbilisi that the Russian Federation, one way or another, is ready to review the status of the two unrecognized entities and a strategic compromise with the Georgian authorities in case they further distance themselves from the West. As we predicted in August, in order to stop the sagging of the European integration topic and fill the vacuum that inevitably emerged due to the lack of any serious shifts between Chisinau and Brussels, a group of European leaders visited us. The main point of these weekly visits is to maintain the necessary climate through political statements and to focus the positive attention of the Moldovan voter on President Maia Sandu. The inconspicuous voyages of various European tops were diffused only by the Foreign Minister of Hungary, which holds the presidency of the European Council until the end of the year. At a press conference, Peter Szijjarto, in a typical Budapest manner, somewhat cooled the pro-European ardor of our politicians, revealing the open secret that EU countries only publicly support expansion, but actually oppose it. This is expressed in the fact that European leaders, officially “without closing the door,” constantly tell candidate countries that they still need to do something, make some improvements, focus on quality, not speed. Which is a good bureaucratic method that allows them to do nothing. According to Szijjarto, Hungary has set itself a medium-term goal to end this Brussels hypocrisy on the issue of EU enlargement. The statement of the Hungarian minister that the results of the reform of states wishing to join the European Union should be evaluated separately was also intriguing. It sounds like a proposal to abandon the typical “batch approach” and “expansion waves”. As an example, he noted that Ukraine and Moldova should be considered separately, since the former has serious problems with the same violation of the rights of the Hungarian community, which, of course, the latter does not have. He also recalled the energy crisis that Kyiv created in Hungary and Slovakia. It is difficult to talk about the real goals of Hungarian diplomacy, as well as how popular and achievable they are in the current conjuncture in the European Union. But the fact that Budapest is aiming to revise the traditional criteria applied to candidate states should somewhat alarm Chisinau. The statements of the Hungarian Foreign Minister at least indicate that there is a group of countries within the EU that are not satisfied with the methods of evaluating potential members and the package principle, based more on (geo)political factors than on real indicators. Chisinau and Bucharest have enough political groups who would like a tailored approach for Moldova in negotiations with the EU and to detach our country from the Ukrainian case. On the one hand, we could really break away, consistently fulfilling the demands of Brussels, while Kyiv will need much more time for this in the context of the ongoing war and economic devaluation. But, on the other hand, a differentiated approach to Moldova and Ukraine can destroy the pan-European consensus based on anti-war solidarity, according to which all fundamental decisions were made in 2022-2023. Given the proximity of the interests of Moscow and Budapest, it is quite possible that the main idea is to speed up the erosion of this consensus within the EU in order to eventually derail negotiations with Chisinau and Kyiv.