“Transnistrian Card” in the Presidential Elections

Anton ŠVEC

Despite her policy of recent years, Maia Sandu has declared the intention to settle the conflict with the left bank in the coming years. However, in general, the Transnistrian factor receives less attention than in previous election campaigns

On 26 October, Georgia will hold crucial parliamentary elections, which are supposed to have the potential to predetermine the country’s foreign policy vector for the coming years. Bidzina Ivanishvili’s Georgian Dream party seeks to retain the majority of parliamentary seats and, despite the specific public attitude towards the 2008 war, has decided to make the issue of conflict resolution with Abkhazia and South Ossetia the centerpiece of its political and information campaign. The leaders of the ruling party started with blaming the regime of Mikheil Saakashvili for the bloodshed of 16 years ago and also declared their readiness to apologize to the Abkhazians and Ossetians if they won. Of course, the message was warmly accepted in Moscow, with which Tbilisi is not only gradually normalizing relations, but is also getting closer ideologically, at the same time diverging from the Western community on the “foreign agents” and LGBT issues. The Kremlin more than welcomes such a U-turn of the Georgian authorities in its direction and, apparently, can cement it with some perks. Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov has already announced Russia’s readiness to participate in negotiations between Georgia and Abkhazia and South Ossetia, whose independence Moscow recognized in 2008. This definitely gives the sense of a looming federalization, and it seems that official Tbilisi is not scared by this prospect. This is not the case with the separatist entities, for example, Abkhazia, whose relations with Moscow have seriously deteriorated in recent months due to problems of property and transit flows. This has already resulted in a reduced Russian funding for social expenditures. Tskhinvali, which is historically closely linked to the Republic of North Ossetia within the Russian Federation and which suffered greatly 16 years ago, is hardly happy either. The possible victory of the Georgian Dream in the parliamentary elections, if it can be defended after the inevitable street protests of the opposition, may lead to tectonic shifts in the Transcaucasia. In this sense, Bidzina Ivanishvili’s extremely risky political bet clearly makes sense. The election campaign in Moldova differs significantly. Only former prosecutor Victoria Furtuna, the least experienced and recognizable politician, with no obvious bid to take the lead in the race, is actively playing the “Transnistrian card” in her campaign. The administration of the region did not prevent the candidate from holding already two campaigns on its territory, accusing Maia Sandu of electoral law violations and military preparations, as well as exploiting peaceful rhetoric. The other presidential candidates do not seek to prioritize the Transnistrian problem in their electoral activities. Alexandr Stoianoglo, probably Sandu’s main antagonist and rival, with a personal vendetta against her, only mentioned his intent to have a dialogue with the authorities of the region and confirmed his readiness to meet with Vadim Krasnoselsky. This is clearly an attempt to contrast with the incumbent president, who flatly refuses contacts with the separatist leaders, as well as to attract the part of the electorate that favors a non-confrontational interaction with Tiraspol. In turn, Maia Sandu unexpectedly announced last week her intention to resolve the conflict in the next year or two. This was a rather bold and odd statement, running counter to the routine language of the president. After all, the rest of her election promises, such as joining the European Union or raising salaries and pensions, are prudently limited to a planning horizon beyond her second mandate. Maia Sandu’s speeches provoked criticism on both banks of the Dniester. The competing politicians drew attention, and quite rightly so, to the fact that, unlike her, they were in constant communication with the Transnistrian administration. This was noted by both Igor Dodon and Vladimir Filat. And the left-bank “Foreign Ministry” accused Chisinau of having no intention to seek “mutually acceptable solutions” and of “massive pressure by hybrid methods”: “It is rather ill-destined to discuss the resolution of the Moldovan-Transnistrian conflict in the near future, when even the simplest domestic and economic issues can remain on the agenda for months and years.” Moreover, according to the political representative of Tiraspol, the region is still waiting for apologies for the “military aggression” of the early 1990s, which also suggests certain parallels with Transcaucasian cases. Electoral goals aside, it is difficult to provide any assessment of Maia Sandu’s ambitions. On the one hand, the official position is still the desire to resolve the conflict peacefully. But in fact, the main negotiating 5+2 format has not convened since October 2019, meetings with the Transnistrian leadership haven’t been held for a long time either. Tiraspol, meanwhile, keep talking about the crisis of the negotiation process, the large number of unsolvable problems, the blockade, which they believe generates risks of escalation. At the same time, there are no signals that Moscow is going to terminate its military and political presence on the Dniester by disbanding the OGRF and starting to dispose weapon depots. And our authorities quite logically consider this one of the main preconditions for a settlement. It is unclear how, given such background, Maia Sandu expects to achieve a quick breakthrough in the resolving the Transnistrian conflict. Especially given the mismatch between the timing and Moldova’s European integration plans, on which Tiraspol has not yet said its word. Apparently, the incumbent president’s team expects the Transnistrian file to be closed via an ultimatum as a result of a humanitarian crisis in the region due to restrictions on Russian gas supplies or Russia’s military defeat in Ukraine. Meanwhile, it is not excluded that the ruling party is seriously considering force scenarios within the existing “window of opportunity”, and all the statements about the peaceful mood are only needed to cover up the real intentions. Intents of the country’s leadership will be tested very soon. One of the indicators will be the attitude towards those citizens from Transnistria who decide to participate in the presidential elections and referendum: they will either face administrative obstacles on the part of the authorities, given the climate on the left bank of the Dniester, or will be allowed to exercise their electoral rights in peace.