Can the Country’s Foreign Policy Course Change?

Victor ENI

Even the defeat of Maia Sandu in the presidential election is unlikely to have a serious impact on the foreign policy trajectory of Moldova

Foreign policy activity remains one of the important, if not the key, sources for boosting the rating of Maia Sandu, who is running for a second term. That is why, since August, we have seen a string of foreign guests whose purpose is mainly to clap the president on the shoulder and gently hint who the Moldovan electorate should vote for. For example, the visit of Romanian Prime Minister Marcel Ciolacu at the end of last week, who expressed his support for the ruling regime and demonstrated who and what his country is betting on, stuck to the same purpose. He did not miss the opportunity to scare our citizens with a “large-scale geopolitical threat”, predicting that the pro-Russian choice would lead Moldova to isolation and poverty, rather than safety and prosperity. Frequent voyages of dignitaries from abroad are likely to peak this week, with the reappointed Ursula von der Leyen to arrive as an ‘icing on the cake’. There may be some other guests, but, following the pre-election logic, she is an influential political figure who should finalize all these visits. The head of the European Commission will surely fulfil not only the “electoral and decreeing” function, but will also bring some concrete financial support – there are rumors of a 1.8-billion-euro aid package. Clearly, most of the guests visit our republic not because of deep affection and sympathy. I assume there is a specific trip schedule for all European capitals. In fact, 90% of such visits are of little benefit. Therefore, if one of the Baltic leaders refuses to fly to Chisinau next time, we will clearly lose nothing. Nevertheless, the pro-government experts and disinformation fighters who serve the current political regime are trying to actively intimidate residents, claiming that Maia Sandu’s defeat will relegate the country into an outsider. In fact, if the incumbent president loses, foreign development partners will somewhat change their perception of Moldova. But this will certainly not lead to a disaster, and diplomatic contacts won’t be frozen. Sandu is undoubtedly considered a symbol of the current Moldovan authorities, but formally, based on the legislation, she has practically no influence on the external course. The functionality of the presidency by and large does not go beyond ceremonial and protocol moments. Therefore, Maia Sandu, vested with the status of the main holder of Moldova’s all international assets, is nothing more than a nothing-burger. If we consider the fate of the country’s foreign policy vector from the point of view of the election campaign, all candidates for the presidency can be conditionally divided into two camps. The first are dedicated pro-Western/pro-European politicians who, even if they have no love for the PAS, fully support the path to Europe. Once in power, they will continue this path, gradually dragging Moldova into the geopolitical Western bloc, facilitating its integration into its structures and Euro-Atlantic institutions. Obviously, in this case, the West will be completely devoted to Chisinau, promoting in every possible way the final break with the post-Soviet space and the greater East, in particular, with China. The second group of candidates adheres to multi-vector principles, believing that Moldova should build mutually beneficial equidistant relations with all global players, cooperating with both the West and the East. Such a balanced foreign policy implies neutrality and non-interference, as well as pragmatic decision-making on key issues on the global agenda. This year’s polls show the majority of residents are in favor of just a balanced approach. But when has the desire of the majority in our state mattered for the ruling groups? They have always acted at their discretion and understanding, and, to put it bluntly, based on their own “vested” interests. In fact, a vivid confirmation of this disregard for public and political sentiment can be traced in the words of the representatives of the ruling party, who make no secret of the fact that they will continue to pursue their line even if the referendum on European integration fails. There is no doubt about it, because PAS will hold all the power for nearly a year. So, neither Sandu’s defeat nor victory will change absolutely nothing in Moldova’s foreign policy strategy. It will be implemented under any president until the parliamentary elections and appointment of a new government. Besides, if the referendum is successful so far, the majority faction will try to amend the Constitution as quickly as possible on the inevitability of integration into the European Union. After that, all state institutions, regardless of personalities and post-electoral picture, will be obliged to follow the set trajectory. No doubt, even if the situation in Moldova follows the “Georgian scenario” (i.e. Moldovan foreign policy becomes more cautious and balanced) at the end of the election cycle, the West is unlikely to accept it and give up its position. Too many resources have been invested by the U.S. and the EU to drag this post-Soviet region in the domain of their exclusive influence and thus inflict a geostrategic defeat on Moscow. Therefore, perhaps, the frequency of contacts and international visits to Chisinau will decrease, additional requirements and conditions will appear, but neither Washington nor Brussels will definitely break relations and remove Moldova from their priorities. A complete foreign policy turnaround of Moldova is also highly unlikely. Politicians agitating for joining the EAEU, SCO, BRICS, etc. and reducing relations with the West are, frankly speaking, lying. Experience shows that Moldova feels relatively stable in conditions of openness to various geopolitical centers and trade and economic blocs. It is cooperation, not trading ourselves as a springboard for striking one of the major international players, that is the key to success. Of course, this view is largely idealistic, and can hardly be implemented in full in the current international circumstances. Nevertheless, it is necessary to strive for a cooperative model of diplomacy, going beyond the geopolitical struggle. But, unfortunately, the current leadership views the country not as a subject of international politics, but as an object and a geopolitical “garland of victory”, with obvious unfavorable consequences. This is also the reason why the West will not loosen its grip and give up the idea of a gradual takeover of Moldova if Maia Sandu loses. In such a scenario, the next parliamentary elections in the summer of 2025 will be held under stiffer conditions so as to ensure a landslide victory of the pro-Western forces.