Ways to Address Moldova’s Security Issue

Sergiu CEBAN

The security issue has been in limbo almost throughout the entire period of Moldova’s modern history. Some experts say, this problem holds our country back from moving forward

The lengthy electoral cycle has brought to light a lot of underlying problems of Moldova and, at the same time, a wide variety of recipes for their solution voiced by the presidential candidates. Some of the proposals sound too flashy to attract people who are used to voting with their hearts and not with common sense and personal interests. The problems are indeed plentiful, many of them have a long history and a whole trail of failed attempts to address them by different generations of Moldovan politicians. As a result, we have never returned to the Soviet-time production indicators, exhausted our labor resources, and we are slowly rolling into a demographic abyss. The results of the recent census will offer us a clearer picture. But even a cursory glance at the overall situation reveals a deplorable state of the country. There are dozens of reasons why we have reached this critical point. Each of them has its own degree of negative impact. However, Moldova’s fate in the next few decades depends on the willingness and ability to solve some of them. And in this respect, the issue of security is one of the most important, which has remained suspended almost throughout the entire period of Moldova’s modern history. According to some experts, this problem keeps Moldova from moving forward, hindering reform aspirations, discouraging major investors to contribute to our country and other negative trends. All this together has led to a prolonged political and socio-economic depression and degradation of the state system, which is on the edge of the abyss. It is highly likely that the very model chosen and implemented by our elites for several decades, which has already outlived itself, is to blame. To be more precise about the security perimeter in which we are located, several post-Soviet subregions were formed with the collapse of the once unified security circuit of the USSR. Conventionally, they can be divided into the Baltic States, Transcaucasia, Central Asia and, actually, the Eastern European region, which includes Moldova together with Ukraine and Belarus. Given that these countries are at the junction with the North Atlantic Alliance, the highest tension between Russia and the West emerged right here. It was practically doomed to manifest itself in a corresponding security crisis of the three states. Even before the tectonic processes and full-scale hostilities in Ukraine began, it had become clear that the security of the Eastern European post-Soviet subregion had been heavily dependent on unregulated relations between major geopolitical players. For this and other reasons, the first steps towards independence of our country were overshadowed by the tragic events of the armed conflict in the left bank of the Dniester, which was eventually frozen for decades to come. With this situation in mind, our authorities tried to build a foreign policy track more or less equidistant from both the collective West and the Russian Federation until mid-2022 (until the EU candidate country status was obtained). This allowed them to combine membership in the collective institutions of the United States and Europe, as well as in post-Soviet organizations formed from among the former Soviet republics. This, in turn, opened up certain opportunities to benefit from this dual position, which, however, had its own set of limitations due to, so to say, “geopolitical ambivalence”. The unwillingness of key actors to define and build a new pan-European security architecture has naturally resulted in the current events in Ukraine and an even more serious security crisis on the continent. This has to some extent prompted our state to reflect on its relations with the major powers capable of influencing regional processes. As a result, the decision was taken to cancel the whole package of historical issues with a single move towards the European Union, starting an active search for an alliance with Western partners to counterbalance the Kremlin. Recently, premier Dorin Recean, speaking from the rostrum of the UN General Assembly, stated out loud that Moldova, as it turns out, is no longer in a “grey zone” and is not a “profitable enterprise” for money laundering by dishonest oligarchs and foreign forces that have plundered the state and the people. The politician also reiterated that Chisinau is committed to a just and peaceful settlement of the Transnistrian conflict, pointing out the need to withdraw the illegally deployed Russian troops. On the one hand, it is quite possible that we do not know some facts, and our Western allies have already promised Moldova security guarantees along with protection from possible aggression and other threats. However, it still seems to be a figure of speech and an attempt by Recean to get ahead of events, demonstrating that Moldova is already part of the Euro-Atlantic space, with all the ensuing consequences. The objective picture is that since the early 1990s, Moscow has become the entity that ensures, if not security, then, conditionally speaking, the status quo within Moldova’s internationally recognized borders. Such a military-political alliance with the Kremlin, albeit imposed after the 1992 war, was a forced choice of the Moldovan political elites. Therefore, during all this period, the presence of Russian troops has cemented this state of affairs, which the West had to consider as well. Meanwhile, as Ukraine’s case shows, a strong desire to distance oneself and break with Moscow is unfortunately not enough. A counter-movement is also necessary, including a set of concrete proposals. So far, we only see that both Kyiv and Chisinau are provided with the opportunity to find economic shelter under the umbrella of a large union of European states. Meanwhile, no one in the West has offered us a specific way of resolving the fundamental issue of security. And without overcoming this major obstacle, Moldova is unlikely to be able to implement any new project of state development. The national security in the modern world is a sum of components that form a single security mechanism. It includes institutional functionality, fair justice and judicial system, economic and energy security, investment protection, social guarantees, etc. And only last comes the hard military aspect of security. Our politicians are in no hurry to share how exactly they intend to address this task. Either it is a very secret plan, or, as the practice of the PAS actions of recent years shows, they leave it to a chance. Apparently, the ruling regime proceeds from the classic Bonaparte principle - the main thing is to get involved in the battle, and see what happens. And when there is no clear plan of action, it looks more like an experiment, which if conducted by an unskilled laboratory employee threatens to turn into a disaster both for him and for the test subject. In the remaining week or so before the presidential election, the candidates will be travelling around the country to engage in active communication with citizens. So, each reader will have an opportunity to address Maia Sandu as the main favorite of this electoral race with a quite simple and reasonable question – how she sees the solution of the core security problem of Moldova.