Is “Orange Revolution” Possible in Case of Sandu’s Defeat?

Sergiu CEBAN

The high stakes and uncompromising stand of all participants in the elections suggest that the post-vote situation will definitely be a roll of the dice

Just one week after the vote counting and the registration of the protocols of the territorial election commissions, Moldova will face a new political reality, regardless of what the outcome of the first round of the presidential elections and the referendum will be. While there are several days left before the opening of the stations, it’s time to assess the situation, and at the same time make some predictions about the possible trajectory of post-electoral events. The number of opinion polls conducted at the final phase is off the scale, but no one is in a hurry to share objective figures. If we average, then Maia Sandu has about 30-35%. Alexandr Stoianoglo is second, as before, with a 15-20% interval. The leader of Our Party, Renato Usatii, follows him with an indicator of 10-15%. At the same time, the number of undecided or undisclosed voters is quite high – almost a third of the respondents. In addition, none of the polls takes into account the diaspora and residents of the Transnistrian region, which, depending on the turnout, can give about 5-10%. Other candidates have failed to achieve a passing score, or their rating does not exceed the sociological margin of error. Nevertheless, almost all of them will accumulate votes of a more left-wing protest profile. That is, any candidate who gets into the second round with Maia Sandu has a significant base to increase their chances of winning, while the current president can only rely on undecided/disappointed citizens. Moreover, they are to be mobilized before the second round by the threat of disruption of Moldova’s pro-European path. The state-run experts and different talking heads, in the best traditions of propaganda of the mid-last century, instill in the loyal PAS and Sandu voter overconfidence that their candidate will “beyond all doubt” win the elections in the first round. Convinced followers of the president, of course, can blindly believe in anything, but it is impossible to ignore sociology and relevant indicators – unless there are plans for mass manipulation of election results. We will not discuss who from the second-tier contenders is more likely to get to the second round – Alexandr Stoianoglo or Renato Usatii. May the best win, as they say. But I must admit that less than a week before the start of voting, most analysts had a strong impression that absolutely any counter-candidate could defeat the current head of state. The president’s office acknowledges this reality, and as the elections approach, the rising tension and anxiety within Maia Sandu’s campaign headquarters become increasingly evident. A self-assured politician with a feeling of dominance tends to demonstrate a completely different behavior. Yet, we witness targeted actions against rivals, including the banning of campaign materials, restrictions on media access, and the exposure of opposition network structures. The chaotic nature of actions and attempts to undermine opponents, despite their weak prospects, suggest that the team of political advisors of the incumbent president has failed to find a strategy to boost her approval rating. Apparently, it is now at the critical level of a confident victory in the first round, but without a chance in the second. In addition, over the past few weeks, we have watched a gradual promotion of the topic of candidates’ ties with the Kremlin and an active stream of investigative journalism. On the one hand, all these actions seem to be aimed at swaying the still high percentage of undecided voters. However, the main motive is to create the CEC’s argumentation base, which is highly likely to remove one of the candidates by the end of the week. The stakes are so high that this electoral stage will unlikely to be calm, especially if events don’t unfold according to the plan of the current authorities and the West. Although, as has been repeatedly said, the presidential election will not affect the internal political situation in any way, still a lot is at stake, both geopolitically and regionally. Therefore, both Moscow and the Western capitals will make every possible effort, use the whole array of tools and methods to achieve the desired outcome. The fierce competitive battle and the uncompromising attitude with which all involved parties act suggests that the situation will be anything but predictable. There are several potential scenarios after the first and second rounds of voting.

1. The failure of the referendum or its validation on the basis of extremely low turnout may become a decisive factor that will deprive Maia Sandu of the main electoral support and reduce her chances of winning the second round to almost a minimum. At the same time, when all alternative forces “smell blood”, they will eagerly take advantage of the dire situation after the first round in order to deal a decisive blow to the regime.

In this case, it cannot be ruled out that the PAS, backed by the Western allies, will resort to extreme measures to invalidate the results of the presidential elections, and will later conduct them together with the parliamentary ones. A tight hold on power is unlikely to add electoral points to the party in power, but will extend its monopoly rule for at least 10 months. This will give time to mop up Moldova’s political space even more and do everything to ensure the victory of Sandu and the ideologically “right” parties. Everything will depend on the opposition’s determination to resist the regime, otherwise, in a year, only pro-European and pro-Western candidates will be on the ballot for voters.

1. Maia Sandu’s relatively positive result, coupled with the referendum following the results of the first round, but the defeat in the second. In this case, in order to keep Sandu in office, the ruling regime can bring people out onto the streets and put into action the plan of the “color revolution”, which has been implemented more than once in almost all post-Soviet states.

Recall that last year, people from the entourage of the current president openly threatened mass actions of disobedience in the event of her dismissal. This suggests that the Moldovan version of the “orange revolution” has been planned for a long time, as well as conditions in which the square will decide who should become the head of Moldova. There is also an opinion that in case of Maia Sandu’s victory, any radical forms of reaction to this are very unlikely, since all political forces will focus on the parliamentary elections. There are different ways to assess the opposition’s protest potential and the degree of its willingness to accept Sandu’s second mandate. However, it still cannot be ruled out that the clearly rigged re-election of the current president may still trigger people dissatisfied with the current government to take to the streets to express their disagreement. In addition to the range of post-election scenarios, we should also be concerned, of course, that strong geopolitical and electoral internal tension may eventually lead to serious, if not catastrophic consequences across the country. The rigid split of the state and society into two camps usually ended bad, and there are great doubts that our elites realize this.